China is a nation of massive proportions, home to nearly a fifth of the planet’s population, and spanning 3.7 million sq. miles, making it one of the largest countries in the world. With 56 ethnicities inhabiting 33 regions, China represents a vast diversity of geographies, cultures, economies, and even political systems.

Delegates attend the closing session of the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, November 14, 2012. Credit:REUTERS/Jason Lee

Governing 1.3 billion people is no small task, and in China, the Communist Party is in charge.

While government and military institutions form the backbone of the state apparatus, the Party controls it, as well as courts, military, resources and major industries through a parallel organization of Party committees, whose leaders wield the greatest power.

According to the constitution, the State Council is the country’s cabinet and the highest executive organ of state power.¹ But while the State Council implements many of the functions of government – crafting and implementing policies and regulations – its work is determined by the Party.

The country’s highest power is actually the Politburo Standing Committee, made up of seven Party leaders who also lead the nation’s top military and government bodies, their Party roles superseding their state roles. Little is known about the group’s inner workings.

It is in this context – behind-the-scenes Party control coupled with the varied needs of diverse, far-flung provinces – that governance in China takes place.

While previous leaders have focused on dismantling the worst excesses of central planning, the next generation must grapple with increasingly complex challenges – managing the difficult transition from a middle-income to high-income country, driving the exploration of space, building a global military presence while countering expansionist fears among its neighbors. Moreover, leaders face increasing pressures from within – from a yawning wealth gap to high-profile corruption scandals, to an aging society and calls for political reform.

Women wear traditional Uighur clothes wait for the start of the Olympic torch relay in Kashgar, Xinjiang province June 18, 2008. Credit:REUTERS/Reinhard Krause

Managing 1.3 billion people

There are 33 regions in China, each with populations rivaling European countries and a diversity of political agendas, ethnicities and economic arrangements.

Directly under the central government there are 22 provinces, as well as four municipalities (the large cities of Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Chongqing), five autonomous regions (Xinjiang, Tibet, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia and Guangxi) and two Special Administrative Regions (Hong Kong and Macau). China also claims Taiwan as a province, though the island functions as a de facto independent state with its own government.²

The autonomous regions are made up of ethnic minorities, where according to the Constitution, the state’s regional head, the chairperson, is a “citizen of the nationality, or of one of the nationalities, exercising regional autonomy in the area concerned.”³ However, the Party secretaries of all five autonomous regions – who exercise the most control over the area – are all Han, the major ethnic group in China.^{4, 5} Under the “one country, two systems” policy, Hong Kong and Macau maintain their own economic and political systems as “special administrative regions,” enjoying greater autonomy than other parts of China.⁶

These regions are further divided into cities, counties and townships.

A villager votes during an election in Wukan, in China’s southern Guangdong province, March 3, 2012. Credit:REUTERS/Bobby Yip

The central government and the provinces

China’s 31 provincial-level Mainland regions have long been laboratories of governance, with local Party secretaries enjoying a significant degree of autonomy and power, cultivating their own public personas and promoting their own varying political agendas.

As China’s economy began to open up in the 1980s, the government designated special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong and Fujian with tax incentives, certain exemptions from import duty and other benefits. They proved to be the first of many. By the end of the decade, China added Hainan as its first provincial SEZ and further opened up 14 coastal cities, putting them in prime position to receive foreign direct investment.⁷

The result today is a vast difference in wealth between the coastal regions such as Shanghai and Tianjin and those inland like Guizhou and Gansu.

In addition to economic development, these coastal provinces have also seen more experimentation in social policy.^{8, 9}

When arrests and intimidation failed to stop protests in a rebellious fishing community in southern China’s Guangdong province in late 2011, then-provincial Party secretary Wang Yang (汪洋) threw out the playbook that senior Communist officials routinely follow in dealing with grass roots protests.

Instead of unleashing a violent crackdown on the village of Wukan, in late-December Wang sent one of his senior aides to mediate a dispute over land seizures that had captured global attention. The aide, Zhu Mingguo (朱明国), helped broker a peaceful end to the three-month standoff between local authorities and villagers incensed at the death of a protest leader in custody.

Wang, a Politburo member who angled unsuccessfully for a seat on its standing committee, is an example of the wide berth of autonomy given to provincial-level Party secretaries – particularly those leading economic powerhouse regions such as Shanghai and Guangdong.

As of March 2013, six provincial-level Party chiefs also serve as members of the Politburo – those of the high-growth and politically important regions of Beijing, Guangdong, Tianjin, Chongqing, Xinjiang and Shanghai.

Only six out of 25 members have not served as Party chief of a province or municipality at some point in their career. Additionally, serving as a provincial-level Party chief has practically become a prerequisite for entrance into the Politburo Standing Committee – all but one of the current members have served in this role during their careers.

These leaders serve dual functions – they govern their regions with unmatched authority, but also serve as proxies for the central leadership.

Under China’s authoritarian system, leaders are not elected by citizens, freeing them from the sort of electoral pressure common in democratic political systems.

This leaves Party chiefs with “considerable latitude to define what provincial interests are according to their own preferences and calculations,” according to Hong Kong Polytechnic University scholar Lam Tao-chiu.¹⁰

The central authorities have a number of key checks to the autonomy of regional leaders, however. The Party’s Organization Department, not the local government, is responsible for appointing Party chiefs across the country, usually relocating them every three to seven years so they do not establish regional power bases.¹¹ Central Party authorities can also investigate corruption in the provinces, giving them another means of local influence.¹²

China scholar Zheng Yongnian describes China’s existing political system as “de facto federalism,” writing that the provinces have become so decentralized that it is “increasingly becoming difficult, if not impossible, for the central government to unilaterally impose its will on the provinces.”¹³

Regions have their own revenue streams and local government spending now makes up the bulk of the country’s public expenditure.¹⁴ In 2011, local government spending accounted for 84.8 percent of the total government expenditure.^{15, 16}

Despite efforts by the central government to exert political control over regions, rich provinces have the means to act more independently and resist central policy initiatives. On the other hand, regions with less economic power are too weak – economically and politically – to implement directives from Beijing, or initiate meaningful reform.¹⁷

Technically, all local governments are under the State Council, which sets policies, laws and tasks for the regions and which has the power to send auditors to check their accounts books.^{18, 19}

The central government dictates policy on issues such as the economy, international diplomacy, national defense and population planning, while the regions take care of local infrastructure and local public security on their own.²⁰ Other policies may be set by Beijing but are implemented locally.²¹ As special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau are granted more autonomy, and each has its own unique government structure and legal system.

Paramilitary guards stand outside the Xinhua Gate of the Zhongnanhai leadership compound, the residence of Chinese President Hu Jintao, located in the centre of Beijing June 18, 2012.Credit:REUTERS/David Gray

Party and state

According to Richard McGregor’s “The Party”, around 50 top state companies are installed with “red machines”, a unique phone network offering secure direct lines to the desks of ministers, vice-ministers and heads of SOEs that he calls “a powerful symbol of the party system’s unparalleled reach, strict hierarchies, meticulous organization and obsessive secrecy”.²²

Only top officials, state enterprise chairpersons, chief editors of Party newspapers and leaders of Party-controlled bodies have them, making the phones an exclusive network for the most elite leaders in China.²³

One vice-minister told McGregor that more than half of the calls he received were from officials seeking favors, often jobs for family, friends and connections.²⁴

Both the Party’s Central Committee and State Council are headquartered within the high walled, closely guarded, Zhongnanhai compound in the center of Beijing. Surrounding two lakes, it has been dubbed a modern day Forbidden City, China’s Kremlin, or the capital within the capital where the country’s leaders such as Mao Zedong (毛泽东) and Jiang Zemin (江泽民) have worked and lived.^{25, 26, 27, 28}

The architecture of the Chinese government is designed to keep the Party omnipresent across every powerful organization in the country from the courts to the media and universities. An attempt by reformist former Party chief Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) to separate Party and state in the 1980s was never implemented after the 1989 government crackdown against pro-democracy protestors in Beijing, when senior leaders ousted Zhao from power.²⁹

Major policy decisions are dictated by the Party and then implemented by the state or rubber stamped into law. The premier, who heads the State Council, also serves on the Politburo Standing Committee, as does the head of the legislature, the National People’s Congress. Almost all senior officials are Party members, meaning that the Party can punish them outside the courts through their own Discipline Inspection Commission.³⁰

The Party maintains a presence in state-owned enterprises, government offices and military units through Party committees and leading Party members’ groups, giving it consistent voice through every major channel of power in the country.³¹

Although there is some division of labor – the Party takes the lead on policy, personnel and “matters of political principle” while the state handles the economy and social issues – the differentiation “enhances rather than undermines the party’s dictatorship,” according to Xiaowei Zang, author of “Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China”.³²

According to Ming Xia, a professor from The College of Staten Island’s Modern Chinese Studies Group, Jiang Zemin, who became Party general secretary after the Tiananmen crackdown, set the overall guidelines for China’s governance after Zhao’s failed attempt to separate Party and state.

“The Party stands aloof, assumes overall responsibility and coordinates all sides of the government, congress, political consultative conference, and the masses organizations,” Xia wrote in the New York Times. “If the latter are the bones and fleshes of Chinese body politics, the Party is undoubtedly its brain, its nerve center and its sinews.”³³

The National People’s Congress is supposed to preside over all administrative, judicial and procuratorial organs, as well as elect the president, chairman of the Central Military Commission and other top positions.³⁴ But in reality, the Party drafts most legislation and passes it to the NPC for approval.³⁵

About 70 percent of National People’s Congress delegates are Party members so “their loyalty is to the Party first, the NPC second,” according to a report by the BBC.³⁶ According to a U.S. Congressional research report, the Party makes lists of nominees for deputies to the NPC “based in part on potential nominees’ perceived loyalty to the party” except at the most local level, namely the people’s congresses of townships and villages.³⁷

According to a 2009 paper from the National University of Singapore’s East Asian Institute, 95 percent of leading civil servants at county level and above are Party members, and almost all top leaders in agencies and ministries are Party cadres.³⁸

Meanwhile, the Party operates a United Front Work Department to manage relations with officially sanctioned groups, including religious organizations and the so-called eight democratic parties. The parties, however, have comparatively small membership and are not allowed to challenge the Communist Party’s leadership, with their heads instead accepting vice-chairman positions in the National People’s Congress.

Wan Gang (万钢), chairman of China’s Zhigong Party, became the first non-Communist Party minister since 1972 when he was appointed Minister of Science and Technology in 2007.³⁹ He has a doctorate in mechanical engineering from Clausthal University of Technology in Germany and once worked at the German automaker Audi AG Corporation.

While the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference also exists for prominent outside groups to provide recommendations to the Party and the government, none of the suggestions are binding.⁴⁰

The courts are officially subordinate to the legislature. At every level, government officials appoint judges while setting their budgets and salaries, making judges protective of the government, according to the Council on Foreign Relations, a U.S.-based policy think tank.⁴¹

The head of the Party’s Central Politics and Law Committee – not the chief justice – is actually the most powerful legal figure in China, overseeing the entire judicial branch, as well as the police and legislature.⁴² Meanwhile, the Party maintains its own disciplinary system, which it uses to investigate cases, arrest and detain people without going through the legal system.

State-owned enterprises are key contributors to China’s economy, and industries that the government believes are important to their economic and national security remain entirely or mostly under its control.⁴³ By dominating key sectors such as oil, gas and telecoms, the government, and by extension, the Party, directly controls the flow of the nation’s wealth.⁴⁴

Similarly, the People’s Liberation Army belongs to the Party, not the state.⁴⁵ It remains subordinate to the Central Military Commission, which is headed by the Party general secretary (there are technically two CMCs – one that is under the state and another under the Party. However, they function as one organization and have the same members).

The Ministry of National Defense under the State Council does not play an active role in the PLA, instead mostly carrying out foreign military exchanges, according to China expert David Shambaugh.⁴⁶

A villager looks at a picture of China’s President Xi Jinping, which hangs next to a banner in protest against a land acquisition project by the local government, in Sanhe village of Jinning county, Yunnan province April 16, 2013. Credit:REUTERS/Wong Campion

Key governance issues

The new leaders face a host of domestic challenges that now threaten the achievements made since the late 1970’s, a period in which annual economic growth has averaged around 10 percent.⁴⁷

As China’s economy continues to grow, debate has grown over issues including income disparity, corruption, and the lack of reform, which the outgoing premier Wen Jiabao (温家宝) reiterated at a press conference after the closing meeting of the March 2012 National People’s Congress, the last before the leadership handover.⁴⁸

The rich are getting richer as the breakneck economic growth of the last few decades has been funneled primarily to the government and business elite, according to Evan Feigenbaum, a senior associate at Carnegie’s Asia Program.⁴⁹

In 2007, the 10 percent of people with the highest income earned 23 times more than the 10 percent who earned the least, compared to a ratio of 7.3 back in 1988.⁵⁰

These vested interests are blocking further reform, which might curtail their ability to take advantage of their positions, according to Sun Liping, a sociologist who was academic advisor to Party general secretary Xi Jinping (习近平), during his doctoral studies at Tsinghua University.⁵¹

The problem is exacerbated by the lack of a competitive political process and free press, according to Minxin Pei, professor of government at Claremont McKenna College, who estimated in a 2007 paper that about 10 percent of government spending, contracts and transactions are used as kickbacks, bribes or is simply stolen.⁵²

Meanwhile, China’s elderly population – already 13 percent of the population in 2010 – continues to grow, fuelled by the continuation of the one-child policy.⁵³ How to provide social security as the elderly population peaks to an estimated 437 million by 2051 is a pressing question.⁵⁴ By that time China’s workforce will have dropped from 72 percent to 61 percent of the population, perhaps signaling the end of China as a mass-manufacturing hub, according to the Economist.⁵⁵

And for all the economic strides made by China, many of its minorities remain dissatisfied. Beside the ethnic Han majority, there are 55 other nationalities numbering approximately 106 million living in China, and a series of recent incidents of unrest and riots, particularly in Xinjiang and Tibet, have led to tight control of these regions.^{56, 57} By the beginning of 2013, more than 90 Tibetan monks, nuns and lay people had set themselves on fire to protest China’s rule in Tibet.^{58, 59, 60}

China’s constitution promises freedom of religion, but many religious groups still claim persecution and repression.^{61, 62}

Since 2011, China’s domestic security spending has exceeded its defense spending.⁶³ In 2012, China’s “public safety” spending, including police, militia and other domestic security arms, reached 701.8 billion yuan ($111.4 billion), higher than the government’s reported 670.3 billion yuan ($106.4 billion) in defense spending.⁶⁴

In a report jointly compiled with a top-level Chinese advisory council with the backing of then premier-in-waiting, Li Keqiang (李克强), the World Bank in March warned that China’s investment and export-led growth model had become unsustainable.⁶⁵

Failure to bring about sweeping political and economic change would expose China to the risk of economic stagnation or crisis, it said.

The report called for new policies to boost the private sector, allow individuals greater freedom of movement, protect farmers’ land rights, stimulate innovation and creativity, enhance social equality, arrest grave environmental degradation, bolster a potentially unstable financial system and accelerate integration with the global economy.

Calls for change have found an audience among officials who worry the Communist Party has been treading water while risks mount that could threaten economic growth and, ultimately, Party rule.

“The problems that didn’t demand a solution before are becoming urgent,” said retired central government official Zhang Musheng in an interview with Reuters.

References

1. ¹ “The State Council,” GOV.cn, August 5, 2005.
2. ² “为什么说’台湾是中国不可分割的一部分’?,” Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC, January 1, 2003.
3. ³ “China’s Political System,” China.org.cn, accessed July 5, 2012.
4. ⁴ “张毅,” The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China, last modified July 26, 2010, accessed July 6, 2012.
5. ⁵ Cheng Li, “Ethnic Minority Elites in China’s party-state leadership: an empirical assessment,” China Leadership Monitor 25 (2008):2.
6. ⁶ “Introducing Hong Kong,” Hong Kong Economic and Trade Office, London, accessed July 5, 2012.
7. ⁷ Qinghua Zhang and Heng-fu Zou, “Regional Inequality in Contemporary China,” Annals of Economics and Finance 13 (2012):124.
8. ⁸ Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 5.
9. ⁹ Qinghua Zhang and Heng-fu Zou, “Regional Inequality in Contemporary China,” Annals of Economics and Finance 13 (2012):124.
10. ¹⁰ Lam Tao-chiu, “Central-provincial relations amid greater centralization in China,” China Information 24 (2010):342.
11. ¹¹ Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 5.
12. ¹² Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 5.
13. ¹³ Zheng Yongnian, “Power to dominate, not to change: How China’s central-local relations constrain its reform,” EAI Working Paper 153 (2009):1.
14. ¹⁴ Tony Saich, “Governance and Politics of China,” 3rd ed. (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 200 in Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012.
15. ¹⁵ “中央财政近年来切实增强基层政府财政保障能力 成效明显,” The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China website, March 8, 2012.
16. ¹⁶ “2011年全国财政收入103740亿 财政支出108930亿,” China Economic Net, January 20, 2012.
17. ¹⁷ Zheng Yongnian, “Power to dominate, not to change: How China’s central-local relations constrain its reform,” EAI Working Paper 153 (2009):2.
18. ¹⁸ “Country paper: China,” United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, accessed 6 July 2012.
19. ¹⁹ Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 5.
20. ²⁰ Zheng Yongnian, “Power to dominate, not to change: How China’s central-local relations constrain its reform,” EAI Working Paper 153 (2009):2.
21. ²¹ Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 5.
22. ²² Richard McGregor, The Party (London: Penguin, 2011), 8.
23. ²³ Richard McGregor, The Party (London: Penguin, 2011), 9.
24. ²⁴ Richard McGregor, The Party (London: Penguin, 2011), 10.
25. ²⁵ Nicholas Kristof, “Beijing Journal; Whatever the High Walls Hide, It Isn’t Opulence,” The New York Times, January 25, 1991.
26. ²⁶ Geremi Barme, “Walled Heart of China’s Kremlin,” Time, September 27, 1999.
27. ²⁷ David Pan, “Beijing’s real ‘Forbidden City,’” Asia Times Online, June 24, 2006.
28. ²⁸ David Pan, “Beijing’s real ‘Forbidden City,’” Asia Times Online, June 24, 2006.
29. ²⁹ Matthew Forney and Susan Jakes, “The Prisoner of Conscience: Zhao Ziyang, 1919-2005,” Time, January 16, 2005.
30. ³⁰ John Dotson, “The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report (2012), U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 23, 2012.
31. ³¹ John Dotson, “The Chinese Communist Party and Its Emerging Next-Generation Leaders,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report (2012), U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, March 23, 2012.
32. ³² Xiaowei Zang, Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), 34.
33. ³³ Ming Xia, “The Communist Party of China and the ‘Party-State’,” The New York Times, accessed July 6, 2012.
34. ³⁴ “The Constitution of The People’s Republic of China,” GOV.cn, accessed July 6, 2012.
35. ³⁵ “Inside China’s ruling party: National People’s Congress,” BBC News, accessed July 6, 2012.
36. ³⁶ “Inside China’s ruling party: National People’s Congress,” BBC News, accessed July 6, 2012.
37. ³⁷ Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 25.
38. ³⁸ Kjeld Erik Brødsgaard and Chen Gang, “China’s civil service reform: an update,” EAI Background Brief 493 (2009):5.
39. ³⁹ “Observation: Non-communist personages as ministers,” People’s Daily Online, July 10, 2007.
40. ⁴⁰ Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, “Understanding China’s Political System,” Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 25.
41. ⁴¹ Jayshree Bajoria, “Access to Justice in China,” Council on Foreign Relations, April 16, 2008.
42. ⁴² Richard McGregor, The Party (London: Penguin, 2011), 24-25.
43. ⁴³ Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, “An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 26, 2011.
44. ⁴⁴ Willy Lam, “China’s state giants too big to play with,” Asia Times Online, January 22, 2011.
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48. ⁴⁸ “Wen says China needs political reform, warns of another Cultural Revolution if without,” XINHUANET, March 14, 2012.
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In China, all roads lead to the Communist Party. China remains a single-party state and the Party is omnipresent – membership is crucial to careers in both the public and private sectors, leading many people to join for practical reasons.

Middle school students hold cardboards featuring the emblems of the Communist Party of China as they pose for photographs during an event to celebrate the party’s 91st anniversary, in Suining, Sichuan province June 30, 2012. Credit: REUTERS/China Daily

The Communist Party of China is the world’s largest political party, with more than 80 million members – approximately six percent of China’s population and roughly the entire population of Germany.^{1, 2}

The nation’s most powerful leadership position is the Party general secretary – not the president or prime minister – and according to the country’s Constitution, the Party’s leadership “will exist and develop for a long time to come.”^{3, 4}

The Party is front and centre in all areas of life, controlling the military, state, judiciary, key resources and major industries. Becoming a Party member means being part of an elite group that confers many benefits. However, the Party also enforces its own code of conduct, discipline and loyalty, wielding power through its Discipline Inspection Commission, which administers extrajudicial punishment to Party members with little public transparency.

Today’s Party

Despite predictions that China’s prosperous entry into the world economy would herald the end of communist rule, the Party is alive and well. But years of catastrophes and ideological shifts have made it far different from the party that was founded by a revolutionary band in 1921.⁵

The Party began as a small, leftist group of revolutionaries who sought to build a “classless society”.⁶ They defeated the ruling Nationalists, or Kuomintang, after a protracted civil war and in 1949 founded the People’s Republic of China. With Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology and Chairman Mao Zedong (毛泽东) at the helm, the Party instigated a number of radical campaigns. The Anti Rightist Movement of 1957 led to the persecution of thinkers and reformers. The Great Leap Forward (1958-1960) accelerated collectivism and set off years of chaos and mass famine, resulting in the deaths of tens of millions.⁷ The decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) saw a breakdown of society, with the closing of schools and institutions, which led to yet more leftism and persecution of intellectuals.

When Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) became paramount leader in late 1978, the Party’s priorities shifted to modernization and the opening up of the Chinese economy.^{8, 9} The Cultural Revolution was denounced and the Party line was retooled towards a more pragmatic “socialism with Chinese characteristics.”

Top leaders were poised to begin implementing political reforms, such as the separation of the Party and state and liberalization of the media, until the violent suppression of pro-democracy activists in Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989 brought those discussions to a crashing halt.^{10, 11}

By the time Jiang Zemin (江泽民) allowed private entrepreneurs into the Party in 2001, the same year China joined the World Trade Organization, the country was far from the Marxist ideal its forefathers envisioned.

Chinese wave the Party flags at the new airport construction site in
the southern city of Guangzhou to celebrate President Jiang Zemin’s
“three represents” political theory during an art performance, November
28, 2002. Credit: REUTERS/China Photo

“When the world looks back to the moment when the Chinese Communist Party finally embraced capitalism, this may be it,” the Far Eastern Economic Review declared after Jiang’s ‘Three Represents’ theory was officially announced at the Party’s 80th anniversary in 2001.¹² The theory legitimized the Party’s expansion to include people from the country’s nascent private sector, opening the way for further privatization.

Today, China’s economy is capitalist in many respects, including the legal protection of private property rights, which was passed in 2007.¹³ However, major economic sectors, including energy and telecommunications, are monopolized by state-owned enterprises, led by government (and thus Party) appointees.¹⁴ The Chinese economic model helped the country weather 2008’s global financial crisis, but many questions have been raised over how to reform the economy further as growth cools in the coming years.^{15, 16}

Toeing the line

Despite being constantly in flux, ideology still matters in China as a key way to legitimize the one-party state.^{17, 18}

The Party requires millions of cadres nationwide to participate in “study campaigns,” where they study ideological Party theories propagated by leaders, such as former president Hu Jintao’s “scientific development” concept. Cadres study speeches and books and report their thoughts on what they’ve learned.¹⁹

The Party runs a network of thousands of Party schools across the country responsible for training officials, and attendance is a requisite stepping-stone for those climbing the Party hierarchy.^{20, 21}

The most prestigious of these institutions is the Central Party School, which is located in northwestern Beijing, near the Summer Palace. Officials selected by the Central Organization Department and its regional branches are summoned there and are inspected for their future potential. Studying there is a sign of excellence and a way to move on to the Party’s fast track.²²

There’s an old joke that circulates within the Party’s highly secured hallways: Where do you find the most careful driver in China? The Central Party School, because you never know who you might run into (or over) – anyone could be the future general secretary of the CPC.²³

Such is the caliber of the roughly 2,000 cadres – including senior officials and managers of state-owned enterprises – who pass through its doors each year.^{24, 25, 26} They learn Party thought from Marx to Mao, Deng and Jiang, and social sciences such as economics, law and military affairs.^{27, 28}

The school – which is also a think tank for the Party – serves as a forum for discussing new policies that allow the Party to convey its views to the Party’s rising stars on hot-button issues such as political reform, the role of NGOs and religious tolerance.

“The goal is to suck up an idea, defang it, and legitimize it for Chinese circumstances in a way that’s not threatening to the party,” Kerry Brown, a scholar working at Chatham House, told Foreign Policy. (Chatham House, a UK-based think tank, has hosted members of the school, according to the magazine.)^{29, 30} The school has also sent students to institutions worldwide including Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, Cambridge University and Copenhagen Business School,³¹ and runs a collaborative program with Yale University.³²

In addition, the Party runs three national “executive leadership academies” for mid-level and senior cadres of the Party, governments, military, and state-owned enterprises, located at Jinggangshan , Yan’an and Pudong. Founded in 2005, the academies served to supplement Party schools in training Party members. Training usually serves as a prelude to and preparation for, a promotion.

Directed by the Party’s Central Organization Committee, which coordinates the staffing of official bodies nationwide, they also run public courses such as MBA and MPA programs.

Mid-level government officials dressed in red army uniforms stand next to a portrait of former Chinese leader Mao Zedong at an old house where Mao used to live, during a five-day training course at the China Executive Leadership Academy of Jinggangshan, in Jiangxi province September 21, 2012. Credit: REUTERS/Carlos Barria

The United Front

China has eight so-called “democratic parties” but they don’t interfere with the dominance of the Communist Party. According to the government’s official website, “the CPC is the sole party exercising political leadership in this system of multi-party cooperation,” which has been “generally accepted by various parties and people across the country after decades of practice.”³³

The parties’ influence is limited and is “window dressing” that allows the government to say they listen to outside views, China observer Willy Lam told the BBC.³⁴ Their membership rolls are comparatively minuscule, and they are barred from challenging the Communist Party’s leadership.³⁵

Heads of the parties hold vice-chairman positions on the National People’s Congress or the Chinese People’s Consultative Conference (CPPCC), according to pro-Beijing newspaper Wen Wei Po.³⁶ There have only been a handful of non-Communist Party ministers since China’s opening up – China Zhi Gong Dang (Party for Public Interests) chairman Wan Gang (万钢), became the first when he was appointed Minister of Science and Technology in 2007.

Still, internal factions exist within the Communist Party, which is viewed by analysts as a more likely catalyst for reform.³⁷ The Party’s two most powerful factions, former Chinese leader Jiang Zemin’s so-called Shanghai Clique and Jiang’s successor Hu Jintao’s (胡锦涛) Tuanpai, have their own agendas and views about key political and economic reforms. However, the Party does not tolerate the public airing of these political differences and such fissures remain papered over for the public.

A hold on all areas

The power of the Party is built directly into the country’s governance structure.

Roughly based on the “hierarchical model of central control” developed by the Russian Bolshevik leader Vladimir Lenin, the Party ultimately makes decisions from the top and enforces them rigidly down the chain of command.³⁸

The Party’s 25-member Politburo and its seven-man standing committee represent the apex of political power in China. Each Politburo member concurrently holds key positions in the central government, provincial-level leadership and the People’s Liberation Army, ensuring the Party retains influence over the main channels of power.³⁹

Although little is publicly known about the Politburo’s internal machinations, it is believed to meet roughly once a month, with the Party releasing sporadic details about its discussions.^{40, 41} The body may meet to consider major policy shifts, handle extremely urgent issues, or legitimize a particular policy direction.⁴²

The Politburo is elected by and responsible to the Central Committee, according to the Party’s constitution.⁴³ But in practice, the makeup and policy decisions of the Central Committee are determined by the Politburo, according to Lawrence Sullivan, author of the “Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party.”⁴⁴

Meanwhile, the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) is China’s top leadership body, made up of the top seven members of the Politburo, and makes decisions in all major policy spheres.⁴⁵

No other Party or government body can overrule the PBSC, which increasingly operates according to “collective leadership” rather than the diktats of a single ruler.⁴⁶

PBSC members typically lead all the major pillars of governance – including the Party, the State Council, the National People’s Congress, and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference – making it the key decision-making and operational body in Chinese politics.⁴⁷

(The only time PBSC members do not hold the top state positions is during the transition period between the Party congress – usually held every five years in the autumn – when the new members of the Politburo Standing Committee are appointed, and the joint meetings of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference held the following March, when those Party leaders take on their new state roles.)

Through the Central Committee, the Party operates departments that oversee personnel appointments, media, ideology, non-communist bodies, the judiciary, the police and civilian security, effectively preventing any autonomous power from challenging the Party’s dominance.⁴⁸

The Central Committee also appoints the members of the Central Military Commission, the Party’s leading military body.^{49, 50} The general secretary of the Party typically serves as chairman of the CMC, which helps maintain Party control over the People’s Liberation Army.⁵¹

Smaller Party organizations also operate in enterprises, rural areas, government organs, schools, research institutes, and small neighborhoods.^{52, 53}

People take their oaths in front of a Communist Party of China (CPC) flag during a ceremony to join the party at a park as part of celebrations marking the 90th anniversary of the party’s founding in Shanghai July 1, 2011. Credit: REUTERS/Aly Song

Joining the club

“Today’s Communist Party is a highly developed bureaucracy, like IBM or General Motors,” Columbia University scholar Andrew Nathan told The New York Times. “It’s not the Communist Party of Mao’s time.”⁵⁴

The Party’s all-encompassing influence and embrace of the private sector has caused a surge of new members, with star students and entrepreneurs flocking to join.⁵⁵ Membership is heavily male, with women making up less than one quarter of the Party’s 80 million members in 2011.⁵⁶

Citizens are exposed to the Party early. The Young Pioneers, run by the Communist Youth League, is an organization for nearly all six to 14 year-olds.⁵⁷ They learn about Communist ideals to “do as the Party says, love the motherland, love the people” and become the “heirs of communism,” according to the Young Pioneers’ constitution.⁵⁸ It is also compulsory for them to wear a red scarf (honglingjin) every day at school to designate their membership in the Young Pioneers.

Joining the Communist Youth League between ages 14 and 28 is “an absolute must” for anyone seeking Party membership, according to Lawrence R. Sullivan, a political scientist, in the Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party.^{59, 60}

The organization has been a launching pad and power base for many of the country’s top leaders, including Hu Jintao, a one-time CYL boss. The organization is also the recruitment base of the Tuanpai, one of the Party’s main factions and Hu’s power base.

Nearly all of the first secretaries of the youth league have also joined the Party’s Central Committee. The current chief, Lu Hao (陆昊), was appointed in 2008, one year after the 17th Party congress and was elevated to the Central Committee at the following Party congress in 2012.⁶¹

The organization mimics the power structure of the Party itself, with a congress every five years, a central committee and standing committee. It teaches its more than 75 million members Chinese communist thought and provides social services to young people such as assisting with exam study and helping them find jobs.^{62, 63}

To join the Party, one must be over 18, introduced by two members and have their application discussed and approved by Party organs after background checks.^{64, 65} Prospective members attend study sessions and carry out community service.⁶⁶ The Party will also recruit exceptional candidates.⁶⁷ Probation is usually one year during which time limited membership dues must be paid.^{68, 69} Party members may not hold religious beliefs.⁷⁰

After probation, members are part of an elite club. Membership is seen as a laurel, providing access to a career-advancing network. That explains the Party’s appeal to students; according to one study, college education is “by far the most important single predictor of party membership.”⁷¹

It could be a stepping-stone to a place in the civil service, which provides highly stable and prestigious jobs.^{72, 73} Membership also helps job prospects with state-owned enterprises and major firms.⁷⁴ The crème de la crème may go to Party schools later, a key opportunity to network with movers and shakers in politics and business, who will all pass through its doors at some point in their careers.⁷⁵

“Just as education is regarded as an investment in human capital, CCP membership can be regarded as an investment in what is sometimes termed political capital,” according to a paper from the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute.⁷⁶

Party membership is pivotal to gaining guanxi – the deep personal connections that can smooth one’s rise to the top, whether in the government or private spheres. And in China, forging relationships with powerful mentors can alter the course of a person’s career.

To some analysts, conferring career benefits has helped the Party legitimize its rule.⁷⁷ Just as red-hot economic growth has given the Party legitimacy to the masses, its ability to deliver material rewards to its most prized members proves its value to top achievers. This is even more important at a time when economic liberalization is rapidly creating more opportunities for Chinese citizens to create wealth and influence in the private sector, outside government jobs and state-owned enterprises.^{78, 79}

The Party’s police

When it comes to crime and punishment, Party members are accountable to two authorities – the state and the Party. And as in so many areas of Chinese society, the Party’s rule supersedes the state.

The Discipline Inspection Commission, under the leadership of the Party’s Central Committee, is the Party’s in-house anti-graft body, empowered to investigate officials and detain them when necessary.^{80, 81} At least 800 full-time staff work in the west Beijing head office, while local commissions operate in the provinces under the dual leadership of the Party committees at the corresponding levels and the next higher commissions for discipline inspection.⁸²

Officials wait outside the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Communist Party of China’s office in Beijing September 20, 2007. Credit: REUTERS/Reinhard Krause

In recent years, the Party has said that combating corruption is a top priority, with 881,000 officials punished for misconduct from July 2003 to December 2008, according to Xinhua.^{83, 84} However, at a time when new millionaires emerge every year, many people now seek administrative positions precisely to monetize them.⁸⁵

Officials in fields like customs, taxation, land sales and infrastructure development have discretion to select local businesses for lucrative work, and decide on regulations which affect those businesses’ bottom lines.⁸⁶

The low salary of senior officials is another incentive for corruption.⁸⁷ For example, Vice-Premier Wu Yi (吴仪) told Chinese business leaders in 2007 that her annual income totaled RMB120,000 (about $19,000).⁸⁸ Some officials have even publicly complained about their low income.⁸⁹

That has given rise to the so-called “black-collar class,” referring to corrupt officials whose cars are black, and shroud everything about their income, work and lives. “Everything about them is hidden, like a man wearing black, standing in the black of night,” Richard McGregor quoting an anonymous blog post in his book “The Party: The Secret World of China’s Communist Rulers.”⁹⁰

Those who run afoul of the Party are subject to shuanggui, or ‘double regulation,’ a CPC internal disciplinary measure that usually demands Party and government officials accused of wrongdoing to respond to charges or accusations against them at a designated time and place.

In China, senior Party officials cannot be arrested by civilian law enforcement bodies or other outside agencies for criminal offences until the Party’s Discipline Commission has investigated first.⁹¹ But to investigate an official, the commission needs to get approval from the Party organ at the next level above the official. That means the more senior a cadre, the more difficult for the commission to investigate, as senior leaders are able to protect their protégés, and other leaders don’t wish to anger a mentor by investigating his protégé.⁹²

The use of extra-judicial shuanggui is designed to extract confessions^{93, 94, 95} via a shrouded Soviet-style disciplinary machine.⁹⁶ Its hallmarks are isolation and harsh interrogation techniques, Flora Sapio, a visiting scholar at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, told The New York Times.⁹⁷ The Dui Hua Foundation, a non-profit humanitarian organization in San Francisco, wrote that suspects are subject to simulated drowning, cigarette burns and beatings.^{98, 99}

In the aftermath, suspects have committed suicide or died under mysterious circumstances. Peng Changjian, former deputy director of Chongqing’s Public Security Bureau, allegedly died of a heart attack during shuanggui detention.^{100, 101}

Others are stripped of Party membership and wealth following their confessions, and handed over to government prosecutors for rubber-stamp trials that are closed to the public.¹⁰²

“It’s as if you’ve fallen into a legal black hole. Once you are called in, you almost never walk out a free man,” Sapio said. She added that those in detention are not allowed to meet family members and do not have access to lawyers.¹⁰³

Politicians who have experienced shuanggui include Chen Liangyu (陈良宇), the former Party chief of Shanghai, and Liu Zhijun (刘志军), former railways minister.

Naked officials

Corruption in the Party has given rise to hordes of ‘naked officials’ who send their family and money abroad and plan a getaway themselves.¹⁰⁴ The phrase was coined in 2008 by Zhou Peng’an, a member of the China Democratic League and blogger in Anhui Province. Zhou’s blog post was later reprinted in the country’s mainstream media, including the websites of the Party’s flagship newspaper the People’s Daily and the official Xinhua News Agency.^{105, 106}

A typical naked official is usually in his fifties, about to retire and with more than $13 million.¹⁰⁷ China Economic Weekly, an economic magazine managed and sponsored by People’s Daily News Group, reported that since 2000, 18,487 officials have been caught allegedly trying to flee overseas.¹⁰⁸

According to a confidential study of the People’s Bank of China in 2011, RMB800 billion had been moved out of China by officials between the mid-1990s and 2008.¹⁰⁹

Top destinations for hoarding money are the US, Europe, Australia, Canada, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand.¹¹⁰ Foreign countries that have no extradition treaty with China are particularly favored by corrupt officials, said Li Chengyan, director of the Centre for Anti-Corruption Studies at Peking University.¹¹¹

To prevent officials from fleeing overseas, the government has tried restricting travel abroad, confiscating passports, and requiring officials to register family members living overseas.¹¹²

In July 2010, a temporary regulation publicized by the central leadership required naked officials to provide written reports about the migration of their spouses and children to organization or personnel departments.¹¹³

In the same month, a national regulation said officials should make detailed annual reports about themselves, their spouses and children, on aspects including marital status, employment, income, properties, and investments, among other details.¹¹⁴

In January 2012, Guangdong Province announced that officials whose families have emigrated will probably not be promoted to high-level posts.¹¹⁵

However, officials have loopholes for the new measures, such as divorcing a spouse who lives overseas then remarrying,¹¹⁶ or holding multiple passports – the former governor of Yunnan Province Li Jiating was found to have five passports.¹¹⁷

“The big problem is that these officials are losing faith in the Chinese central government,” He Jiahong, a corruption expert at People’s University in Beijing, told the L.A. Times. “They are just taking care of their family and don’t care about China.”¹¹⁸

Updated March 14, 2013: This article has been updated to reflect that there have been several non-Communist Party ministerial-level officials since the opening up of China.

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105. ¹⁰⁵ “Origin of Naked Officials,” (裸官的由来), China.com.cn, last modified February 21, 2012, accessed July 5, 2012
106. ¹⁰⁶ “Blog: How Many Corrupted Officials Are Still Naked,” (博客：还有多少贪官在“裸体做官”), People.com.cn, last modified June 24, 2010, accessed July 5, 2012, originally on sina.com.cn, last modified July 3, 2008,
107. ¹⁰⁷ Barbara Demick and David Pierson, “China steps up efforts to keep officials from leaving country,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012
108. ¹⁰⁸ “Supreme People’s Procuratorate: 18,487 fugitive officials caught in 12 year and 54.1 billion seized,” (最高检: 12年抓18487个在逃贪官 5年缴获541亿), People.com.cn, June 5, 2012, accessed July 13, 2012
109. ¹⁰⁹ Barbara Demick and David Pierson, “China steps up efforts to keep officials from leaving country,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012
110. ¹¹⁰ Barbara Demick and David Pierson, “China steps up efforts to keep officials from leaving country,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012
111. ¹¹¹ “Moving the family abroad: Hedging their bets,” The Economist, May 26, 2012, accessed July 13, 2012
112. ¹¹² Barbara Demick and David Pierson, “China steps up efforts to keep officials from leaving country,” Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2012, accessed June 27, 2012
113. ¹¹³ “General Offices of the Central Party Committee and of the State Council require stronger management of civil servants whose spouses and children have moved overseas”, (中办国办要求对配偶子女均已移居国（境）外的国家工作人员加强管理), People.com.cn, last modified July 26, 2010, accessed July 13, 2012
114. ¹¹⁴ “Regulations on self-declaration of personal issues of leaders and cadres,” (关于领导干部报告个人有关事项的规定), People.com.cn, last modified July 12, 2010, accessed July 13, 2012
115. ¹¹⁵ “Guangdong proposes that in principle, officials whose families have emigrated will not occupy principal posts,” (广东拟规定家属已移居境外官员原则上不担任正职), China.com.cn, January 6, 2012, accessed July 13, 2012
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The Connected China app showcases a wealth of information about China’s top leaders, key political and military bodies, and the informal factions and ideologies underpinning the system.

Key People

The Communist Party’s top officials exercise power in almost every sphere of Chinese society, from business to the military, judiciary and parliament.

The Politburo Standing Committee

• Xi Jinping
• Li Keqiang
• Zhang Dejiang
• Yu Zhengsheng
• Liu Yunshan
• Wang Qishan
• Zhang Gaoli

Retiring Politburo Standing Committee members

These individuals have stepped down from the Politburo Standing Committee, but retain their state leadership positions until the next joint meeting of the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, scheduled for March 2013.

• Hu Jintao
• Wu Bangguo
• Wen Jiabao
• Jia Qinglin
• Li Changchun
• He Guoqiang
• Zhou Yongkang

Key Party Organizations

Major policy decisions are driven Party organizations, not the state ministries or legislature.

• Politburo Standing Committee
• Politburo
• Central Committee
• Secretariat of the Central Committee
• Central General Office
• Central Organization Department
• Central Publicity Department
• Central International Department
• Central United Front Work Department
• Central Commission for Politics and Law
• Central Discipline Inspection Commission

Key State Organizations

The state apparatus implements the Party’s policies across a vast country of 1.3 billion people. These bodies are also led by key Party leaders, ensuring the Communist Party of China’s ultimate control.

• Presidency
• State Council
• National People’s Congress
• Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
• Supreme People’s Court
• Supreme People’s Procuratorate
• State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission

Key Military Organizations

China has the largest standing army in the world, and its military leaders are historically potent political powerbrokers. Several powerful organizations represent the overlap of military and political clout in the mammoth force, about which very little is publicly disclosed.

• CPC Central Military Commission & PRC Central Military Commission
• CMC General Office
• PLA General Staff Department
• PLA General Political Department

Key Party Factions

While China remains a single-Party state, the Communist Party of China is carved into several cliques and factions behind closed doors, each with their own policy interests and entrenched leadership. The importance of guanxi and patron-client ties makes factional membership essential for climbing the Party ladder.

• Shanghai Clique
• Tuanpai
• Princelings

Key Ideologies

Today’s Communist Party of China has significantly evolved since its founding in 1921. Every leader since the Party’s founding has sought to introduce his own policies and leave a unique ideological legacy.

• Mao Zedong Thought
• Deng Xiaoping Theory
• The Three Represents
• Harmonious Society

What else?

China has a long history and a complex political fabric. Here are some key terms, events and groups.

• Birth Control/One-child Policy/Family Planning Policy/Policy of Birth Planning
• Danwei
• Eight Elders (Eight Immortals)
• 50-cent Party
• Generations of Chinese Leadership
• Guanxi
• Hukou
• Lianghui or “two sessions”
• Mishu
• Party Committee
• Privileged Supplies (tegong)
• Reform and Opening Up
• Secretary
• State-owned enterprises
• The Left and The Right
• Within the system
• Rusticated Youth or Sent-down Youth (zhiqing)
• Zhongnanhai

Video Tutorials

China 101 + Featured Stories

Social Power View

Institutional Power View

Career Comparison View

Connected China showcases a wealth of information about China’s top leaders, as well as key political, governmental and military bodies.

People

Ai Weiwei Outspoken social critic and China’s most famous contemporary artist
Bao Tong Former political secretary of Zhao Ziyang and former director of the Party’s Political Structure Reform Research Centre
Bateer Governor and deputy Party chief of Inner Mongolia
Bayanqolu Governor and deputy Party chief of Jilin, and member of the Party Central Committee
Bo Xilai Disgraced former Party chief of Chongqing, former member of the Politburo and of the Central Committee
Cai Wu Minister of Culture and member of the Central Committee
Cai Yingting Commander of the Nanjing Military Region
Cao Gangchuan Former vice-chairperson of the Central Military Commission and former minister of National Defense
Chang Wanquan Member of Central Military Commission, state councilor and Minister of National Defense
Chang Xiaobing Chairman of China United Network Communications Group Co Ltd
Chen Bingde Former member of the Central Military Commission and chief of the PLA General Staff
Chen Deming President of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits and CPPCC standing committee member
Chen Esheng Chairman and temporary Party chief of China Sinolight Corporation
Chen Guangcheng Activist for victims of illegal birth control abuses
Chen Guoling Vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee
Chen Hongsheng Chairman of the China Poly Group Corporation
Chen Lei Minister of Water Resources
Chen Liangyu Former Shanghai Party chief and Politburo member sentenced to 18 years in jail for bribery and abuse of power in 2008
Chen Min’er Governor and deputy Party chief of Guizhou
Chen Quanguo Party chief of Tibet
Chen Wu Chairman of Guangxi Autonomous Region
Chen Yuan Vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee, son of one of the Party’s Eight Immortals Chen Yun
Chen Zhenggao Governor and deputy Party chief of Liaoning
Chen Zhili Former State Councilor and former minister of education
Chen Zhu Chairman of the Chinese Peasants’ and Workers’ Democratic Party and vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress
Chi Haotian Former Politburo member (1997-2002)
Chu Yimin Political commissar of the Shenyang Military Region
Chui Sai-On, Fernando Chief executive of the Macau Special Administrative Region government
Cui Dianguo Chairman of China CNR Corporation Limited
Dai Bingguo Former state councilor (2008-2013)
Dalai Lama Spiritual leader of the Tibetan people, former head of state of Tibet, and Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 1989
Deng Changyou Vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee
Deng Xiaoping (d. 1997) Former paramount leader of China
Ding Guangen (d. 2012) Former Politburo member (1992-2002)
Ding Zilin Leader of activist group Tiananmen Mothers
Du Hengyan Political commissar of the Jinan Military Region
Du Jiahao Deputy Party chief and acting governor of Hunan
Du Qinglin Member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
Fan Changlong Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member
Fang Fenghui China’s top general — chief of the PLA General Staff, Central Military Commission member
Fang Lizhi (d. 2012) Astrophysicist and pro-democracy campaigner
Fu Chengyu Chairman of China Petrochemical Corporation and chairman of China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation
Fu Yuning Chairman of the China Merchant Group and chairman of the China Merchants Bank
Gan Yisheng Standing committee member of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
Gao Hucheng Minister of Commerce
Gao Zhisheng Leading human rights lawyer
Geng Huichang Minister of State Security
Gong Jingkun Chairperson and Party chief of Harbin Electric Corporation
Guo Boxiong Former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and former Politburo member (2002-2012)
Guo Gengmao Party chief of Henan Province
Guo Jinlong Politburo member and Party chief of Beijing
Guo Shengkun State councilor and Minister of Public Security
Guo Shuqing Deputy Party chief and acting governor of Shandong
Han Changfu Minister of Agriculture and member of the Central Committee
Han Qide Chairperson of the Jiu San (Sept. 3rd) Society and vice-chairperson of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
Han Zheng Politburo member and Party chief of Shanghai
Hao Peng Governor and deputy Party chief of Qinghai
He Guoqiang Former top anti-graft official and former Politburo Standing Committee member (2007-2012)
He Yong Former deputy secretary of the Party’s Central Discipline Inspection Commission and former member of the Party’s Secretariat
He Yu Chairman and Party chief of the China Guangdong Nuclear Power Holding Corporation
Hu Chunhua Politburo member and Party chief of Guangdong
Hu Jia Activist for the environment, AIDS victims, democracy and human rights
Hu Jintao China’s sixth president, former Party general secretary and former chairman of the Central Military Commission
Hu Maoyuan President and Party chief of the Shanghai Automotive Industry Corporation (Group)
Hu Yaobang (d. 1989) Liberal former Party general secretary (1980-1987); seen as too liberal and sacked as Party chief by conservatives
Hua Guofeng (d. 2008) Successor to Mao, former Party chief (1976-1981) and premier (1976-1980), major decision-maker in removing the Gang of Four
Hua Jianmin President of Red Cross Society of China
Huang Ju (d. 2007) Former Politburo Standing Committee member (2002-2007) and former vice-premier (2003-2007)
Huang Qifan Mayor and deputy Party chief of Chongqing
Huang Shuxian Minister of Supervision and deputy secretary of the CPC Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Huang Xingguo Mayor and deputy Party chief of Tianjin
Hui Liangyu Former vice-premier (2003-2013) and former Politburo member (2002-2012)
Ismail Tiliwaldi Former vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (2008-2013)
Ji Bingxuan Vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress
Jia Baojun President and Party chief of Sinosteel Corporation
Jia Qinglin Former head of Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference and former Politburo Standing Committee member
Jiang Chaoliang Chairperson and Party chief of the Agricultural Bank of China
Jiang Chunyun Former vice-premier (1995-1998)
Jiang Daming Minister and Party chief of the Ministry of Land and Resources
Jiang Dingzhi Governor and deputy Party chief of Hainan
Jiang Jianqing Chairman and Party chief of the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China
Jiang Jiemin Chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
Jiang Shusheng Vice-president of the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification
Jiang Weixin Minister of Housing and Urban-Rural Development and member of the CPC Central Committee
Jiang Yikang Party chief of Shandong and chairman of the Shandong Provincial People’s Congress
Jiang Zemin Former paramount leader of China; China’s fifth president, former Party general secretary, and former Central Military Commission chairman
Jin Zhuanglong Chairperson of the Commercial Aircraft Corp. of China and alternate member of the Central Committee
Jing Zhiyuan Former member of the Central Military Commission and commander of the PLA Second Artillery Corps
Leung Chun-ying Chief Executive of Hong Kong
Li Bin Minister of the National Health and Family Planning Commission
Li Changcai Political commissar of the Lanzhou Military Region
Li Changchun Former member of Politburo Standing Committee (2002-2012) in charge of propaganda and ideology
Li Changyin President and Party chief of China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation
Li Hongzhong Party chief of Hubei and chairman of the Hubei Provincial People’s Congress
Li Jianguo Politburo member and vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress standing committee
Li Jianhua Party chief of Ningxia
Li Jiheng Governor and vice-Party chief of Yunnan
Li Jinai Former Central Military Commission member and former director of the PLA General Political Department
Li Keqiang Chinese Premier and ranked #2 in the Politburo Standing Committee
Li Lanqing Former member of the Politburo Standing Committee
Li Liguo Minister of Civil Affairs and vice-chairman of the National Disaster Reduction Committee
Li Peng Former premier (1987-1998), former Politburo Standing Committee member (1987-2002) and former chairman of the National People’s Congress
Li Qiang Governor and deputy Party chief of Zhejiang
Li Ruihuan Former chairperson of the CPPCC and former Politburo Standing Committee member (1992-2002)
Li Shiming Commander of the Chengdu Military Region and standing committee member of the National People’s Congress
Li Tieying Former vice-chairperson of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee and former Politburo member
Li Xiannian (d. 1992) One of the Party’s Eight Immortals, China’s third president (1983-1988) and former Party vice-chairman (1977-1982)
Li Xiaopeng Deputy Party chief and governor of Shanxi and son of former premier Li Peng
Li Xueyong Governor and vice-Party chief of Jiangsu
Li Yanhong, Robin Chairman and founder of Baidu Inc and vice-chairman of All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce
Li Yuanchao Vice-president of the People’s Republic of China and Politburo member
Li Zhanshu Politburo member, member of the Party’s Secretariat and director of the Central Committee General Office
Liang Guanglie Former minister of national defense, former state councilor and former member of the Central Military Commission
Liao Xilong Former member of the Central Military Commission and director of the PLA General Logistics Department
Lin Zuoming Chairperson of the Aviation Industry Corporation of China and member of the CPC Central Committee
Ling Jihua Head of the Party’s Central United Front Work Department and vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee
Liu Fulian Political commissar of the Beijing Military Region
Liu Hui Chairwoman of Ningxia Hui Autonomous Regional Government
Liu Jiayi China’s chief state auditor — head of the National Audit Office
Liu Kaiyong General manager and Party chief of China Silk Corporation
Liu Qi Deputy director of Party’s Central Guidance Committee on Ethical and Cultural Construction and former Politburo member (2002-2012)
Liu Qibao Politburo member, head of the Central Publicity Department and member of the Party’s Central Committee Secretariat
Liu Shaoqi (d. 1969) China’s second president (1959-1966) and former Party vice-chairman (1956-1966)
Liu Shaoyong General manager of China Eastern Air Holding Company
Liu Shunda Chairman and Party chief of the China Datang Corporation
Liu Weiping Governor and deputy Party chief of Gansu
Liu Xiaobo Scholar, political activist and Nobel Peace Prize recipient in 2010
Liu Xiaojiang Political commissar of the Navy and son-in-law of former Party general secretary Hu Yaobang
Liu Yandong Politburo member and Vice-Premier of the State Council
Liu Yuan Political commissar of the PLA General Logistics Department and son of Liu Shaoqi, former president of the PRC
Liu Yuejun Commander of the Lanzhou Military Region
Liu Yunshan Ranked #5 in the Politburo Standing Committee and member of the Party’s Secretariat
Liu Zhenya President and CEO of the State Grid Corporation of China
Losang Gyaltsen Chairperson and deputy Party chief of Tibet
Lou Jiwei Minister of Finance
Lou Qinjian Governor and deputy Party chief of Shaanxi Province and standing committee member of the Party’s Shaanxi Provincial Committee
Lu Hao Deputy Party chief and acting governor of Heilongjiang
Lu Qizhou President and Party chief of China Power Investment Corporation
Lu Xinshe Governor and deputy Party chief of Jiangxi
Lu Yongxiang Former vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee (2003-2013)
Lu Zhangong Vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee and member of the CPC Central Committee
Luo Baoming Party chief of Hainan and chairperson of Hainan Provincial People’s Congress Standing Committee
Luo Gan Former Politburo standing committee member (2002-2007) and former member of the Party’s Secretariat (1997-2002)
Luo Huining Party chief of Qinghai and chairman of its provincial people’s congress standing committee
Luo Zhijun Party chief of Jiangsu and chairman of the Jiangsu Provincial People’s Congress
Ma Biao Vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee and member of the CPC Central Committee
Ma Kai Politburo member, vice-premier of the State Council
Ma Wen Chairwoman of the NPC Internal and Judicial Affairs Committee
Ma Xiaotian Chinese air force commander and member of the Central Military Commission
Ma Xingrui Vice-Minister of Industry and Information Technology and member of the Central Committee
Ma Yun, Jack Chairman of Alibaba Group
Mao Zedong (d. 1976) Founder of the People’s Republic of China and one of the founders of the Communist Party of China
Meng Jianzhu Politburo member and secretary of the Central Politics and Law Committee
Miao Wei Minister of Industry and Information Technology
Mu Zhanying Chairman of the Supervisory Board for key, large state-owned enterprises
Nur Bekri Chairman of the Xinjiang Autonomous Regional Government
Padma Choling Tibet Autonomous Regional People’s Congress chairman and deputy Party chief of Tibet
Peng Qinghua Party chief of Guangxi
Qian Qichen Former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1988-1998)
Qiang Wei Party chief of Jiangxi Province and Central Committee member
Qin Guangrong Party chief of Yunnan and chairman of the Yunnan Provincial People’s Congress
Rebiya Kadeer Uyghur activist, businesswoman and president of the World Uyghur Congress
Ren Jianxin General manager of the China National Chemical Corporation
Ren Kelei CEO and Party chief of OCT Enterprises
Sang Guowei Honorary vice-president of the Red Cross Society of China
Shang Fulin Chairperson and Party chief of the China Banking Regulatory Commission
Sheng Guangzu General manager of the China Railway Corporation and standing committee member of the National People’s Congress
Shi Zhengrong Founder and former CEO of Suntech Power, once the world’s largest producer of solar panels, ousted as CEO in March 2013.
Si Xianmin President of China Southern Air Holding Company
Song Lin Chairman of China Resources (Holdings) Co Ltd
Song Ping Former Politburo Standing Committee member (1989-1992) and mentor of former president Hu Jintao and other senior Chinese leaders
Song Zhiping Chairman of China National Building Material Company Ltd and chairman of China National Pharmaceutical Group Corporation
Su Rong Vice-chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference National Committee
Su Shulin Governor and deputy Party chief of Fujian
Sun Chunlan Politburo member and Party chief of Tianjin
Sun Qin President and Party chief of China National Nuclear Corporation
Sun Zhengcai Politburo member and Party chief of Chongqing
Sun Zhongtong Former deputy secretary of the CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Tan Zuojun Vice-governor of Liaoning Province
Tan Zuoren Activist for 2008 Sichuan earthquake victims and writer
Tian Jiyun Former vice-premier and former vice-chairperson of the NPC Standing Committee
Tian Xiusi Political commissar of the Air Force and member of the Central Committee
Tsering Woeser Tibetan dissident author
Uyunqimg Vice-president of Chinese Association for International Understanding
Wan Gang Minister of Science and Technology and chairman of the China Zhi Gong Party
Wan Yanhai AIDS activist
Wang Anshun Deputy Party chief and mayor of Beijing
Wang Dan Leading student protester in Tiananmen Square, 1989
Wang Dongming Party chief of Sichuan and member of the Central Committee
Wang Gang Former Politburo member (2007-2012)
Wang Guosheng Governor of Hubei
Wang Guosheng Former commander of the Lanzhou Military Region
Wang Hongyao Political commissar of the PLA General Armament Department and member of the Central Committee
Wang Hongzhang Chairperson, executive director and Party chief of China Construction Bank
Wang Huning Politburo member and director of the Party’s Central Policy Research Center
Wang Jianzhou Former chairman of China Mobile Communications Corporation
Wang Jiaocheng Commander of the Shenyang Military Region
Wang Jun Party chief of Inner Mongolia
Wang Lequan Former Politburo member (2002-2012)
Wang Min Party chief of Liaoning
Wang Qishan Party anti-corruption chief, ranked #6 in Politburo Standing Committee
Wang Rong Party chief of Shenzhen and alternate member of the Central Committee
Wang Rulin Party chief in Jilin Province
Wang Sanyun Party chief of Gansu
Wang Shengjun Vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress
Wang Xia Chairwoman and Party chief of the All-China Federation of Supply and Marketing Cooperatives and member of the CPC Central Committee
Wang Xiankui Party chief of Heilongjiang
Wang Xiaochu Chairman and Party chief of the China Telecommunications and alternate member of the Central Committee
Wang Xuejun Deputy Party chief and acting governor of Anhui Province
Wang Yang Politburo member and vice-premier of the State Council
Wang Yi Minister of Foreign Affairs
Wang Yilin Chairman of China National Offshore Oil Corporation
Wang Yong State councilor and former chairman of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
Wang Zhaoguo Former vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress (2003-2013) and former Politburo member (2002-2012)
Wang Zhengwei Minister of the State Ethnic Affairs Commission and vice-chairman of the CPPCC
Wang Zhenyou Party chief of the Wuhan Iron and Steel (Group) Corporation
Wei Fenghe Chinese nuclear chief — commander of the PLA Second Artillery Corps and member of the Central Military Commission
Wei Hong Governor and deputy Party chief of Sichuan
Wei Jiafu Chairperson and Party chief of the China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
Wei Jianxing Former secretary of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (1992-2002) and former Politburo Standing Committee member (1992-2002)
Wei Jingsheng Veteran democracy activist
Wei Liang Political commissar of the Guangzhou Military Region
Wen Jiabao Former Chinese premier (2003-2013) and former Politburo Standing Committee member (2002-2012)
Wu Aiying Minister of Justice and member of the Central Committee
Wu Bangguo Former chairman of the National People’s Congress (2003-2013) and former Politburo Standing Committee member (2002-2012)
Wu Guanzheng Former member of Politburo Standing Committee and former secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Wu Hongda, Harry Activist exposing China’s prison system
Wu Shengli Chinese navy commander, Central Military Commission member, and member of the Central Committee
Wu Yi Former vice-premier, known as China’s “Iron Lady”
Xi Jinping Party general secretary, president of the People’s Republic of China and chairman of the Central Military Commission
Xia Baolong Party chief of Zhejiang
Xiang Junbo China’s top insurance regulator — chairman of the China Insurance Regulatory Commission and member of the Central Committee
Xiao Gang Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission
Xie Fei (d. 1999) Former politburo member (1992-1999) and vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress
Xie Fuzhan Governor and deputy Party chief of Henan Province
Xie Xuren Chairman of the National Council for Social Security Fund
Xu Bin Former chairman of China South Industries Group
Xu Caihou Former vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and former Politburo member (2007-2012)
Xu Dazhe Chairman and Party chief of the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, Central Committee member
Xu Fenlin Commander of the Guangzhou Military Region
Xu Jianyi Chairman and Party chief of China FAW Group Corp.
Xu Lejiang Chairman of Baosteel Group Corporation
Xu Ping Chairperson of Dongfeng Motor Corporation
Xu Qiliang Vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and Politburo member
Xu Shaoshi Chairman and Party chief of the National Development and Reform Commission
Xu Shousheng Party chief of Hunan
Yang Chuantang Minister of Transport
Yang Jiechi State Councilor
Yang Jing Member of the Party’s Secretariat, state councilor and secretary-general of the State Council
Yang Weize Party chief of Nanjing City in Jiangsu Province
Yang Xiong Mayor of Shanghai and Deputy Secretary and Standing Committee member of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee
Yi Junqing Former director of the Party’s Central Compilation and Translation Bureau
Yin Weimin Minister of Human Resources and Social Security and deputy head of the Party’s Central Organization Department
You Quan Party chief of Fujian
Yu Zhengsheng
Yuan Chunqing Party chief of Shanxi and chairman of the Shanxi Provincial People’s Congress
Yuan Guiren Minister of Education
Yuan Jiajun Vice-chairman of Ningxia and standing committee member of the Ningxia Autonomous Regional Party Committee
Yuan Li Vice-president of the China Development Bank Corporation
Yuan Xingyong Assistant president of the Export-Import Bank of China
Yuan Zhiming Evangelical Christian activist
Zeng Peiyan Former vice-premier and Politburo member
Zeng Qinghong Former vice-president and top aide to former Party general secretary Jiang Zemin
Zhang Baoshun Party chief of Anhui and chairman of the Anhui Provincial People’s Congress
Zhang Chunxian Politburo member and Party chief of Xinjiang
Zhang Dejiang China’s top legislator – chairman of the National People’s Congress, ranked #3 in the Politburo Standing Committee
Zhang Gaoli Vice-premier of the State Council, ranked #7 in the Politburo Standing Committee
Zhang Guoqing Deputy Party chief of Chongqing and Central Committee member
Zhang Haiyang Political commissar and Party chief of the Second Artillery Corps, son of former Central Military Commission vice-chairman Zhang Zhen
Zhang Huixin Former deputy secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
Zhang Lichang (d. 2008) Former Politburo member (2002-2007)
Zhang Ping Vice-chairman of the National People’s Congress Standing Committee
Zhang Qingli Secretary-general and vice-chairman of the CPPCC National Committee
Zhang Qingwei Governor and deputy Party chief of Hebei
Zhang Shibo Commander of the Beijing Military Region
Zhang Wannian Former vice-chairman of Central Military Commission and chief of PLA General Staff (1992-1995)
Zhang Xiaogang President of the Anshan Iron and Steel Group Corporation and member of the CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Zhang Xiwu Chairperson of the Shenhua Group Corporation Limited and alternate member of the Central Committee
Zhang Yalin Chairman and Party chief of China XD Group
Zhang Yang Director of the PLA General Political Department and member of the Central Military Commission
Zhang Yi Vice-chairman and Party chief of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
Zhang Youxia Director of the PLA General Armament Department and member of the Central Military Commission
Zhao Jianguo Chairman and Party chief of China Southern Power Grid
Zhao Keshi Director of the PLA General Logistics Department and member of the Central Military Commission
Zhao Kezhi Party chief of Guizhou
Zhao Leji Politburo member, member of the Party’s Secretariat and head of the Party’s Central Organization Department
Zhao Lianhai Lead activist for victims of the 2008 tainted milk powder scandal
Zhao Xiaogang Chairman and Party chief of China South Locomotive & Rolling Stock Corporation
Zhao Zhengyong Party chief of Shaanxi Province
Zhao Ziyang (d. 2005) Former Party chief (1987-89) and former premier (1980-87); removed from power in 1989 and held under house arrest until he died
Zhao Zongqi Commander of the Jinan Military Region
Zheng Weiping Political commissar of the Nanjing Military Region
Zhou Benshun Party chief of Hebei Province and member of the CPC Central Committee
Zhou Enlai (d. 1976) Former premier (1949-1976) and former Politburo Standing Committee member (1956-1976)
Zhou Qiang President of the Supreme People’s Court and chairman of the Hunan Provincial People’s Congress
Zhou Shengxian Minister of Environmental Protection and member of the Central Committee
Zhou Tienong President of Chinese Association for International Understanding
Zhou Xiaochuan China’s central bank chief — governor of the People’s Bank of China and vice-chairperson of the CPPCC National Committee
Zhou Yongkang Former Politburo Standing Committee member (2007-2012) and former secretary of the Central Politics and Law Committee (2007-2012)
Zhou Zhongshu President of the China Minmetals Corporation and member of the CPPCC National Committee
Zhu Fuxi Political commissar of the Chengdu Military Region and member of the Central Committee
Zhu Rongji Former premier (1998-2003) and former Politburo Standing Committee member (1992-2002)
Zhu Xiaodan Governor and deputy Party chief of Guangdong

Organizations

Academy of Military Sciences
Air Force Armament Department
Air Force Changchun Command Post
Air Force Dalian Command Post
Air Force Headquarters
Air Force Lhasa Command Post
Air Force Logistics Department
Air Force Political Department
Air Force Shanghai Command Post
Air Force Wuhan Command Post
Air Force
Baicheng Conventional Weapons Testing Center
Beijing Aerospace Command and Control Center
Central Committee for Comprehensive Social Management (formerly Central Committee for Comprehensive Management of Public Security)
Central Committee General Office
Central Committee
Central Compilation and Translation Bureau
Central Coordinating Group for Hong Kong and Macau Affairs
Central Coordinating Group for Tibet Affairs – General Office
Central Coordinating Group for Tibet Affairs
Central Coordinating Group for Xinjiang Affairs – General Office
Central Coordinating Group for Xinjiang Affairs
Central Discipline Inspection Commission
Central Foreign Affairs Office
Central Guidance Committee on Ethical and Cultural Construction
Central Institute of Archives
Central International Department
Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics – Group Office
Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics
Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs
Central Leading Group for Party Building
Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology
Central Leading Group for Rural Work – General Office
Central Leading Group for Rural Work
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Second Artillery Corps – Base 56
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Supreme People’s Procuratorate – Duty Offences Prevention Office
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Supreme People’s Procuratorate – International Cooperation Bureau
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Supreme People’s Procuratorate
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