China's 12th Five-Year Plan (2011-2015) set in motion a series of economic and development initiatives. The basic targets set out in the plan were seen as "pragmatic", in particular, the goal of achieving an annual average growth rate of seven percent, which then-premier Wen Jiabao hoped would stabilize economic growth and improve its quality and performance.

The plan reflects China's efforts to restructure and rebalance the economy and reduce income inequality, as well as to boost domestic consumption to shift the economy away from export and investment-led growth.

The plan was discussed in 2010 at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and was officially approved and released by the National People's Congress in March 2011.

References

1. "十一届人大四次会议闭幕 通过"十二五"规划纲要," ifeng.com, March 14, 2011.
2. "China prepares to end GDP obsession," xinhuanet.com, March 6, 2011.
3. "China's 12th Five-Year Plan signifies a new phase in growth," China Daily, October 27, 2010.
4. "Key targets of China's 12th five-year plan," Xinhuanet.com, March 5, 2011.
5. "Outcomes of NPC, CPPCC annual sessions catch eyes worldwide," People's Daily, March 15, 2011.
6. Prime Sarmiento, "China's 12 Five-Year Plan seen to boost domestic consumption," Xinhuanet.com, March 3, 2011.

The "50-Cent Party" is the nickname for Internet commentators who are reportedly hired by the Communist Party or the Chinese government to post pro-Party and pro-government remarks or attack government critics online. They are said to be paid five mao, or 50 cents RMB (around 8 US cents) for every web post.

The term originated in 2005 and the number of 50-cent Party members is estimated to be more than 250,000.

References

1. Brook Larmer, "Where an Internet Joke Is Not a Joke," New York Times, October 26, 2011.
2. "China and the Internet," Harvard International Review, October 26, 2009.
3. "China's ‘bridge blogs' show Great Firewall's other side," The Independent, February 21, 2010.
4. Paul Carsten, "China's march to regulate the internet explained," The Telegraph, March 16, 2012.

The term yizu, or "ant tribe," refers to young Chinese college graduates born in the 1980s who are either unemployed or working in unstable jobs. They usually come from rural regions of China, dreaming of a better life, but live cheaply on the outskirts of big cities, and work in low-paid jobs.

References

1. "Ant Tribe 蚁族," China Media Project, accessed August 24, 2012.
2. "Ant tribes and mortgage slaves," The Economist, January 28, 2012.
3. "The Ant Tribe," New York Times, June 7, 2010.
4. Xing Zhao, "China's growing postgrad 'ant tribes'," CNNgo, November 27, 2009.

In a swift reversal from the brief liberalization of the "Hundred Flowers Movement," Mao Zedong launched the Anti-rightist Movement in 1957, during which more than 550,000 people were labeled as rightists and were ordered to undergo "reform" through labor or reeducation camps, according to official estimates.

Only one year before, Mao had proposed to let "a hundred flowers bloom" in literature and arts and "a hundred schools of thought contend" in academic circles, which later became the slogan of the Hundred Flowers Movement.

The Chinese leader and the Party's Central Committee encouraged intellectuals to criticize the Party and its leadership, as well as to discuss controversial issues, and intellectuals responded by openly questioning the government, condemning corruption and criticizing the Party's monopoly on power. Some even publicly wrote their grievances and discontent on large posters.

In May 1957 at conferences sponsored by the Party, non-Party members and participants from the democratic parties expressed their opinions freely, urging a more democratic society and an end to the Communist monopoly.

Their hostility towards the Communist regime surprised Mao, and this period of free speech soon ended. On June 8, 1957, the Central Committee issued a directive drafted by Mao, urging the Party to fight back against the "rightists", marking the start of the Anti-rightist Movement.

"If we don't win this battle, it will be impossible to attain socialism," Mao wrote in the directive.

References

1. "‘百花齐放，百家争鸣'方针（‘双百方针'）," Xinhuanet.com, accessed August 22, 2012.
2. "反右派斗争," China.com.cn, September 22, 2002.
3. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995).
4. Jan Wong, Toronto Globe and Mail, "Bureaucrats Do A Number On Chinese," Chicago Tribune, December 25, 1993.

The Beida Clique is a term used by journalists to refer to officials who are graduates of the prestigious Peking University, often holding degrees in the arts and social sciences. Beida is an abbreviation of Peking University (PKU) in Chinese.

The Beida Clique rose to prominence soon after President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao took office in 2003. In a large-scale reshuffle of senior officials from 2003 to 2004, the promotion of Li Keqiang, then Party chief of Henan Province, Zhao Leji, then deputy Party chief of Qinghai Province, and Leng Rong, deputy director of the Central Party Literature Research Center, indicated that Beida graduates were breaking into a top power circle that was once dominated by alumni of Tsinghua University.

Peking University is widely recognized as China’s top university for the humanities, while Tsinghua University has the best science departments.

According to the 2012 subject-based ranking of universities presented by the China Academic Degrees and Graduate Education Center under the Ministry of Education, Peking University is top-ranked in seven of the 17 subjects in the humanities, while Tsinghua University does best in 14 science and engineering-related subjects.

At the start of Hu and Wen’s second term, the Beida Clique held the upper hand over the Tsinghua Clique numerically. In 2007, at least 57 officials at or above the deputy-provincial or ministerial level were alumni of Peking University, 20 more than those from Tsinghua University, according to a survey conducted by the Guangzhou-based newspaper Southern Weekly.

A 2006 report by Hong Kong newspaper Sing Tao Daily said the Beida Clique had gradually consolidated its political power in China and thus could replace the Tsinghua Clique.

Strength in social science disciplines at Peking University and its pro-liberal atmosphere are considered advantageous for China’s future development, reported a Hong Kong-based weekly magazine Yazhou Zhoukan. The majority of the PKU alumni in top leadership positions studied arts or social science-related majors.

The Southern Weekly report said the rise of cadres with Peking University backgrounds shows that social science graduates were coming to the fore, in contrast to the last generation’s technocrats.

Prominent members of the clique include Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, and Cai Wu.

References

1. "2012年学科评估结果发布 北大清华人大位列前三," people.com.cn, January 30, 2013.
2. "2012年全国高校学科评估结果," 教育部学位与研究生教育发展中心, accessed February 19, 2013.
3. "「北大帮」动摇「大清帝国」," Hong Kong Economic Times, October 24, 2007, Factiva.
4. "蔡武掌国新办「北大帮」冒起," Sing Tao Daily, August 18, 2005, Factiva.
5. "李克强袁纯清胡春华…北大毕业生'崛起'," china.com.cn, October 25, 2007.
6. “人事调整牵动十七大,” Sing Tao Daily, May 30, 2006, Factiva.
7. "中国高官北大挑战清华," Yazhou Zhoukan, February 6, 2005.
8. "University Alumni Rise to Top," china.org.cn, October 17, 2007.

Beidaihe, known as China's "summer capital", is located on the northern coast of Hebei province, about three hours' drive from Beijing. It has been the summer workplace for political, economic and military policymakers since the 1950s, where Chinese leaders would debate the future of the country and conduct backroom lobbying, polling and wrangling over meals and card games.

Retired Party elders and incumbent top leaders would gather there to discuss critical political, economic issues and Party personnel appointments before formal Party congresses and central government meetings. The conference usually lasted about 10 days to two weeks.

In 2003, President Hu Jintao cancelled the Beidaihe tradition and while Party elders continued to meet at the seaside resort, most major decisions were reportedly made out of Beijing.

However, the Beidaihe meeting appears to have been resurrected in August 5, 2012, when Party leaders convened to discuss the new line-up of the 25-member Politburo and its elite Standing Committee ahead of the 18th Party Congress. The 2012 Beidaihe Conference reportedly ended on August 15, when state television reported top leaders' activities after a 10-day freeze.

References

1. "死去活来的北戴河会议," Hong Kong Economic Journal, August 12, 2011.
2. Benjamin Kang Lim and Chris Buckley, "EXCLUSIVE-China leadership rules Bo case isolated, limits purge – sources," Reuters, May 25, 2012.
3. Edward Wong, "Signs in China Point to Meeting on Transition," New York Times, August 6, 2012.
4. Elizabeth Rosenthal, "At One Resort in China, Tow Distinct Worlds," New York Times, August 10, 2001.
5. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China (The Chinese University Press, 1995), 18.
6. Josephine Ma, "Beidaihe in spotlight as resort's role in politics renewed," South China Morning Post, August 7, 2004.
7. Shi Jiangtao, "Succession meeting in Beidaihe ends," South China Morning Post, August 16, 2012.
8. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Bad start for China's Beidaihe meet," CNN, July 30, 2002.
9. Zhuang Pinghui, "Beidaihe still in the spotlight to chart the future," South China Morning Post, July 31, 2010.

The Beijing Clique, once a powerful political faction, was an association led by former Beijing Party chief Chen Xitong, and strongly backed by former Secretary of the Central Politics and Law Committee Peng Zhen and former Premier Li Peng. It mainly included Chen’s political allies.

The Beijing Clique gained prominence thanks to its hardline response to the pro-democracy protest at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989. It emerged as one of the three most powerful factions at the time, together with the Shanghai Clique and the Guangdong Clique.

Known as a rival to former President Jiang Zemin’s Shanghai Clique, it lost power and influence after its leader, Chen Xitong, was convicted of corruption and stripped of power in the late 1990s during the Jiang administration’s rule.

References

1. "Jiang behind my downfall, Chen suggests," South China Morning Post, May 29, 2012.
2. "彭真去世'北京帮'地位更显不利　 陈希同案将加快审结.," Sing Tao Daily, April 28, 1997, Factiva.
3. "政治势力重组︰团派与太子党逐鹿中原," Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 1, 2001, Factiva.

Abbreviation

Chinese Academy of Engineering (中国工程院)

Abbreviation

Chinese Academy of Sciences (中国科学院)

Abbreviation

Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (中国社会科学院)

Abbreviation

Central Committee of the Communist Party of China(中国共产党中央委员会)

Abbreviation

Central Discipline Inspection Commission (中央纪律检查委员会)

This expression was a traditional official name for China, or the Chinese government, in ancient times. The term has been adopted by Chinese netizens to sarcastically refer to the current government.

References

1. "Word of the Week: Celestial Empire," China Digital Times, May 23, 2012.

This term refers to the offspring of high-level officials, many of whom are viewed by the media and public as beneficiaries of nepotism and cronyism. These youngsters are commonly given special treatment at school, including study sessions and invitations to special meetings.

When the national college entrance exam was slowly restored during the 1970s, children of high-ranking cadres had more opportunities to go to college compared to children with a proletarian background. And in the late 1970s, when studying abroad emerged in China, children of high-ranking cadres again were among the first beneficiaries to take advantage of it with full government support.

The children of high-ranking cadres are more likely to marry people with the same background as they came from, rather than ordinary people, such as farmers or workers, according to the book "Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party Under Deng Xiaoping" by His-Sheng Chi. Such marriages lead to elite inbreeding among the Party, government and military in China, according to His-Sheng Chi.

A popular aphorism illustrates their perceived superiority: "Dragons beget dragons, phoenixes beget phoenixes, mice beget little mice who are good for nothing except digging holes."

During the Cultural Revolution, the children of high-ranking cadres formed their own band of the Red Guard, called the "Capital Red Guards United Action Committee" or United Action, which sought revenge against Mao's wife Jiang Qing and trusted aide Lin Biao for persecuting their families, relatives and friends.

References

1. "浅谈族阀资本主义," Ming Pao, May 21, 1998, Factiva.
2. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China (The Chinese University Press 1995), 230.
3. His-Sheng Chi, Politics of Disillusionment: The Chinese Communist Party under Deng Xiaoping 1978-1989 (M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 92-93.
4. "Power Progeny 官二代," China Media Project of The University of Hong Kong, accessed October 11, 2012.
5. Susan L. Shirk, Competitive Comrades: Career Incentives and Student Strategies in China (University of California Press, 1982), 140.

The term refers to an economic growth model that was first used in the Chongqing Municipality. This economic model is marked by high-speed growth, massive construction of public infrastructure and top-down campaigns to promote social equity. The engine of growth underlying this model is a strategy that relies on massive government-oriented public expenditure and an aggressive expansion of the state-owned economy.

The annual gross regional product growth rate of Chongqing in 2011 reached 16.4%, the highest among the 31 provincial-level regions in the country, while the national GDP growth rate of 2011 was 9.2%.

The downfall of Bo Xilai, former Chongqing Party chief and the architect of the Chongqing Model, in March 2012 was seen as the end of the model due to opposition from the Party mainstream. Economic observers had previously claimed that short-term growth could not overcome deep contradictions in the economic structure.

The Chongqing Model is often discussed in the same breath as another alternative model of governance, the "Guangdong Model", championed by Guangdong Party chief Wang Yang. The fall of Bo Xilai has been seen as a victory for Wang's Guangdong Model, but he subsequently denied that there was such a thing.

"It's not accurate to use ‘Guangdong Model' to comment or summarize Guangdong's practices to implement scientific development concept," Wang said at Guangdong Party Committee plenary session in January 2012, reported the state news wire China News.

References

1. "2011年中国经济增长9.2% "十二五"开局良好," gov.cn, January 17, 2012.
2. "重庆市2011年GDP突破万亿元 增速跃居全国第一," 中央政府门户网站, January 20， 2012.
3. Bo Zhiyue and Chen Gang, "Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Model," East Asian Policy, Background Brief No. 465 (July 2009): 43.
4. "Chongqing rolls on," the Economist, April 28, 2012.
5. Keith B. Richburg and Andrew Higgins, "In Chinese official's ouster, hints of a win for reformists," Washington Post, March 16, 2012, Factiva.
6. Rajiv Jayaram, "Triumph of Guangdong model over Chongqing model in China," The Economic Times, April 14, 2012.

In 1977, students were invited to sit for nationwide university entrance exams, the first time since the start of the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Many had missed out on an education because of the decade-long turmoil that scrapped entrance exams and instead admitted worker-peasant-solider candidates based on their political qualifications.

The examinations were open to unmarried candidates under the age of 25, with specially qualified candidates who were under 30 also accepted, even if they were married. In total 5.7 million people sat for the exams and only 273, 000 were admitted, an acceptance rate of only one out of 29.

With competition so great, the Class of 1977 is seen as the brightest group of their generation. Many current Chinese leaders passed these exams in 1977, including Li Keqiang, who studied law at Peking University from 1978, Li Yuanchao, and Lu Hao.

References

1. "1977年高考录取比例29:1," hexun.com, August 29, 2008.
2. "邓小平决策恢复高考 改变一代知识青年命运(2)," 中国共产党新闻网, accessed August 24, 2012.
3. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995).
4. Mark Sidel, "University Enrollment in the People's Republic of China, 1977-1981: The Examination Model Returns," Comparative Education, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1982.
5. "Testing times that created a clamour for education The 1977-78 university exams defined a nation," South China Morning Post, December 10, 2008, Factiva.

Family origin and class status are categorizations that date back to the Agrarian Revolution, created by the early regime of the Communist Party of China in 1933. The central government launched several campaigns to identify each citizen's class status in the early 1950s.

An individual's family origin was so important to each citizen that it served as a lifelong label of a person's personality and reliability.

A "good" class status, such as being from a poor peasant family, would offer educational or employment opportunities, while those with a "bad" class status, such as merchants and intellectuals, would face nationwide political discrimination.

Class status reflected a person's ownership of the "means of production" and whether it created an exploitative relationship.

For example, in rural areas, different class statuses included:

• Landowners and landlords, who charge high rents to landless peasants
• Rich peasants, who hire people to work on their land but also engaged in labor themselves
• Middle peasants, who have ample production tools and mostly rely on their labor
• Poor peasants, who own few production tools and have to rent land to make a living
• Hired farmhands, who made their living by selling their labor

Among these class statuses, a hired farmhand and poor peasant were the most favorable for the Party and the regime. In cities, a "good" class status usually referred to a worker or a proletarian background, while a "bad" class status referred to family origins such as capitalists and intellectuals.

Family origin referred to the class status of a person's parents or guardians.

In the 1960s Wuhan, universities and public security organizations would examine and categorize the family backgrounds of students before they took the college entrance exams. If they were put into the "unsuitable for admission" type, they would not receive higher education, no matter how good their grades were.

This classification of class status was not abolished until 1983. However, prospective Party members are required to fill the box of the family origin and personal status in the background check materials before they are approved to join in the Party.

References

1. 杜兴，"45个'家庭出身'代码'," 民间历史，香港中文大学中国研究服务中心.
2. 李谷城, 中国大陆政治术语 (The Chinese University Press, 1992), 405.
3. 任弼时, "土地改革中的几个问题," cpc.people.com, January 12, 1948.
4. 王绍光&王红续，超凡领袖的挫败：文化大革命在武汉 (中文大学出版社)，42.
5. 王绍光&王红续，超凡领袖的挫败：文化大革命在武汉 (中文大学出版社)，44.
6. "新中国的土地改革运动," 新华网, January 20, 2003.
7. "怎样分析农村阶级," china.com.cn, September 18, 2007.
8. "怎样填写‘家庭出身'？," 党务知识问答, accessed September 2, 2012.
9. "政务院关于划分农村阶级成分的决定," Xinhuanet.com, August 20, 1950.
10. William L. Parish and Martin King Whyte, Village and Family in Contemporary China (University of Chicago Press, 1980).

Abbreviation

Central Military Commission (中央军事委员会)

The Communist Party of China is the sole source of power in the country. The largest political party in the world, it controls the military, state, judiciary and major industries in China. The Party’s general secretary – not the prime minister or president – is the country’s preeminent leader. For more information, see Inside the Party.

Members of Chinese political parties, including the Communist Party of China and the eight non-communist "democratic parties", usually address other members with the communist term "comrade", such as Hu Jintao tongzhi and Jiang Zemin tongzhi.

Political observers sense minor political indications by closely watching the use of "comrade" on official announcements made by the Party. When a demoted official's name appears on official documents without the title "comrade" this is usually seen as a sign of further punishment to come because the Party no longer views that person as a member.

References

1. Viv Marsh, "New Chinese dictionary in row over ‘gay' omission," BBC, July 21, 2012.

Abbreviation

Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (中国人民政治协商会议)

This term describes a capitalist economy in which business success is based on the close relationships between businessmen and the government. In China, the existence of crony capitalism is a result of aggressive government intervention in allocating market resources, according to Wu Jinglian, one of China's most influential economists.

"The combination of authoritarian rule and the state's economic dominance has bred a virulent form of crony capitalism, as the ruling elites convert their political power into economic wealth and privilege at the expense of equity and efficiency," wrote Minxin Pei, professor of Government and the Director of the Keck Center for International and Strategic Center of Claremont McKenna College.

"The Chinese economy is not merely inefficient; it has also fallen victim to crony capitalism with Chinese characteristics -- the marriage between unchecked power and illicit wealth", Pei wrote.

This collective intervention not only lowers the economic efficiency of enterprises, but also "directly causes corruption and disparity between the rich and the poor," according to Wu.

It was expected that the government would retreat from the market in the 1990s as the market economic mechanism began to mature. However, administrative power, with its authority to allocate market resources and intervene with enterprises activities, has maintained its dominance in the market, preserving the interests of officials.

References

1. "【高端】吴敬琏：再论‘权贵资本主义'," 中国企业家网, October 20, 2010.
2. "吴敬琏：防止政府主导型经济蜕变为权贵资本主义，" 财新《新世纪》, July 11, 2011.
3. "Crony capitalism," Financial Times, accessed August 23, 2012.
4. Henry Wai-Chung Yeung, Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era: Towards Hybrid Capitalism (Psychology Press,2004), 184.
5. Minxin Pei, "The Dark Side of China's Rise," Foreign Policy, February 17, 2006.

The Cultural Revolution is an abbreviation of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, which was launched by Mao Zedong in 1966 to eliminate bourgeois elements from the Communist Party of China and to re-establish his power.

After the Lushan Conference of 1959, Lin Biao, head of the People's Liberation Army, initiated the all-round promotion of Mao Zedong Thought across the country, creating the cult of Mao and providing the ideological basis for the struggle against bourgeois elements.

Jiang Qing, Mao's wife, felt cultural works were being used to criticize the Party so she led the battle to reverse this trend and use cultural works to promote revolution. Beginning in May 1966, Jiang and her allies ousted key figures in the cultural departments and criticized writers who were allegedly critical of Mao Zedong.

Schools were closed and students joined the Red Guards, encouraged by Mao to attack traditional values and clean up "bourgeois" elements from ideological and cultural spheres, as well as publicly criticize Party cadres who, in Mao's view, were trying to subvert the revolution.

The Red Guards then escalated their activities beyond Mao's original intention and turned their criticism to intellectuals, who faced public humiliation and physical abuse for their alleged bourgeois activities. Many of the accused died from the abuse. With no rules or regulations, infighting between Red Guards led to chaos.

Mao and his allies used the Cultural Revolution to remove rival figures, including President Liu Shaoqi and Party General Secretary Deng Xiaoping from power.

After Mao's death in 1976, his second-in-command Hua Guofeng took power and arrested the members of the "Gang of Four", the most powerful group of the revolution, which included Mao's wife Jiang Qing, Wang Hongwen, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao Wenyuan. The arrests in October 1976 marked the end of the Cultural Revolution.

The Cultural Revolution wreaked great havoc on people's lives and the country's development. According to official estimates, there were around two million wrongly prosecuted cases, directly affecting several million people.

On September 20, 1977, Li Xiannian, vice-president of the Central Committee, told members of the National People's Conference that the 10 years of chaos cost the nation five hundred billion yuan in national income.

References

1. "'红宝书'《毛泽东语录》出版史话," Xinhuanet.com, July 13,2007.
2. "Cultural Revolution," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed January 21, 2013.
3. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995).
4. Jonathan Spence, "Introduction to the Cultural Revolution," Spice, Stanford, Fall 2007.
5. Melvyn C. Goldstein and Ben Jiao, On the Cultural Revolution in Tibet: The Nyemo Incident of 1969 (University of California Press, 2010), 11.

Abbreviation

Communist Youth League of China (中国共产主义青年团)

The term refers to a work unit, or a place of employment, in China. The word danwei literally means unit and is an abbreviation of work unit.

Work units served as social organizations with the function of controlling all aspects of life for their employees, from cradle to grave. Until the "reform and opening up" period of the late 1970s, work units provided employees with accommodation, medical care, canteens offering low-priced food and even education for their children.

Employees' lives were tightly tied to their work units by the administrative powers of these organizations. Private affairs such as marriage, divorce and travel all needed prior approval from the work unit.

Larger work units usually operated as an isolated mini-society. The social functions provided by work units began to vanish in the 1980s, when the government began reforming state-owned enterprises and loosened its control over the economy.

References

1. "Danwei people become citizens," the Economist, September 4, 2003.
2. David Bray, Social Space And Governance In Urban China: The Danwei System From Origins To Reform (Stanford University Press, 2005).

The so-called "democratic parties" in China refer to eight non-communist political parties permitted to exist under the ruling Communist Party of China (CPC), on the condition they do not challenge the Party's leadership.

They are:

• China Revolutionary Committee of the Kuomintang
• China Democratic League
• China National Democratic Construction Association
• China Association for Promoting Democracy
• Chinese Peasants' and Workers' Democratic Party
• China Zhi Gong Party (Party for Public Interests)
• Jiu San (Sept. 3rd) Society
• Taiwan Democratic Self-Government League.

The eight parties were all founded before the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, mainly during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-45) and the CPC-Kuomintang War (1945-49). After their establishment, they gradually cooperated with the CPC, fighting against Kuomintang rule, and eventually accepting the CPC leadership.

The basic principle of the cooperation between the CPC and democratic parties is "long-term coexistence, mutual supervision, sincere treatment with each other and sharing of weal or woe," according to the constitution of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC).

In theory, they enjoy "political freedom, organizational independence and lawful equality" within the fixed scope of the state Constitution.

However, these are not political parties in the common definition – they do not aspire to take over leadership nor do they function as parliamentary opposition. To participate in political life and deliberate on state issues, the parties must abide by the system of "multi-party cooperation and political consultation led by the Communist Party of China" outlined in the Constitution.

"In certain cases of the governance, ‘democratic parties' are able to give advice and participate; but in matters of significance they can never propose any independent idea that differs from the CPC," according to Randall Doyle and Zhang Boshu in "Modern China and the New World".

By the end of 2011, these democratic parties had more than 800,000 members in total, mainly comprising intellectuals, industrialists and overseas Chinese.

References

1. "八大民主党派," 中国共产党新闻网, accessed January 11, 2013.
2. "多党合作的基本方针--'十六字方针'," people.com.cn, accessed January 11, 2013.
3. "《中国的政党制度》," 中国共产党新闻, accessed January 11, 2013.
4. "中国民主党派开始集中换届实现"新老交替""政治交接"," 新华网, December 4, 2012.
5. Bo Zhiyue, "State power and governance structures," in Chris Ogden ed. Handbook of China's Governance and Domestic Politics (London: Routledge), 15.
6. "Constitution of the People's Republic of China: Amendment Two," people.com.cn, accessed January 18, 2013.
7. "Democratic Parties," people.com.cn, accessed January 11, 2013.
8. "[Democratic parties] Multi-party Cooperation and the Political Consultative System," Gov.cn, accessed July 18, 2012.
9. "IV. The System of Multi-Party Cooperation and Political Consultation," china.org.cn, accessed January 18, 2013.
10. Randall Doyle and Zhang Boshu, Modern China and the New World: The Reemergence of the Middle Kingdom in the 21st Century (Lexington Books, 2011), 124.
11. Susan Lawrence and Michael Martin, "Understanding China's Political System," Congressional Research Service, May 10, 2012, 25-26.

The Deng Xiaoping Theory, short for the "Deng Xiaoping Theory on building Socialism with Chinese characteristics", is a series of political and economic ideologies first introduced by the late paramount leader.

Seen as a major departure from Mao Zedong Thought, the theory emphasized economic construction and stability. According to Deng, "economic development is the centre of party work."

The theory, which encapsulates Deng's various policy pronouncements since the Third Plenum of the 11th Party Congress of the Communist Party in 1978, was written into the Party's constitution at the 15th Party Congress in 1997 as a guiding ideology, together with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

References

1. "邓小平理论的提出," Xinhuanet,com, accessed August 22, 2012.
2. "中共将科学发展观写入党章," 中华人民共和国科学技术部, October 22, 2007.
3. "Deng Xiaoping Theory," China Daily, accessed August 22, 2012.
4. "Hu Jintao applauds Jiang's report at Party Congress," People's Daily, November 9, 2002.

The Diaoyutai guesthouse is China's state guesthouse. Located in Beijing, the traditional-style building, flanked by bronze lions, has welcomed foreign dignitaries from U.S. president Richard Nixon to Russian president Boris Yeltsin

Official foreign guests often stay at the guesthouse and its meeting rooms are used to hold high-level discussions such as the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue.

The guesthouse was originally built to welcome visitors for the 10th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 1959. Since then, more than 1,000 foreign heads of state and ministers, such as Britain's Queen Elizabeth II, former prime minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew, and former prime minister of Japan Kakuei Tanaka, have stayed in its lakeside villas.

Diaoyutai State Guesthouse is available to the public if no head of state is staying there, but it does not come cheap. One carton of Diaoyutai cigarettes costs 600 yuan ($100) and one day at No.18 villa at Diaoyutai State Guesthouse costs $50,000.

References

1. "钓鱼台总厨师长披露：招待外宾的国宴菜单," Xinhuanet.com, February 19, 2005.
2. "Diaoyutai State Guesthouse Introduction," Diaoyutai State Guesthouse, accessed August 24, 2012.
3. Zhang Ming'ai, "Diaoyutai State Guesthouse accessible to the public," China.org.cn, October 14, 2007.

Shuanggui, or "double regulation", is an internal disciplinary measure used by the Party, which requires officials accused of wrongdoing to respond to charges against them at a designated time and place.

In China, senior Party officials cannot be arrested by civilian law enforcement bodies or other outside agencies for criminal offences until the Party's Discipline Commission has investigated first.

But to investigate an official, the commission needs to get approval from the Party organ at the next level above the official. That means the more senior a cadre is, the more difficult it may be for the commission to investigate, as senior leaders attempt to protect their protégés or if other leaders want to avoid angering a mentor by investigating his protégé.

The use of extra-judicial shuanggui is designed to be an effective and important means to investigate crucial cases, preventing corrupt officials from fleeing and extracting their confessions via a shrouded Soviet-style disciplinary machine.

Its hallmarks are isolation and harsh interrogation techniques, Flora Sapio, a visiting scholar at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, told The New York Times. The Dui Hua Foundation, a non-profit humanitarian organization in San Francisco, wrote that suspects have been subject to simulated drowning, cigarette burns and beatings.

Lin Zhe, a professor at the Central Party School and expert on anti-corruption theories, denied torture in shuanggui, and said that the Central Discipline Inspection Commission would prepare medical staff for the detainees and provide regular body checks to avoid torture.

"It's as if you've fallen into a legal black hole," Ding Xikui, a prominent defense lawyer, told The New York Times. "Once you are called in, you almost never walk out a free man." He added that those in detention are not allowed to meet family members and do not have access to lawyers.

From November 2007 to June 2012, more than 660,000 Party members were under shuanggui and punished for disciplinary violations by the Party's anti-corruption bodies at various levels, then-CPC Central Discipline Inspection Commission head He Guoqiang announced in October 2012.

In May 2005, Liang Yuncai, former chairperson and Party leader of Hebei International Trust and Investment Company (deputy-bureau-director level) was beaten to death by three guards during shuanggui, two months after he was taken away from home.

In August 2012, Xu Xiangjun, former inspection team leader of Miluo Municipal Housing Management Bureau in Hunan Province, dashed out of his room when the iron door was opened by the dustman for daily housekeeping, ran up to the fourth floor of a residential building nearby and jumped to kill himself during shuanggui, Xinhua reported.

Others are stripped of Party membership and wealth following their confessions, and handed over to government prosecutors for trials that are closed to the public. Of the 660,000 officials punished since 2007, 24,000 were transferred to the judicial system.

The Party's most severe punishment is expulsion from the Party. Lesser punishments include: warning, serious warning, removed from Party position, and probation within the Party, depending on the harm and loss caused by the official's wrongdoing.

References

1. Andrew Jacobs, "Accused Chinese Party Members Face Harsh Discipline," The New York Times, June 14, 2012.
2. Choi Chi-yuk, "Another top official in Guangdong falls - Labour chief sacked as anti-graft drive goes on," South China Morning Post, May 19, 2009.
3. "Official Fear: Inside a Shuanggui Investigation Facility," Dui Hua Foundation, July 5, 2012.
4. "Over 660,000 officials punished in five years," Xinhua News Agency, October 8, 2012.
5. Richard McGregor, The Party: The Secret World of China's Communist Rulers (Penguin Books, 2011), 137-138.
6. Wang Xiangwei, "A fine line between fighting graft and providing justice," South China Morning Post, February 7, 2005.
7. Zhuang Pinghui, "Troubled drug agency's deputy sanctioned," South China Morning Post, June 5, 2010.
8. "贺国强: 不断以反腐倡廉建设新成效取信于民," Xinhuanet.com, October 10, 2012.
9. 刘刚 & 赵力, "湖南一官员‘双规'间跳楼身亡，已交代违纪行为," Xinhuanet.com, August 17, 2012.
10. 罗昌平, "河北国投原董事长离奇死亡案 双规期间被殴致死," people.com.cn, November 11, 2005.
11. 王巍 & 张丽锦, "中纪委官员解读‘双规'," china.com.cn, September 29, 2004.
12. "专家解读：中纪委如何肃贪," people.com.cn, October 15, 2009.

The term he cha, or "drink tea", is an euphemism used by netizens to describe the act of being summoned for interrogation or questioning, generally conducted by the state security forces known as guobao (国保),or domestic security.

An actual cup of tea may or may not be offered during the interrogation session. It is considered to be a relatively mild form of engagement by security forces.

According to the Chinese language website "Records of Drinking Tea", where those interrogated share their experiences, a tea talk usually follows this script: two or more state security agents call on the interrogatee at home or at work, or phone for a compulsory appointment. The interrogation generally takes place in police stations, secluded offices at workplaces or in schools, or even in one's home. A tea talk lasts from at least one hour to several hours.

References

1. "突然机密 国安搜捕军事迷," Ming Pao, August 11, 2011, Factiva.
2. Mark McDonald, "A Chinese Scholar, Summoned for Tea," International Herald Tribune, March 4, 2012.
3. "Records of ‘Drinking Tea'," China Digital Times, accessed August 27, 2012.

This prestigious kindergarten was set up in 1948 in the Huadong military district in Shandong to look after the children of Communist soldiers and cadres during the CPC-Kuomintang War (1945-1949). In 1949, the nursery and 184 attendees and teachers relocated to Shanghai, where the school cared for the children of elite cadres.

One of the founders of the nursery, Deng Liujin, is the mother of Zeng Qinghong, former vice-president of China. Deng's husband, Zeng Shan, went on to hold the position of minister of internal affairs from 1960-69.

Many students of the nursery, such as Politburo member Liu Yandong, former deputy commander of Beijing Military Region Su Rongsheng, and NPC standing committee member Bai Keming, have gone on to high-level political careers and are said to have benefited from these personal connections built during their early years.

References

1. "[邓妈妈]在政坛举足轻重," Singtao Daily, July 24, 2003, Factiva
2. "历史课," Jiefang Daily, June 1, 2012
3. "特稿：回忆文章：怀念宽怀慈爱的奶奶邓六金," chinanews.com.cn, July 23, 2003.
4. "拥名牌大学博士衔刘延东是官场才女," Sing Tao Daily, May 29, 2004, Factiva
5. "幼儿园园史," 上海市市级机关第一幼儿园, accessed August 24, 2012.
6. "曾山简历," 中国社会报, September 23, 2009, Factiva

The four-character phrase "ba rong, ba chi" or "Eight Honors, Eight Disgraces," is a set of moral concepts introduced by President Hu Jintao in March 2006 as part of his plan to construct a harmonious society. The concept's formal name is "Socialist Concepts on Honors and Disgraces".

These guidelines are designed to set out the correct view of honor and disgrace, and foster socialist ideology and morality as the "new moral yardstick to measure the work, conduct and attitude of Communist Party officials," according to the official Xinhua News Agency.

According to the China Media Project at the University of Hong Kong, "Mostly for political show, the policy is designed to mollify Leftist elements within the Party who have spoken out against the excesses brought on by China's commercialization drive."

Xinhua released an English translation, writing "in the Chinese language the list of eight honors and disgraces reads like rhyming couplets and sounds almost poetic."

• Love the country; do it no harm.
• Serve the people; do no disservice.
• Follow science; discard ignorance.
• Be diligent; not indolent.
• Be united, help each other; make no gains at other's expense.
• Be honest and trustworthy; do not trade ethics for profits.
• Be disciplined and law-abiding, not chaotic and lawless.
• Live plainly, struggle hard; do not wallow in luxuries and pleasure

References

1. "CPC sets moral yardstick for officials," Xinhuanet.com, April 4, 2006.
2. "Eight Honors and Eight Disgraces," China Media Project, accessed August 22, 2012.

Under the government's "Great External Propaganda Plan," launched by President Hu Jintao in 2002, China has invested heavily in wai xuan, or external propaganda, spending billions of dollars on the overseas expansion of its mainstream media outlets to improve China's image internationally and as Hu said, "the voice of China better heard in international affairs," according to the Wall Street Journal.

China launched a 24-hour English language all-news TV channel, CNC World, run by the Xinhua News Agency in July 2010, Arabic and Russian language channels run by CCTV in July and September 2009, and the English edition of the Beijing-based mouthpiece Global Times in April 2009.

CCTV opened its Africa broadcast center in Nairobi in January 2012, and a Washington DC bureau one month later. Most of the international staff hired by CCTV America had worked for leading international media, such as ABC, CBS, CNBC and Bloomberg.

References

1. "《环球时报》英文版创刊," huanqiu.com, April 19, 2009.
2. 刘箴, "向世界展现真实的非洲," enorth.com.cn, January 2, 2012.
3. "田进焦利出席中央电视台俄语国际频道开播仪式," The State Administration of Radio Film and Television, September 15, 2009.
4. "新华社主办英语电视台正式开播 24小时滚动播出," people.com.cn, July 2, 2010.
5. "中央电视台阿拉伯语国际频道7月25日开播," cctv.com, July 24, 2009.
6. "About the Global Times," Global Times, accessed August 23, 2012.
7. Andrew Jacobs, "Pursuing Soft Power, China Puts Stamp on America's News," New York Times, August 16, 2012.
8. "CCTV to launch Russian channel," CCTV, September 3, 2009.
9. "CCTV launches Arabic international channel," CCTV, July 24, 2009.
10. "China's New Propaganda Machine," The Wall Street Journal, January 30, 2009, 2011.
11. "China's State-Run CCTV Seeks to Grow English Speaking Audience," Voice of America, February 15, 2012.
12. Feter Foster, "China launches global news TV station," The Telegraph, February 11, 2012.
13. Kathrin Hille, "Beijing Makes Voice Heard in US," Financial Times, February 14, 2012.
14. Ray Suarez, "China's Programming for U.S. Audiences: Is it News or Propaganda?," PBS Newshour, March 23, 2012.
15. "Xinhua launches CNC World," XINHUANET.com, July 2, 2010.

The emerging fifth generation refers to political leaders who took over the top seats of power at the 18th Party Congress in November 2012. This cohort is led by Xi Jinping, who replaced Hu Jintao as the Party’s General Secretary and chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission. Xi is poised to become president in March 2013.

Most fifth-generation leaders were born in the postwar years, from 1950 to 1959 and were educated at elite universities in China and abroad. Unlike their predecessors who mostly majored in engineering and science, most of the fifth generation studied economics, finance, law, or the humanities.

For example, Xi holds a doctorate in law from the prestigious Tsinghua University (he studied chemical engineering as an undergraduate), while premier-in-waiting Li Keqiang earned a PhD in economics from the equally prestigious Peking University.

In addition, Politburo member Li Yuanchao studied public administration at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government in 2002.

In addition to Xi and Li, other prominent figures include Politburo Standing Committee members Yu Zhengsheng, Zhang Dejiang, Wang Qishan, Wang Yang, and Zhang Gaoli.

References

1. Cheng Li, China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy, (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 99.
2. Lawrence R. Sulliva, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party (Scarecrow Press,2011), 147.
3. Mark Landler and Edward Wong, “With Edge, U.S. Greets China’s Heir Apparent”, New York Times, February 14, 2012, .
4. "Understanding Xi Jinping and China’s New Generation of Leaders,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, February 13, 2012.

The first generation of leadership refers to the Party’s leaders from the period between the 1935 Zunyi Conference – when chairman Mao Zedong took power – to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976.

The core leader of this generation is Mao Zedong. Its members include Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping and Lin Biao.

Leaders of the first generation were born around 1900 and lived through drastic changes in China, including the demise of the Qing Dynasty, the birth of the Republic of China, the second Sino-Japanese War, the founding of the People's Republic of China and the Cultural Revolution. Many leaders from this era were charismatic and derived their political legitimacy from their role in the revolution, according to China expert Joseph Fewsmith from Boston University.

Deng Xiaoping deemed it the first “stable and mature collective leadership” since the birth of the Communist Party of China in 1921.

The guiding political ideologies of this generation were Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought.

References

1. "邓小平论毛泽东 思想培育了我们整整一代人," 中国共产党新闻网, accessed February 19, 2013.
2. "鄧小平著手選拔第三代領導人：認為自己'分量太重'(2)," 人民网, April 11, 2011.
3. "第一代中央領導集體形成——兼談毛澤東核心地位怎樣確立," cpc.people.com.cn, February 7, 2012.
4. "毛泽东在遵义会议是怎样成为领导核心的," 新华网, January 6, 2011.
5. Joseph Fewsmith, “Generational Transition in China,” The Washington Quarterly, 2002, 25:4, pp.23, in C.X.George Wei, “The Cultural Revolution and Its Impact on the Fourth Generation of the Communist Leadership,” The Journal of Comparative Asian Development, 2006, Vol.5, No.1:203.
6. "WE MUST FORM A PROMISING COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP THAT WILL CARRY OUT REFORM," peopledaily.com.cn, May 31, 1989.

Hu Jintao's elevation to vice president in 1998 was seen as the first clear sign of the rise of the fourth generation of leaders, according to China expert Cheng Li, writing for The China Quarterly in 2000.

The leaders of the fourth generation were born between 1941 and 1956, whose formative years were during the Cultural Revolution, according to Cheng Li . The fourth generation is characterized by common political and social experience, rather than age, noted Cheng Li. However, the tenure of the fourth generation of leaders is generally understood as lasting from 2002 to the 18th Party Congress in 2012.

Other representatives of the fourth generation of Chinese leaders include Wen Jiabao, Wu Bangguo and Zeng Qinghong.

Compared with former generations, the fourth generation is more technocratic by training and more pragmatic in their thinking, wrote China experts Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley in their book China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files.

They inherited the world’s fastest growing economy, but have grappled with polarizing disparity between the rich and poor, growing corruption and social unrest.

Like every generation of Chinese leaders, Hu Jintao also marked his era with his own ideologies, including “scientific development” and “harmonious society”. However, this generation has seen palpable signs of social unrest increasing over the years, such as protests over environment, land use and labor rights.

References

1. Andrew J. Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, (The New York Review of Books, 2002), 11, 21
2. Cheng Li, Chinese Leaders: The New Generation, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, February 21, 2001), 10.
3. Cheng Li, “Jiang Zemin’s Successors: The Rise of the Fourth Generation of Leaders in the PRC”, The China Quarterly, 161 (March 2000), JSTOR
4. David Michael Finkelstein and Maryanne Kivlehan, China’s Leadership in the 21st Century: The Rise of The Fourth Generation, (M.E. Sharp, 2002), 16.
5. Nicoletta Ferro, "The Chinese Path to Sustainable Development, a Critical Analysis of Reality and Propaganda," Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, September 2009.
6. Shi Jiatao, “President Hu Jintao’s legacy seen as one of stability but stagnation”, South China Morning Post, September 7, 2012.

The Gang of Four was a political faction that gained power in the late 1960s, led by Mao Zedong’s wife, Jiang Qing. The group has been blamed for the excesses of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), considered one of the most turbulent periods in modern China’s history.

The group had four key members: Jiang Qing, Yao Wenyuan, Wang Hongwen and Zhang Chunqiao. Other Party officials promoted during the Cultural Revolution include: military leader Lin Biao, who was considered to be Mao’s heir-apparent until he died in a mysterious plane crash; former National People’s Congress vice-chairman Kang Sheng; and Chen Boda, who had served as Mao Zedong’s personal assistant.

Soon after Mao’s death in 1976, his designated successor, Hua Guofeng worked with military leaders Ye Jianying and Wang Dongxing to remove the Gang of Four from power, marking the end of the Cultural Revolution.

In June 1980, the Central Committee set up a special committee to coordinate the Gang of Four’s trial and punishment. The special committee’s sentencing recommendations were “soon adopted by the jurors and approved by the Central Committee” according to Wu Xiuquan, deputy chief judge of the special court.

The committee also ordered the Ministry of Justice to form a lawyers group to defend the four. However, the 17 lawyers were told by the Ministry that “facts and convictions are set in stone” and they didn’t receive the relevant documents until a week before the trial. There were two rehearsals before the real trial, and witnesses were trained to accuse the defendant in court, according to an official account published on a state-run website.

The trial started on November 20, 1980 and lasted for two months and seven days, consisting of 42 court sessions.

On the morning of January 25, 1981, following the committee’s directive, Jiang Qing was sentenced to death for organizing and leading counter-revolutionary groups; plotting to subvert the government; counter-revolutionary propaganda and demagoguery; as well as slander and framing others. She was given a two-year reprieve and lifelong deprivation of political rights. In January 1983, her sentence was reduced to life imprisonment. On May 14, 1991, Jiang Qing hung herself to death while on medical parole.

Zhang Chunqiao received the death penalty for instigating armed rebellion, with a two-year reprieve and life-long deprivation of political rights. His sentence was also reduced to life imprisonment in 1983. In 1997, Zhang Chunqiao had his sentence further reduced to 18 years’ imprisonment. On April 21, 2005, he died of cancer on medical parole.

Wang Hongwen was sentenced to life imprisonment and deprivation of political rights. He died of liver disease on August 3, 1992 while on medical parole.

Yao Wenyuan was sentenced to a 20-year term in prison, with a five-year deprivation of political rights. He was released on October 5, 1996 after serving his term and passed away in December 2005.

References

1. "党史专家：重温粉碎'四人帮'的历史意义," 新华网, December 12, 2011.
2. “华国锋叶剑英指挥 我们亲历抓捕看押'四人帮',” 中国共产党新闻，accessed February 19, 2013.
3. “江青的所谓'绝命书'：主席除刘未除邓，后患无穷,” 人民网，March 30, 2012.
4. "審判「四人幫」的前前後後," 文匯網, September 22, 2012.
5. “审判'四人帮：认罪态度最好的王洪文为何被重判？(2),” 人民网，April 6, 2012.
6. “审判'四人帮：认罪态度最好的王洪文为何被重判？(3),” 人民网，April 6, 2012.
7. “伍修权,” GOV.cn，October 23, 2008.
8. “姚文元：“四人帮”中唯一活着走出秦城监狱的人(4),” 人民网，April 9, 2012.
9. "张春桥靠心理承受能力成'四人帮'最长寿之人," 中国新闻网, January 29, 2013.
10. “張思之口述：審判'四人幫'，我為異端辯護(2),” 人民网，June 10, 2011.
11. “張思之口述：審判'四人幫'，我為異端辯護(4),” 人民网，June 10, 2011.
12. "Yao Wenyuan; Gang of Four Propagandist," The Washington Post, January 9, 2006, Factiva.

China scholars and observers commonly refer to successive cohorts of Chinese leadership by "generation", since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

Mao Zedong was the key figure of the first generation, which lasted from the Zunyi Conference in 1935 to the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976. Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Ren Bishi, Chen Yun and Lin Biao were also first generation leaders.

The second generation, led by Deng Xiaoping, began with the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978 and ended with the Fourth Plenary Session of the Thirteenth CPC Central Committee in 1989.

Jiang Zemin was at the core of third-generation leadership, which began after the Fourth Plenary Session in 1989.

The fourth generation began in 2002 and was led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, who transfered power to the fifth generation at the 18th Party Congress at the end of 2012, when Hu stepped down as the Party's general secretary and was replaced by Xi Jinping.

Prominent figures in the fifth generation include Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang, Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli.

References

1. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China, (Chinese University Press, 1995).
2. H. Lyman Miller, "Beijing Sets the Stage to Convene the 16th Party Congress," China Leadership Monitor No. 4, accessed 24 July 2012.
3. Mark Landler and Edward Wong, "With Edge, U.S. Greets China's Heir Apparent," The New York Times, February 14, 2012.

Gerontocracy refers to a form of oligarchical rule in which a group of older leaders dominates or exercises control, which acutely slows generational changes of leadership. The Chinese gerontocracy was gradually formed in the 1970s, reached its peak in the late 1980s, and faded out after the mid-1990s.

Paramount leader Mao Zedong held absolute power until his death in 1976, and his successor, Deng Xiaoping, retained powerful influence well into his 80s.

The gerontocracy phenomenon was the result of the lack of a retirement mechanism for cadres, according to the book, "The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Elite Politics" by Kou Jianwen. Early Chinese communist cadres would remain in their positions as long as they were healthy enough to work.

The average age of new members of the Politburo elected at the 12th Party Congress in 1982 was above 70. Many of these aged leaders gained their positions through seniority, and the issue was not limited to the central government – even top cadres at Shandong coalmines held on to their positions well into old age.

References

1. Bryan Johnson, "China launches plan to foster promotion of younger leaders," Globe and Mail, March 11, 1980.
2. Christopher S. Wren, "China's Career Ladders Are Crowded By Gerontocracy," New York Times, October 10, 1982.
3. Kou Jianwen, The Evolution of the Chinese Communist Elite Politics: Institutionalization and Transfer of Power 1978-2004 (中共精英政治的演变: 制度化与权力转移, 1978-2004), (Wunan Book Inc, 2005), 30-31.
4. Rone Tempest, "Next Step: China's Power Game: Who will succeed leader Deng Xiaoping? Top players are jockeying for position," Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1995.

This term represents an important trend since the "reform and opening up" of China in 1978, when more and more people started commercial activities, in particular, government officials and state employees, who gave up their secure jobs in the traditional political system to jump into the sea of commerce.

Those who took the plunge sought their fortunes through commerce, setting up government companies, becoming private entrepreneurs, or working for foreign businesses. In many cases, one spouse would take a job in the non-government sector, while the other would stay within the government system to maintain government benefits such as housing and pension. This arrangement was called "one family, two systems", a play on Deng's "one country, two systems" arrangement between Mainland China and Hong Kong.

Pan Shiyi, the chairman of SOHO China, the largest real estate developer in Beijing, worked at the former Ministry of Petroleum Industry after college graduation, until he decided to xiahai in 1987 to venture into the property development realm in Shenzhen and Hainan.

In 1992 alone, registered companies in China soared 88 percent and registered capital of private enterprises surged 79 percent. And while the craze for xiahai sustained in the 1990s, some people worried that the country was steering towards money-centered materialism.

References

1. Jane Duckett, The Entrepreneurial State in China: Real Estate and Commerce Departments in Reform Era Tianjin (Routledge 1998), 227.
2. Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Applauds as Its Officials Plunge Into Profit," New York Times, April 9, 1992.
3. "Pan Shiyi," Boao Forum for Asia, accessed August 23, 2012.

The term "golden son-in-law" stems back to the Tang Dynasty and refers to a son-in-law who himself is a rich man or senior official. In modern daily usage, its meaning remains the same.

Some news organizations, including the Hong Kong Economic Journal and Singapore's largest Chinese-language newspaper Lianhe Zaobao, have used the term to describe a non-princeling man who marries a privileged daughter of a high-ranking leader.

In elite Chinese politics, accumulated social capital is essential for promotion into the higher ranks of the Party, the state and the military, and powerful family connections can wield enormous influence.

Prominent figures married to princelings include Wang Qishan, son-in-law of former Vice-Premier Yao Yilin, Dai Bingguo, son-in-law of former Minister of Culture Huang Zhen, and Wang Guangya, son-in-law of former Minister of Foreign Affairs Chen Yi. In the military, Liu Yazhou is the son-in-law of former Chinese President Li Xiannian, and Liu Xiaojiang is son-in-law of former Party general secretary Hu Yaobang.

References

1. "从戴秉国言行看中国外交," Lianhe Zaobao, August 1, 2009, accessed September 3, 2012.
2. "话说'金龟婿'," Yaowen Jiaozi (咬文嚼字), Iss.7, 2008, accessed September 3, 2012, CNKI.
3. "金龟族名人 王毅掌台办," Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 5, 2008, accessed July 11, 2012.
4. "李先念女婿刘亚洲：从作家到空军副政委的成长路," ifeng.com, February 25, 2008.
5. "中华人民共和国中央军事委员会," Xinhuanet.com, January 25, 2002.
6. 钟坚, "解放军晋升6名上将解析 红色血脉军中延续," ifeng.com, August 17, 2011.
7. Ian Johnson, "Elite and Deft, Xi Aimed High Early in China," New York Times, September 29, 2012.

In November 1957, Mao Zedong proposed the lofty goal of overtaking the UK in industrial production within 15 years, leading to the frantic Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1960.

Encouraged by the modest success of the First Five-Year Plan, Mao had abandoned the Soviet model and threw China into a push to modernize agriculture and industry simultaneously. The campaign also accelerated collectivization, with everything from ploughs to housing to food being held in common.

Backyard steel furnaces were built across the country to drive steel production but pursuit of targets meant valuable metal tools were melted down for a substandard product. In rural areas, peasants were mobilized to join mass infrastructure projects such as irrigation, which diverted farm laborers away from agriculture, causing agricultural production to fall.

A mixture of agricultural disruption, misreporting of grain targets and supply chain collapses led to mass starvation, responsible for at least 45 million deaths from 1958 to 1962, according to Frank Dikotter, author of "Mao's Great Famine".

References

1. "二五计划（1958~1962）：大跃进 大倒退," people.com.cn, accessed August 21, 2012.
2. Frank Dikotter, Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958-62 (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2010).
3. Frank Dikotter, "Mao's Great Leap to Famine," International Herald Tribune, December 15, 2010.
4. "Great Leap Forward 大跃进," BBC, September, 1999.
5. Xizhi Peng, "Demographic consequences of the Great Leap Forward in China's Provinces," Population and Development Review, Vol.13, No.4, (December 1987): 639-670.

The Guangdong Clique is a political faction comprised of leaders native to Guangdong province.

Guangdong is the most populated and richest of China’s provinces. Known to be more liberal and willing to experiment in policy, the coastal province was one of the first to open up economically, and is widely known as the “southern gate” of China.

For two decades after the end of the Cultural Revolution, the Guangdong provincial administration was dominated by local Cantonese, especially officials close to Ye Jianying, a Guangdong native himself. Ye was one of the "Ten Marshals" who led the revolutionary Communist Party Red Army and considered one of China’s most powerful leaders until his death in 1986.

Ye Xuanping, son of Ye Jianying, built his power base in Guangdong during his tenure as the province’s governor in the 1980s, growing the provincial economy, while bucking orders from the central government, the Chicago Times reported in 1991.

The clique remained powerful until 1998, when Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin dealt a deadly blow to the faction by appointing his ally, Li Changchun, a northerner and then Party chief of Henan Province, to lead Guangdong.

After taking office, Li fired, retired or imprisoned a number of the clique’s members for corruption and other economic crimes.

References

1. "2011年各省市人均GDP数据出炉 25省份超4000美元," 新华网, February 7, 2012.
2. "改革开放先行者任仲夷：执掌广东 敢为天下先," 人民网, accessed February 19, 2013.
3. "广东省常住人口数达1.05亿 跃居全国第一位," 环球网, April 20, 2011.
4. "李長春陳至立將升副總理," Sing Tao Daily, December 29, 2001.
5. "李長春將晉京任副總理," Sing Tao Daily, January 10, 2000.
6. "Beijing-backed party boss too powerful for Guangdong clique," South China Morning Post, April 17, 2009.
7. "Hu Jintao's move to consolidate power," The Jamestown Foundation, accessed September 26, 2012.
8. Cheng Li, "Hu’s Southern Expedition:

   Changing Leadership in Guangdong," China Leadership Monitor 24.

9. Uli Schmetzer, "2 Reformers In China Get New Posts," Chicago Tribune, , April 11, 1991.

Guanxi (pronounced "gwan-shee"), or the influence derived from connections and influential relationships, is a central tenet of Chinese society. The powerful cultivate intricate webs of guanxi relationships, culled from extended family, school friends, work colleagues and members of common clubs or organizations.

The term guanxi, which literally translated means "relationships", is used in both English and Chinese to denote the personal connection between two parties from which one or both are able to obtain benefits. More broadly, the term is also used to describe the influence derived from connections and influential relationships.

Cultivating a strong guanxi network is crucial for success in Chinese politics, business and society. "Good guanxi" can help open doors that would otherwise remain closed. In the absence of strong regulation or guidelines, a well-connected person can use their guanxi to their advantage, according to Thomas Gold, Doug Guthrie and David Wank, who have written extensively on the subject.

Guanxi has both positive and negative connotations. Critics of guanxi, they wrote, "see it as fueling the country's rampant corruption, and as an obstacle to China's becoming a modern society based on the rule of law."

References

1. Frederik Balfour, "You Say Guanxi, I Say Schmoozing," Bloomberg Businessweek, November 18, 2007.
2. Thomas Gold & Doug Guthrie eds., "Social Connections in China: Institutions, Culture, and the Changing Nature of Guanxi," (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 8.

"A harmonious society should feature democracy, the rule of law, equity, justice, sincerity, amity and vitality," President Hu Jintao said in 2005.

Together with the "scientific concept of development", "harmonious society" is a political slogan promoted by Hu. It was formally adopted as the Party's "supreme goal in governance" at the sixth plenum of the Central Committee in October 2006.

The slogan was aimed to endear the leadership to the masses, and was supposed to mark a shift in emphasis from Jiang Zemin's growth at all costs to a more balanced approach that intends to develop the hinterland as well as the coast, taking into account factors such as environmental degradation, according to the paper "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?" by China experts Cheng Li and Eve Cary.

There has been social consensus around building a harmonious society since 2006, according to Zheng Gongcheng, director of China's Social Security Research Center at Renmin University.

Relevant programs have been improved, including the introduction of legislation on social security and social welfare issues and the establishment of an emergency response system to deal with national crises such as environmental disasters and social chaos, he said in an interview with state media.

Some urgent or long-lasting problems have been solved or reduced, Zheng said, such as the implementation of compulsory education, reform of the medical system and affordable housing.

However, with the wealth gap, official corruption and spending on internal public security all growing to unprecedented levels, society may have been left "anything but harmonious", wrote Li and Cary.

References

1. "郑功成：社会主义和谐社会建设取得显著成果," people.com.cn, August 17, 2012.
2. "专家：六中全会进一步完善了现代化建设奋斗目标," XINHUANET.com, October 11, 2006.
3. "Building harmonious society crucial for China's progress: Hu," People's Daily, June 27, 2005.
4. Cheng Li and Eve Cary, "The Last Year of Hu's Leadership: Hu's to Blame?," China Brief Vol.11, Iss.23, accessed March 6, 2012.
5. Lindsay Beck, "From struggle to harmony, China slogans mark Hu era," Reuters, September 7, 2012.
6. Zhengxu Wang, "Hu Jintao's Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China's Elite Politics," Issues & Studies 42, No. 4, (December 2006): 99.

Abbreviation

Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (香港特别行政区)

Four commentary pieces that appeared in the Jiefang Daily, the mouthpiece of the Shanghai Municipal Party Committee, in early 1991, written under the pen name Huang Fuping, caused a storm of controversy for defending Deng Xiaoping's reforms. Deng had visited Shanghai from January 28 to February 18 that year, prompting Zhu Rongji, then Shanghai Municipal Party Secretary, to convey his comments to Zhou Ruijin, a Jiefang Daily journalist, who organized writers to produce the editorials.

The third article, published on March 22, criticized some Shanghai leaders for holding back the city's development during the 1980s and called for greater efforts in the 1990s. Under the headline "An Opening-up Consciousness Should be Strengthened," the editorial said Shanghai should not allow itself to be slowed by the "Socialism or Capitalism" question.

Soon the People's Daily and Guangming Daily, both mouthpieces of the Party, attacked Huang Fuping's stance, repeating that when dealing with any issue it must first be established whether it is socialist or capitalist. This, the commentary argued, would prevent decisions leading to capitalism and the destruction of socialism in China.

The Shanghai Party committee protected the writers of the articles by purposely playing down the incident. Meanwhile, the then vice-director of the Shanghai Party Committee's Publicity Department, Liu Ji, sent a report and some materials to Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to explain the whole process of how the articles were produced.

The ideological debate took a sharp turn in Deng's favor when Jiang Zemin gave a speech at the Party's 70th anniversary ceremony in July 1991 emphasizing the importance of promoting the reform and opening up policy. Mention in the speech of Deng's reform theory was viewed as a political gesture showing Jiang was also pro-reform. After Jiang's stance, criticism of Deng's reforms started to fade.

References

1. "皇甫平：扩大改革开放意识要更强烈些," 东方网, accessed August 24, 2012.
2. "‘皇甫平事件'的前前后后," www.ifeng.com cited Yanhuang Chunqiu magazine, September 25, 2009.
3. "China at Another Critical Reform Juncture," caijing.com.cn, January 17, 2012.
4. Henry Yuhuai He, Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China, (M.E. Sharpe, 2001).

The hukou is a resident permit given by the Chinese government. It is issued on a family basis and is required by law in China. Every household has a hukou booklet that contains detailed information about each of the family members.

Without the hukou, citizens are unable to obtain an identity card or a passport, attend school, work or even marry.

Established in 1958 to stop mass migration to the cities, the hukou system divides the population into two classifications: urban and rural. A person with a rural hukou has no access to urban medical care or social security when living in a city and their children find it very difficult to obtain school places.

A child is registered with the same hukou as his or her parents. A child born to a parent with urban hukou is inherently an urbanite. One can transfer his or her hukou for education, employment, or other reasons, but the government limits the number of hukou transfers and imposes high fees on extra births to constrain migration and control population growth.

References

1. "China urges proactive, cautious residency permit reform," Reuters, February 24, 2012.
2. "Hukou 'an obstacle to market economy'," China Daily, May 21, 2007.
3. "Hukou – longest stopgap policy in China," People's Daily, March 30, 2011.

Inner-party democracy is described by Yu Keping, a noted Party theoretician and advisor to Hu Jintao, as an important way to promote Chinese-style incremental democracy, through which the Communist Party hopes to institutionalize its procedures and make them more transparent, in order to enhance the Party's ruling capacity and leadership.

The term "inner-Party democracy" was first used by Jiang Zemin during a speech at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. The Chinese leader said that "inner-Party democracy' is the "lifeblood" of the Party and plays a crucial role in people's democracy.

Guidelines on developing inner-Party democracy were established at the Party Congress, which state that the realization and improvement of inner-party democracy must 1) fully reflect the will of Party members and organizations; 2) begin with the reform of the relevant systems and mechanisms; 3) guarantee the democratic rights for all Party members; and 4) prioritize the systems of Party Congress and of Party committees.

At a 2009 Politburo meeting, Hu Jintao reiterated the importance of inner-party democracy, saying it will help the Party to "perform its duty as the ruling party in more scientific and democratic ways and in accordance with the law."

References

1. 俞可平, "增量民主: 中国特色政治模式," Beijing Daily, November 28, 2011.
2. "Big Surprise," The Economist, December 17, 2009.
3. C. Fred Bergsten, Charles Freeman, Nicholas R. Lardy and Derek J. Mitchell, China's Rise: Challenges and opportunities (Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 23, 2008), 62.
4. Cheng Li, "China's Inner Party Democracy: Towards a System of ‘One Party, Two Factions'," China Brief, Vol.6, Iss.24, (May 9, 2007).
5. Cheng Li, "The Chinese Communist Party: Recruiting and Controlling the New Elites," Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 38, 3, 13-33, (2009).
6. "CPC chief Hu Jintao stresses inner-party democracy," China Daily, July 1, 2009.
7. "CPC inner-party democracy: theory, practice and institutionalization," china.org.cn, accessed August 18, 2012.
8. Joseph Fewsmith, "Inner-Party Democracy: Development and Limitations," China Leadership Monitor 31 (2010): 1.

The term refers to a form of media digest that is custom-made for Chinese political leaders within high-level government or decision-making circles. Media organizations operated by the government or a Party department, in particular the official Xinhua News Agency, are required to file these reports. The system guarantees officials have access to sensitive information that is inaccessible for ordinary citizens because of media censorship.

The content includes important domestic and overseas news on a daily basis. Most content is coded as state secrets with different sensitive classifications. Officials at different levels are authorized to read only references with a corresponding security level. The purpose of producing such news is to optimize the government's decision-making process by providing leadership with reports on social issues and policy suggestions that are too sensitive to be published in the popular media.

Ordinary citizens normally do not have access to the internal reference. Unauthorized reading or leaking of the content of internal reference files to foreigners or foreign media can lead to imprisonment on the grounds of leaking state secrets.

References

1. "陈植源, 发挥《内参》在舆论监督中的作用," people.com.cn, accessed July 9, 2012.
2. "吉林内参," Xinhuanet.com, accessed July 9, 2012.
3. "内参报道的拓展与延伸," people.com.cn, July 23, 2007.
4. "谌彦辉, 内参揭秘," 凤凰周刊, June 23, 2005.

The Jiangsu Clique is a term used by media and academics to refer to officials who rise from Jiangsu Province to higher posts, usually of national significance.

Their rise is partially because of Jiangsu’s status as an economic powerhouse – its GDP accounted for more than 10 percent of the national total in 2011. Xinhua news agency has labeled the coastal province north of Shanghai as the “land of fish and rice”.

In 2007, Li Yuanchao was appointed head of the Party’s powerful human resources department – the Central Organization Department – after serving four years as Jiangsu Party chief.

“Jiangsu officials who used to work under Mr Li now enjoy bright prospects for being transferred to posts of national significance,” according to Zhengxu Wang, a senior fellow at the China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham.

References

1. "江苏概览," 新华网, accessed February 19, 2013.
2. "自然资源," 新华网, accessed February 19, 2013.
3. "Jiangsu Gang could hold sway," Straits Times, June 22, 2009.
4. Statistics of Suzhou and national GDP from 中国统计年鉴2011.

Socialist and communist movements adopted the terms "the Left" and "the Right", with leftism defined as revolutionary and in pursuit of a classless society, and rightism as bourgeois and reactionary.

Leftism and rightism are by nature subjective and their definitions within CPC politics have varied over time.

In its broadest strokes, the Left advocates a stronger governmental role in the economy and egalitarian income distribution, while the Right favors more freedom of privatization, and tolerates greater income inequality.

Mao Zedong adopted Stalin's theory that history moved from "primitive communism to feudalism to capitalism to communism" and anything that contributed to this direction was "progressive" and hence leftist. He labeled as leftist those with the "correct" attitude toward historical change and helped push historical progress at a proper speed, while those who failed to do so were labeled as rightist.

Under Mao, the accepted view was that "Left is better than Right" meaning leftist indiscretions, such as errors made during the Great Leap Forward, were seen as much less threatening to China's socialist development than any actions from the Right.

The period from 1958 to 1976, which included the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, is seen in hindsight as being led by ultra-leftist forces.

Mao had close personal ties to the ultra-leftists at the time, from his wife Jiang Qing to political figures who owed their careers to his patronage, including Lin Biao. After Mao's death in 1976, the ultra-leftist Gang of Four was prosecuted.

The political climate swung to the right under Deng Xiaoping, whose 1978 "Reform and Opening Up" policy brought market reforms and pushed China in a new direction. The country witnessed intense debates between leftists and rightists over the speed and content of those reforms.

In the post-Tiananmen era, neo-leftists and neo-rightists have emerged with a new focus on central power and the question of whether, and how, to address issues related to economic and political reforms.

Generally speaking, the leftists nowadays are seen as the most ideological and strictest adherents to Mao Zedong Thought, impelled partly by a nostalgic yearning for the past and partly by a strong discontent with the current social status quo.

They favor more government intervention in handling issues of social inequality that have arisen during the economic development. It is worth noting that the neo-left doesn't fully reject the marketization of economic life, but stresses a stronger socialist state.

The rightists are widely viewed as individualistic people who agree that personal interests take priority over national interests. They mainly comprise liberal intellectuals and economists who prefer the market economy and corporate privatization.

Often seen as being pro-West, they advocate capitalist-style economic reforms and opening up, and a transition to a modern civilization via political reforms to achieve their universal values, including democracy, human rights and liberty.

References

1. Andrew J. Nathan and Tianjin Shi, "Left and right with Chinese characteristics: issues and alignments in Deng Xiaoping's China," World Politics, Vol.48 (1996): 526-27.
2. "China's reform is beyond left-right conflict," Global Times, July 6, 2011.
3. Henry Yuhuai He, Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China (M.E. Sharpe, 2001).
4. Jian Junbo, "China at a crossroad: Right or left?," Asia Times Online, April 24, 2009.
5. Mukul Devichand, "How the West shaped China's hidden battle of ideas," BBC, July 9, 2012.
6. Roderick MacFarquhar, The Cambridge History of China: Volume 15, The People's Republic, Part 2, Revolutions Within the Chinese Revolution, 1966-1982 (Cambridge University Press, 1991).
7. Russel Leigh Moses, "Right, Left or Centre in China?," the Diplomat, May 9, 2011
8. William A. Joseph, The Critique of Ultra-Leftism in China, 1958-1981 (Stanford University Press,1984).

The Lost Generation refers to sent-down, or rusticated, youth who were sent to work in the countryside from 1968 to 1980. Schools were closed and university entry was disrupted, which meant a whole generation had little or no access to formal education during this period.

Mao Zedong believed young people in cities should be sent to the countryside to learn from the rural poor and lower-middle peasants. Around 17 million teens were sent to farmland in rural China from 1968 to 1980, according to official estimates.

Many grasped at the chance to return to the cities in 1977 when the university entrance exam was reinstated. However, university slots were limited and many youths were unsuccessful.

In response to the hardships suffered, the Lost Generation created a new literary genre called "Scar Literature", which drew on their experiences.

References

1. 潘鸣啸, "失落的一代：中国的上山下乡运动（1968～1980）," people.com.cn, accessed October 16, 2012.
2. Cheng Li, China's Changing Political Landscape: Prospects for Democracy (Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 100, 102.
3. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995), 395.
4. Henry Yuhuai He, Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China (M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 377.
5. Malcolm Moore, "China sends unemployed graduates to teach countryside peasants in 'Mao policy'," The Telegraph, December 25, 2008.
6. Steven W. Mosher, Broken Earth (Simon and Schuster, 1984), 140.

Mao Zedong Thought is an ideology based on the writings and actions of Mao, brought to the fore by early revolutionaries including Lin Biao and Liu Shaoqi, which is one of the guiding ideologies for the Chinese Communist Party.

The term Mao Zedong Thought first appeared in the Party mouthpiece Jiefang Ribao (Liberation Daily) on July 8, 1943 in Yan'an Communist base during National Liberation War. Developed during the 1950s and 1960s, the thought was based on the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism and was widely used as the Party's political and military guiding theory.

Three key aspects of the Thought are: seeking truth from facts, pursuing the mass line, and sticking to the principle of independence.

Support for Mao Zedong Thought reached its peak during the Cultural Revolution, when the ideology was "the sun that never sets" for the movement's Red Guards. Fervent obsession with Mao Zedong Thought cooled in 1977, one year after Mao's death, when Deng Xiaoping argued it should be understood "comprehensively and correctly," not as Mao's own ideology, but as a "crystallization of the collective wisdom of the Chinese Communist Party."

References

1. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (The Chinese University Press, 1995).
2. "Mao Zedong - Comments and Historical Resolution," China Daily, September 14, 2010.
3. "Mao Zedong Thought Must be Correctly Understood as an Integral Whole," People's Daily, July 21, 1977.

On October 5, 1968, a report in the People's Daily contained Mao Zedong's praise of a new political education concept, the May 7 Cadre School. The first school, the May 7 Cadre School in Liuhe County, Heilongjiang, piloted a program of sending urban residents to the countryside that was known as "going down for labor".

Mao said everyone, excluding the sick, elderly and handicapped, should experience manual labor in the countryside, and that transplanting urban cadres to the countryside for manual labor was an opportunity for bureaucrats to be reeducated.

In addition to manual labor, city dwellers also took part in intensive ideological study. At first, the cadres spent varying amounts of time in the countryside with their urban units, but by 1973 this had been rationalized to six months to a year.

Primitive conditions and strenuous labor killed some cadres.

Correction: A previous version incorrectly stated that the first May 7 Cadre School was set up in Liuhe County, Jiangsu. In fact, the first May 7 Cadre School was set up in Liuhe County, Helongjiang.

References

1. "China," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 24, 2012
2. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995), 484.

The Communist Party of China and the Chinese government maintain extensive and sophisticated controls on traditional and new media to prevent challenges to the regime's authority.

They have implemented strict media guidelines to restrict the content that appears in media, intimidating and jailing journalists and shutting down publications or websites that cross the line.

The government and Party also maintain tight, albeit tenuous, control of the Internet. The "Great Firewall" of China permanently blocks access to certain websites and social media services, including Twitter, LinkedIn and Facebook. State and Party entities exert pressure on microblogs, China's version of Twitter, by monitoring what people write, requiring users to register using their real names, and by threatening, arresting or jailing dissidents, activists and journalists who write about sensitive issues online.

An estimated 30,000 censors monitor all data coming into China, and a so-called "Fifty Cent Party" of netizens is paid by authorities to post pro-Party messages on forums and comment sections of websites.

In China, the Central Propaganda Department of the Party is in charge of the nationwide media censorship and control; there is no explicit granting of such power in any national law.

References

1. "2008 Report to Congress of the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission," US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2008, 298.
2. "China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update," Newslater No.4 2009, Congressional-Executive Commission on China, accessed on August 20, 2012.
3. David Shambaugh, "China's Propaganda System: Institutions, Processes and Efficacy," The China Journal 57 (2007): 28.
4. "Internet Censorship in China," The New York Times, March 22, 2012.
5. Isabella Bennett, "Media Censorship in China," Foreign Policy, March 7, 2011.
6. Katia Moskvitch, "Cracks in the wall: Will China's Great Firewall backfire?," BBC, May 1, 2012.
7. "LinkedIn website working again in China," Reuters, February 25, 2011.
9. "World Report 2012: China," Human Rights Watch, accessed on August 20, 2012.
10. Yuezhi Zhao, "Beyond Censorship in China's Media and Cyberspace," Asia Pacific Memo, February 14, 2012.

"Ministry of Truth" originates from George Orwell's novel "Nineteen Eighty-Four", and refers to the department where speech is "subjected to all-encompassing control" by Big Brother, the totalitarian leader of the fictional Oceania.

In China, the expression is widely used by Chinese journalists and online writers to refer to the Central Publicity Department (also known as the Central Propaganda Department), the Internet Affairs Office of the State Council Information Office (SCIO) and other lower-level organs in charge of media regulations and propaganda controls.

These propaganda departments issue directives and orders to regulate what journalists can or cannot report and how they should report. In some cases, the directives include news that journalists themselves do not even know, according to the Hong Kong newspaper Ming Pao.

A mainland journalist told the newspaper, "In some cases, we didn't even know something was happening until we received a directive from the "Ministry of Truth". The "Ministry" is the real news source, while CCTV, Xinhua News Agency and People's Daily are all merely doing PR work."

References

1. "京城密语：封口令变新闻线索," Ming Pao, August 5, 2010, Factiva.
2. "真理部指令," China Digital Times, accessed August 24, 2012.
3. "Ministry of Truth 真理部," China Media Project, accessed August 24, 2012.

Mishu is a job title that literally translated means "secretary," but in fact is used to represent a number of different positions. An organizational mishu is attached to an office, while personal mishus are akin to chiefs of staff in the Western context, who work directly for individual leaders.

This position has served for many as a stepping-stone to leadership positions. The mishus of Mao Zedong (Chen Boda), Zhou Enlai (Song Ping) and Deng Xiaoping (Wang Ruilin), all went on to hold important leadership positions.

This trend continues today with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, who served as mishu to Geng Biao, former vice-premier, for three years.

Mishus can wield great influence, deciding who is allowed access to the boss and drafting policy documents, as was the case with Wang Ruilin, who wrote articles and helped draft Party documents on behalf of Deng Xiaoping during his southern journey in 1992.

A class entitled mishu xue, or mishu studies, is on the curriculum at the Central Party School.

References

1. Cheng Li, "The Mishu Phenomenon: Patron-Client Ties and Coalition-Building Tactics," China Leadership Monitor, NO. 4.
2. Wei Li and Lucian W. Pye, "The Ubiquitous Role of the Mishu in Chinese Politics," The China Quarterly, No. 132 (December, 1992).

Abbreviation

Macau Special Administrative Region (澳门特别行政区)

In China's administrative hierarchy, a municipality is a provincial-level city directly under the jurisdiction of the central government. It falls into the 31 units of the first-level administrative division, including 22 provinces, five autonomous regions and two special administrative regions.

Setting up a municipality aims to stimulate regional economic growth. For instance, Chongqing was named a municipality in 1997 to boost growth in the southwestern region of China.

There are now four municipalities in China, namely Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai and Chongqing.

References

1. "China view," Xinhuanet.com, accessed August 23, 2012.
2. Kerry Dumbaugh and Michael F. Martin, "Understanding China's Political System," Congressional Research Service, December 31, 2009.
3. "OECD Rural Policy Reviews: China 2009," Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD), 2009.
4. Yang Zhengao,"论中国的直辖市," people.com.cn, September 29, 2010.

The National Party Congress of the Communist Party of China convenes once every five years, and constitutionally is responsible for electing the Party's top officials – though in reality, the selection is left to the Party elders and current leaders.

The Congress is usually a week-long event that convenes at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, in the months of October or November. Veteran Party members, along with Party delegates elected from all over China - 2,270 at the 18th Party Congress – attend.

Aside from selecting new leaders, the congress also allows the Party general secretary to present a report on the Party's work during the past five years. Essentially a state of the nation address, it is an opportunity to set the official Party line on major policies and for the Party general secretary to establish his political legacy.

Amendments to the Party constitution are made at the Party Congress, and changes have been adopted at every meeting since the current constitution was adopted in 1982.

According to the Party constitution, delegates elect a new Central Committee, which, at its first meeting, normally the day after the Congress, in turn elects a new Politburo and Politburo Standing Committee, China's most powerful decision-making body.

But in practice, important decisions, including selection of Party cadres into the Central Committee and the Politburo, are negotiated and settled before the congress begins.

While the first Party congress met in secrecy in 1921, it wasn't until after the 12th Party Congress in 1982 that they have been held regularly every five years. Most leadership transitions have been tumultuous: paramount leaders Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping anointed and then purged five successors between them, some of whom were imprisoned, put under house arrest or died in strange circumstances.

They include Liu Shaoqi, who died in prison, Lin Biao, who was killed in a mysterious plane crash, Hua Guofeng and Hu Yaobang, who were sidelined, and Zhao Ziyang, who was put under house arrest until his death.

References

1. 李颖, "《党代会现场》为您展现史上党代会的99个细节," people.com.cn, accessed September 13, 2012.
2. Alice Miller, "The Road to the 18th Party Congress," China Leadership Monitor 36 (2012).
3. Brian Rhoads, "China leadership succession back to old disorderly self," Reuters, April 11, 2012.
4. "The Central Organizations of the CPC," gov.cn, accessed August 23, 2012.
5. "The Communist Party of China (CPC)," people.com.cn, accessed August 23, 2012.
6. "Constitution of the Communist Party of China," china.org.cn, accessed September 1, 2012.
7. Jaime A. FlorCruz, "Who are the next generation of Chinese leaders," CNN, August 17, 2012.

Abbreviation

National People's Congress (全国人民代表大会)

The Oil Clique refers to a political faction within the Communist Party of China, comprised of members who have worked in China’s oil industry. The term is used mostly by media and analysts to describe the political power of the oil industry and to reflect the experience of important leaders (mostly now retired) who once worked in the industry.

Though not as prominent as other major factions such as the Tuanpai, Shanghai Clique or princelings, the Oil Clique carries political clout because of its influence on the country’s energy policies, political power structure and foreign affairs.

The clique came to be known when its de facto founders, Yu Qiuli and Kang Shi'en, developed China’s largest oilfield, the Daqing Oilfield, in the west Heilongjiang province in the 1950s. Tapping the oilfield solved the country’s then-energy crisis in a relatively short time period of time. Both Yu and Kang were promoted to vice-premier and the clique became an important political force.

Members of the clique’s later generations have either worked in China's oil companies or resource-related state departments such as the State Administration of Work Safety and the Planning Commission. Those with close relationships with these members have also found themselves in the clique.

The clique’s most prominent members include Su Shulin, former Vice President Zeng Qinghong, former Vice Premier Wu Yi, and former Secretary of the Central Politics and Law Committee Zhou Yongkang.

References

1. "《热点透视》中海油与中国政府的关系不足为虑," Reuters, July 25, 2012, Factiva.
2. "石油幫活躍中共政壇," Sing Tao Daily, November 29, 2006, Factiva.
3. "苏树林任福建代省长 「石化系」官员抬头," China Times, March 24, 2011, Factiva.
4. "China's approach to Iran will be telling," FT.com, November 25, 2009.
5. "Up against the great wall of China," The Sydney Morning Herald, November 21, 2009.

Translated as "one central bank and three commissions", this is an abbreviation for the People's Bank of China, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission. Together these four organizations are in charge of supervision of the country's financial industry.

References

1. "一行三会," hexun.com, accessed on August 18, 2012.
2. "Handling financial affairs well is the key to all-round success," People's Daily, accessed August 31, 2009.
3. Oscar Zhu, "The Learning from Western Financial Supervision System," student research project for EU-CHINA Business Management Training Project of China Europe International Business School, 2010.

"One organization, two labels" is a commonly used convention applied to organizations with dual identities - in some cases, one for the Party and one for the government.

The two labels co-exist and refer to the same organization, which is led by one management team. For example, the Central Overseas Publicity Office, considered a Party entity, is the same as the State Council Information Office, which is technically a state organization.

References

1. "机构编制统计名词," nybb.gov.cn, accessed September 3, 2012.
2. "机构管理," Commission Office for Public Sector Reform of Zhongshan, June 21, 2011.
3. "中共中央机构沿革概要," 中国机构编制网, June 30, 2011.
4. Scott Ainsworth and Ruoxi Li, "Interests, Groups, and Information Aggregation," in A Bridge Too Far?: Commonalities and Differences between China and the United States, ed. Robert Grafstein and Fan Wen (Lexington Books, 2009), 149.

The policy refers to a nationwide restriction on citizens' reproduction. Married, urban couples are allowed to have only one child, while exemptions are granted for select groups, including rural couples with a female first child, ethnic minorities, and parents without siblings. The policy was added into the constitution and became a basic state policy in 1982.

The policy significantly slowed the growth of the Chinese population and ensured the government was capable of feeding its people. It has been recognized as one of the factors behind China's fast economic growth.

The international community has criticized the policy as a severe abuse of human rights, as the implementation of the policy has resulted in forced abortions and female infanticide.

Decades after the policy was first enacted, China now faces imbalanced birth rates, skewed sex ratios, an aging population, insufficient workers and a burden on young people to take care of their parents and grandparents.

References

1. "我国计划生育基本国策20年 少生人口近3亿," China.com.cn, August 30, 2002.
2. Laura Fitzpatrick, "China's One-Child Policy," Time, July 27, 2009.

An editorial approach used by print media to silently oppose censorship by the government, publications will "open a skylight" by purposely leaving blank spaces on a news page when stories are pulled, a signal to the reader that content has been removed.

The approach was first used in the late years of the Qing Dynasty, in the early 20th century, and was later adopted by media outlets run by the Communist Party before the PRC was established in 1949. One of the most memorable silent boycotts happened in 1989, when Wen Wei Po, a Hong Kong Party-run newspaper, left a blank editorial on May 21 in response to the central government's declaration of martial law in response to the protests at Tiananmen Square, which was a prelude to the brutal crackdown on June 4.

References

1. "Opening a Skylight 开天窗," China Media Project, accessed August 27, 2012.
2. "当年文汇报‘开天窗'总编," sina.com, March 22, 2009.
3. "开天窗," 新闻学简明词典, 1984, 91.

This refers to committees of the Communist Party of China, which exist in all segments of society, from the grassroots level all the way to the country's top governance structures.

In general, if an organization – in the government, military, or business, as well as universities, social organizations and private companies – has more than 100 Communist Party members, it is eligible to establish its own Party committee. Some important organizations can establish a Party committee even if the number of Party members does not reach 100.

For government organizations and state-owned enterprises, the head of a Party committee, called the Party secretary, usually holds equivalent or greater power than the nominal leader of the organization.

In government, the Party has established the "one-secretary-plus-two-deputies" structure. The Party secretary has the most power, while the top government official is subordinate and concurrently holds a deputy Party secretary position. For example, provincial governors are subordinate to the Party secretaries. The Party secretary, not the government head, sets the general development goals.

Party secretaries have "absolute power" in personnel decisions and Party committees control the major supervisory organs, from the discipline inspection commission to the judicial departments, according to Wang Yukai of the Chinese Academy of Governance.

References

1. 雷辉 & 李小伟, "省级党委副书记兼职增多 呈现多样化路线," Xinhuanet.com, June 15, 2012.
2. 汪玉凯, "从程维高案看权力监督：省委书记谁监督？," people.com.cn, accessed January 21, 2013.
3. "各省委书记‘晒'工作目标," people.com.cn, July 19, 2012.
4. "党的基层委员会," jgjy.gov.cn, accessed August 20, 2012.
5. "中国共产党党章," Xinhuanet.com, accessed August 20, 2012.
6. Lance Gore, The Chinese Communist Party and China's Capitalist Revolution: The Political Impact of the Market (New York: Routledge, 2011).
7. Zhiyue Bo, Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility Since 1949 (Armonk: M.E Sharpe, 2002).

A Party democratic life meeting is an activity held regularly among leading Party cadres at the county-level and above to carry out criticism and self-criticism, and to oversee the implementation of Party principles, policies and resolutions.

It is recommended that these meetings are held at least every quarter or sixth months and can be called at any time.

References

1. "党支部民主生活会制度," 河南省交通运输厅(hncd.gov.cn), October 21, 2009.
2. "[在线答疑] 组织生活会、民主生活会、当日活动的异同点," cpc.people.com.cn, August 25, 2007.
3. "中共中央印发《关于县以上党和国家机关党员领导干部民主生活会的若干规定》的通知," 中国共产党新闻, May 25, 1990.

Abbreviation

People's Bank of China (中国人民银行)

The People’s Liberation Army is the full name of China’s military, the largest in the world with an active force of 2.3 million. While termed an ‘army’, the PLA spans not only ground forces, but also the air force and navy.

The People’s Republic of China is the full name of the country established in 1949 after the Communist Party of China defeated the nationalist Kuomintang party in a protracted civil war. The Communist Party has maintained a single-party rule ever since. See more information, see China 101.

Abbreviation

Political Bureau (政治局)

As the Cultural Revolution came to a close in 1976, Party members who had been denounced and imprisoned during the chaos were rehabilitated. Individual verdicts were declared invalid and reversed (pingfan 平反), allowing cadres to return to their original government positions at both the central and local level.

The Central Organization Department reported that more than three million administrators had been rehabilitated nationally by 1982. Official reports declared that tens of millions of citizens had been cleared of political crimes they were accused of during the Cultural Revolution.

References

1. "落实干部政策加强干部队伍建设," 中共中央党史研究室, May 25, 2011.
2. Hong Yung Lee, "The Politics of Cadre Rehabilitation since the Cultural Revolution," Asian Survey, Vol. 18, No. 9 (Sep., 1978).
3. Sharron Gu, Law and Politics in Modern China: Under the Law, the Law, and Above the Law (Cambria Press, 2009).

The Chinese term guan erdai, which literally means the offspring of officials, refers to the children of current or former Party or government officials. The term is used with increasing frequency to describe those who enjoy special privileges derived from the power and influence of their parents.

One famous example of guan erdai is Li Qiming, son of a senior police official in Hebei, who tried to flee the scene of a car accident and evade responsibility by brandishing his privileged bloodline: "Sue me if you dare. My father is Li Gang!" His words quickly became an internet catchphrase deriding various forms of corruption, and a symbol of growing disparity in China.

References

1. David Barboza, "Chinese Man Who Bragged of Privilege Gets Six Years," New York Times, January 30, 2011.
2. "Power progeny 官二代," China Media Project, accessed on August 20, 2012.

The term "princeling" refers to the privileged offspring of China's revolutionary leaders and other high-ranking officials, and is commonly used in discussions about elite Chinese politics. It is not a formal political faction, but a categorization to signify those sons and daughters of leaders who have succeeded in politics, government, business and other fields, often deriving their own influence from the connections of their parents and family friends.

The issue of perceived nepotism is one of particular sensitivity among Chinese leaders as public anger grows, fueled by countless examples of nepotism and corruption exposed by media and citizen-driven investigations.

"Princelings were never popular," said Cheng Li, an expert on Chinese elite politics at the Brookings Institution in Washington DC. "The Chinese public is particularly resentful about the princelings' control of both political power and economic wealth."

While the families of high-level officials generally avoid flamboyant displays of wealth or power, the issue of elite family patronage remains sensitive and controversial.

Prominent princelings include Xi Jinping, Wang Qishan, Yu Zhengsheng and Bo Xilai.

References

1. Cheng Li, "China's Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012" (Part 1: Provincial Chiefs)," China Leadership Monitor 31(2010): 2, 18.
2. Cheng Li, "China's Most Powerful ‘princelings': How Many Will Enter the New Politburo?," Jamestown Foundation, China Brief, Volume 7, Issue 19, October 17, 2007.
3. David Barboza, "China Man Who Bragged of Privilege Gets Six Years," New York Times, January 30, 2011.
4. Jaime A. FlorCruz, "Bo and Gu on trial, in different ways," CNN, August 9, 2012.
5. Jeremy Page, "Children of the Revolution," The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2011.
6. Michael Wines, "China's Censors Misfire in Abuse-of-Power Case," New York Times, November 17. 2010.
7. "Princelings and the goon state," The Economist, April 14, 2011.
8. Shi Jiangtao, "Princelings jostle for power," South China Morning Post, October 11, 2006, Factiva
9. "Time to judge the ‘Princes' on merit," South China Morning Post, February 7, 1995.

A special system established during the Yan'an period in the mid-1930s to provide products of superior quality to the privileged classes, such as senior political leaders, military leaders and retired senior leaders.

Products supplied through the system cover almost every need of the privileged classes, from vegetables, milk and edible oil to alcohol and cigarettes. The supplies mostly come from special production bases funded by the government. Such production bases, especially those that produce vegetables, fruit and milk, are on better land and are run under higher safety standards than normal farms.

On the other hand, some production corporations also supply the government with their best products according to procurement agreements with the government. One of the most famous specially supplied products is Maotai, a famous Chinese liquor brand, which is provided for occasions such as government meetings or state receptions.

The system persists to this day - products that have the "privileged supplies" label are normally sold to the public at higher prices compared to standard products, because they are recognized as being of a higher quality.

References

1. "‘低调'种菜," 南方周末, May 6, 2011.
2. "国家机关‘低调种菜', 记取食品安全信心," 南方都市报, March 06, 2011.
3. "特供菜吃出的另一层滋味," 北京晨报, September 19, 2011.
4. 余以为, "稳定了干部队伍的"特供"制度如何拖垮苏联？," 时代周报, March 23, 2011.
5. Barbara Demick, "In China, what you eat tells who you are," Los Angeles Times, September 16, 2011.
6. Chen Mingyuan, "从供给制到薪给制," Tongzhou Gongji (同舟共济), iss. 2 (2006), 1.
7. Edited by Edward L. Davis, Encyclopaedia of Contemporary Chinese Culture (Routledge, 2005), 756.
8. Mark McDonald, "One Chinese Liquor Brand Is The Life of The Party," International Herald Tribune, July 3, 2012.

The term fu er'dai, or "prosperity progeny", refers to the children of rich and powerful businessmen, who enjoy great wealth and opportunities.

The more conspicuous are known for their flashy lifestyles and predilection for luxury goods, and benefitting from influential connections, or guanxi.

According to a survey conducted by China Youth Daily in 2009, more than half of the fu er'dai are educated abroad, 43 percent in Europe and 22 percent in the U.S.

References

1. "2009年: 备受争议的'富二代'," China Youth Daily, December 31, 2009.
2. "Mending the fu er dai's reputation," China Daily, March 13, 2011.
3. "Power Progeny 官二代," China Media Project of the University of Hong Kong.

"Reform and opening up" was a major policy decision made at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 1978. Promoted by reformist leaders within the Party, this policy sought to reposition the country's economic structure through nationwide reform and outreach to the outside world.

In 1992, paramount leader Deng Xiaoping, who was the chief architect of China's economic reform, made a landmark tour to a few southern cities in China, delivering a series of speeches to clarify socialism in response to doubts about China's economic development.

The trip, widely seen as a turning point for the reform and opening up program, came as the country was mired in political, economic and diplomatic crisis, mainly caused by the 1989 military crackdown and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.

During the tour, Deng emphasized market-oriented economic reform over communist dogma and warned of a left-wing backlash within the Party. His remarks promoted China's reform efforts and ushered in a new period of development, which brought about unprecedented change in China.

During the past three decades, China has completed the transition from a highly centralized planned economy to a socialist market economic system, becoming the world's second-largest economy with a GDP of approximately $ 7.26 trillion at the end of 2011.

References

1. "China in Photos - Thirty Years of Reform and Opening Up," Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the Republic of Albania, December 23, 2008.
2. "China's economic growth decelerates to 9.2 pct in 2011," XINHUANET.com, January 17, 2012.
4. "Chinese economy heads for soft landing in 2012 with room for fiscal stimulus: WB chief economist," Xinhua News Agency, January 18, 2012.
5. "Notice of soliciting articles on 30th anniversary of China's reform and opening up," People.com.cn, October 6, 2008.
6. Shi Jiangtao, "Closed doors to reform," South China Morning Post, January 30, 2012.
7. "The reforms in retrospect," China.org.cn, October 27, 2008.

Comprising the character for ocean (海) and return (归), haigui is slang used to describe Chinese citizens who return to Mainland China after completing studies overseas.

The phrase is a play on the homophonic 海龟, meaning "sea turtle", which is known to migrate great distances across oceans.

References

1. "神州大地：二万洋专家显身手," 文汇报(Wen Wei Po), July 8, 2001, Factiva.
2. Liu Ye, "副刊-专栏-海龟," Hong Kong Economic Journal, February 19, 2012, Factiva.

The re-explanation of Marxism by Nikita Khrushchev and the Soviet Union's Communist Party in the 1960s drew criticism from the Communist Party of China, which accused the Soviet leader of "modern revisionism". The ideological conflict later extended to a dispute between the two nations in the areas of politics, military ties and the economy.

China later started anti-revisionism political campaigns to fight with the Soviet Union and to clear up ideological issues within the Party. The intra-Party campaign was called "Oppose and Guard against Revisionism".

There was no clearly stated definition of revisionism offered by the Party and the opaque ideology caused widespread confusion over the Party's ideological system. Fundamental ideological issues that were formerly viewed as Marxism and Socialism were relabeled as revisionism and capitalism. Those who adhered to Marxism were accused of being "counterrevolutionary revisionists".

The "Oppose and Guard against Revisionism" campaign was at the center of most intra-party battles that occurred during the 1960s, and resulted in extensive battles during the Cultural Revolution.

References

1. "反对修正主义," cpc.people.com.cn, accessed July 9, 2012.
2. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China (The Chinese Unviersity Press, 1955), 92-93.

Revolutionary committees were at the center of Mao Zedong's efforts to dismantle and re-envision China's power structure during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976).

Following Mao's summer tour of the country in 1967, the leader and his aides sought to dismantle the old power structure and replace it with a new regime, with revolutionary committees as the key link between the Party and the people. In March, the Party mouthpiece Red Flag issued an editorial advocating the establishment of a revolutionary committee, and by September 1968, all of the 29 major regions across China had established them.

The Revolutionary Committee was a powerful organ of state power, combining revolutionary mass organizations, the People's Liberation Army, and revolutionary leading cadres. The provincial-level committees had representatives from the Party, the PLA and the common people, with membership ranging from 150 to 200.

A product of the Cultural Revolution, the revolutionary committee structure was dismantled on July 1, 1979.

References

1. "1967年3月10日‘文化大革命'中的临时权力机构成立," people.com.cn, accessed August 21, 2012.
2. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank eds., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14: The People's Republic, Part 1: The emergence of revolutionary China (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
3. Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, Mao's Last Revolution (Harvard University Press, 2008), 158.
4. 关海庭, "‘革命委员会'始末," 中国党史研究, No.6 (1991)，CNKI.
5. 路阳, "‘文革'时期‘革命委员会'概述," 唯实•党建工程，October 2011, CNKI.
6. 霞飞, "革命委员会始末," 党史博览, No.2 (2005)，CNKI.
7. "中共党史不同时期的口号," Xinhuanet.com, accessed August 21, 2012.

During the "Sent-Down Youth Movement", also known as the "Down to the Countryside Movement" from 1955 to 1981, teenage urban students were sent to the countryside to ease urban unemployment and "join the cause of building socialist agriculture".

It isn't known how many youths were rusticated in the nearly three decades of the movement but during 10 years of the Cultural Revolution, 17 million rusticated youths were sent to the countryside, according to official estimates.

Those sent to the countryside were denied educational opportunities and after the Cultural Revolution, were left without productive career opportunities. They are often referred to as China's "lost generation".

It's worth noting that zhiqing in Chinese means intellectual youths, but the young people sent to the countryside were not all intellectuals - most had only graduated from middle or senior high school.

References

1. 崔禄春, "论‘文化大革命'之前的知识青年上山下山运动," 党史论坛，No.3 (1999), CNKI.
2. 潘鸣啸,失落的一代：中国的上山下乡运动 (中国大百科全书出版社 2010).
3. 田树德, "知识青年上山下乡运动始于何时," in 真相：毛泽东史实80问, (中国青年出版社 2007).
4. 魏红跃, "1955-1965年上山下乡运动的研究", 陕西师范大学党史研究, May 2007, CNKI.
5. "知识青年上山下乡运动的评价及其历史命运," 理论与现代化, January 21, 2009.
6. "《中国知识青年上山下乡始末》重修再版发行," people.com.cn, December 19, 2008.
7. "Cultural Revolution," Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed August 20, 2012.
8. Hongbin Li, Mark Rosenzweig, Junsen Zhang, "Altruism, Favoritism, and Guilt in the Allocation of Family Resources: Sophie's Choice in Mao's Mass Send Down Movement," Journal of Political Economy 118(1), February 2010.

Yangqi refers to the mammoth national state-owned enterprises overseen by the State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). They are commonly referred to as "SASAC companies" in English.

Functioning as both holding company and regulator, the commission invests state-owned assets on behalf of the central government, approves major business decisions, and oversees the SOE sector's reform and restructuring. There were 117 SASAC companies in China in 2012.

Because of their significance to the country's economy, three top positions in yangqi enterprises – Party secretary, chairman of the board and CEO – are in some cases appointed directly by the Party's Central Organization Department, according to China economy expert Barry Naughton.

According to Cheng Li, an expert in elite Chinese politics, SASAC companies are companies that: 1) provide public goods such as defense, communications, transportation, and utilities; 2) specialize in natural resources such as oil, minerals, and metals; or 3) concentrate on construction, trade, and other industrial products.

References

1. "央企名录," sasac.gov.cn, accessed August 27, 2012.
2. Andrew Szamosszegi & Cole Kyle, "An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 26, 2011.
3. Barry Naughton, "SASAC and Rising Corporate Power in China," China Leadership Monitor, No. 24, accessed August 27, 2012.
4. Cheng Li, "China's Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012(Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-Owned Enterprises)," China Leadership Monitor, No. 34, accessed August 27, 2012, pp.3-4.
5. "Main Functions and Responsibilities of SASAC," sasac.gov.cn, accessed July 12, 2012.
6. "SASAC's Responsibilities & Targets," People's Daily, May 22, 2003.
7. "State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC), the People's Republic of China," sasac.gov.cn, accessed August 27, 2012.

Abbreviation

State Council (国务院)

The "scientific concept of development", together with "harmonious society", is a political slogan promoted by President Hu Jintao. Hu raised the concept during his 2003 tour in Guangdong at the time of the SARS outbreak, which paved the way for him to gradually set the Party's political agenda.

According to a People's Daily editorial, the concept "calls for people-centered development, which is comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable. It also stresses coordinated development between urban and rural areas, among different regions, between economic and social development, between the development of man and nature, and between domestic development and opening to the outside world."

The Scientific Concept of Development was added to the Constitution of the Communist Party at the 17th Party Congress in 2007 and canonized as one of the Party's guiding ideologies at the 18th Party Congress in 2012.

References

1. "十七大•中国聚焦：中国将科学发展观写入党章," Xinhuanet.com, October 21, 2007.
2. Lindsay Beck, "From struggle to harmony, China slogans mark Hu era," Reuters, September 7, 2012.
3. "Premier Wen highlights scientific development concept," People's Daily, February 22, 2004.
4. "Scientific concept of development," People's Daily, September 30, 2007.

The second generation of leadership was in power from 1978 to 1989.

After Mao Zedong died in 1976, then-Premier Hua Guofeng, a transitional figure, took power as successor to Mao. But power was soon transferred to Deng Xiaoping as the paramount leader, an unofficial position he held from 1978 to 1992. He never served as Party general secretary, president, or premier during this period but chaired the CPC Central Military Commission from 1981 to 1989.

This generation, with Deng Xiaoping as its core leader, includes other prominent leaders, such as Chen Yun, Ye Jianying, Li Xiannian, Hu Yaobang, Zhao Ziyang, Yao Yilin, and Song Ping.

Key figures of the generation had been involved in the Chinese revolution, but some were in junior roles at the time. Many were sent abroad to be educated, particularly to France. Most second generation leaders were persecuted during the Cultural Revolution and politically rehabilitated after it ended in 1976.

Under the leadership of the second generation, the country shifted its focus from class struggle to economic development and modernization, pioneering market-oriented reforms that shape today’s China.

The dominant political ideology of this generation was Deng Xiaoping Theory.

References

1. "第三代领导集体的当务之急," 中国共产党新闻网, accessed February 19, 2013.
2. “邓小平,” 中华人民共和国中央人民政府, November 21, 2007.
3. "邓小平理论指导地位的形成与确立研究述评," cpc.people.com.cn, accessed February 19, 2013.
4. Anthony G. Porter, “CHINA’S MODUS OPERANDI FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,” Marine Corps University, 13, June 2005.
5. Carol Lee Hamrin, Decision-Making in Deng’s China: Perspectives from Insiders (M.E.Sharpe, 1995), 49, accessed September 28, 2012.
6. C. Teiwes, “POLITICS AT THE ‘CORE’: THE POLITICAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF MAO ZEDONG, DENG XIAOPING AND JIANG ZEMIN,” Australian National University, 3, accessed February 19, 2013.
7. C.X. George Wei, “The Culture Revolution and Its Impact on the Fourth Generation of the Communist Leadership,” University of Macau, 202, accessed February 19, 2013.
8. Frederick C. Teiwes, "THE PARADOXICAL POST-MAO TRANSITION: FROM OBEYING THE LEADER TO 'NORMAL POLITICS'," The China Journal, No. 34 (Jul., 1995), 55-94
9. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China, (Chinese University Press, 1995), 61, accessed September 28, 2012.

The term secretary usually refers to the person in charge of a Communist Party or Communist Youth League organization.

The secretary of the Party committee for a geographical region is usually the first in command under the country's party-government dual administrative system. The Party secretary is entitled to decide major policies and personnel changes in the region, while his or her corresponding government counterpart is in charge of implementation of the policies and other day-to-day government matters.

"Secretary" was originally used to denote a clerk or mishu (personal assistant), but after the first Party Congress, the term was used to describe the highest Party official, reflecting the Party's "determination to serve the interest of the people wholeheartedly and never to be bureaucratic", reported official news agency Xinhua.

References

1. "省委书记 一省最大," United Daily News, November 10, 2009, Factiva.
2. "中共中央书记处的由来及职权," Xinhuanet.com, December 30, 2008.
3. Lawrence Sullivan, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party (Scarecrow Press, 2011), 231-32.

From 2006, many leaders of state-owned enterprises started to receive appointments to government and Party posts after the Communist Party of China issued a directive encouraging cadre exchanges.

For instance, then Chairman of Huaneng Power International Inc, Li Xiaopeng, was appointed Vice Governor of Shanxi Province in 2008.

Former Politburo Standing Committee member and security tsar Zhou Yongkang had worked as deputy general manager and then general manager at China National Petroleum and Natural Gas Corporation from 1988 to 1998.

Minister of Industry and Information Technology Miao Wei, a senior engineer, was general manager at Dongfeng Motor Corporation from 1999 to 2005.

According to Duan Peijun, a professor of philosophy and strategy of the Central Party School, officials with knowledge of the economy and enterprises are important for China’s transition into the market economy and service-oriented governance.

References

1. "国企高管纷转任地方高官由省级副职做起　从政收入差距大," Hong Kong Economic Journal, April 5, 2011, Factiva.
2. "央企经理人管而优则仕？," China Enterprises, June 23, 2008, Factiva.
3. "中石化总经理调任福建省委副书记 国企高管的政坛舞步 (2)," 人民网, April 6, 2011.

"Serve the people" was a political slogan first used by Mao Zedong in a speech given on September 8, 1944. The slogan later was expanded to "serve the people whole-heartedly".

The expression was named a general principle of Party members' daily work. The principle was promoted as the core of the socialist moral system, with the purpose of guiding all members' lives and work.

References

1. "党的根本宗旨是什么？如何正确认识新形势下坚持全心全意为人民服务的宗旨？," cpc.people.com, accessed September 2, 2012.
2. "Communist Party of China rooted among masses," people.com.cn, July 8, 2011.
3. Henry Yuhuai He, Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People's Republic of China (M.E. Sharpe, 2001), 320.

The term 'seven up, eight down' refers to the de facto retirement rule for the Politburo and the all-powerful Politburo Standing Committee, which requires members to be 67 years old or younger to be eligible for a new term in office. Those aged 68 or above must retire at the end of their current term.

The existence of age limitation for Politburo membership only came to light at the 1997 15th Party Congress, when all members aged 70 or above retired, except for Party general secretary Jiang Zemin, who was 71 at the time. The age limit was lowered again, to 68, at the 16th Party Congress in 2002.

References

1. "68岁划线 高层换班制度化," Sing Tao Daily，October 22, 2007, Factiva.
2. "新加坡学者：政治交接已非常制度化 中国下届政治局常委呼之欲出," zaobao.com, July 13, 2011, Factiva.
3. 丁望，"七上八下不变 戴老爷不上轿," Hong Kong Economic Journal, June 7, 2011, Factiva.
4. Alice Miller, "The 18th Central Committee Politburo: A Quixotic, Foolhardy, Rashly Speculative, But Nonetheless Ruthlessly Reasoned Projection," China Leadership Monitor, No. 33.
5. Barbara Demick, "China keeps quiet about Central Committee Session," The Los Angeles Times, October 18, 2011.
6. "Zeng Qinghong's retirement," Ming Pao(Enligsh), October 9, 2007.

Abbreviation

Special Economic Zone (经济特区)

The Shanghai Clique, also known as the "Shanghai Gang," is one of China's most powerful political networks , led by former president Jiang Zemin. He appointed many of his protégés in the core decision-making group before his retirement and is still seen as an influential behind-the-scenes figure.

The Shanghai Clique originated when Jiang was first mayor and then Party chief in Shanghai in the mid-1980s. The clique stepped into mainstream Chinese politics shortly after Jiang's sudden appointment in 1989 as Party general secretary following the Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown on June 4.

The new general secretary, who had no deep roots and reliable allies in Beijing in his early years in the role, summoned many of his old partners and colleagues from Shanghai to consolidate his power in the capital, according to political observer Cheng Li.

His men then took key positions at the central level in the Party, government and military. From the mid-1990s, central positions occupied by key Shanghai Clique members include premier (Zhu Rongji), head of the Organization Department of the CPC (Zeng Qinghong), vice-premier (Wu Bangguo), Party secretary of Shanghai (Huang Ju), minister of state development (Zeng Peiyan) and other ministers with significant power and resources.

Not all members of the Shanghai Clique are originally from Shanghai, as the group is more a political association than geographical. However, members advanced their political careers primarily in Shanghai.

The decline of the clique's power, or more precisely, the rise of the Tuanpai, Hu Jintao's camp, started with the fall of Chen Liangyu, former Party secretary of Shanghai and an important protégé of Jiang. In 2006, Hu ordered an investigation into Chen, who was held, and later jailed, on corruption charges. Following Chen's dismissal, leaders associated with Jiang's faction were increasingly balanced by those affiliated with the Tuanpai, according to Cheng Li.

Emerging figures in the Shanghai Clique include Wang Huning and Meng Jianzhu.

References

1. Bruce Gilley, Tiger on the Brink: Jiang Zemin and China's New Elite (University of California Press, 1998)
2. Cheng Li, "The 'Shanghai Gang': Force for Stability or Cause for Conflict?," China Leadership Monitor, No.1 Part 2 (2002).
3. Cheng Li, "Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied? The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin's Faction," China Leadership Monitor, No. 20.
4. Minnie Chan, "Meng Jianzhu expected to be made security tsar at national congress," South China Morning Post, October 7, 2012.
5. Shi Jiangtao, "Former China president Jiang Zemin played key role in punishing Bo Xilai, say analysts," South China Morning Post, October 2, 2012.

This refers to a method of training civil servants through postings at specific positions in higher or lower-ranking organizations, or equivalent departments in other regions, SOEs, public institutions. Officials from Beijing and Sichuan have also been sent to train with foreign governments in Korea, Singapore and the United States.

Such postings are designed to help officials gain hands-on experience, improve their skills and build networks.

The period of the training, the target organization and target position, are all carefully discussed before the appointment. The training posts usually last from six months to two years and salaries are paid by the original work unit. Officials usually return to their original posts after the training period, although some do stay on in the training role.

References

1. 薛万博, "挂职锻炼期待制度创新," 中国共产党新闻网, May 25, 2012.
2. 薛万博, "挂职锻炼期待制度创新（2）," 中国共产党新闻网, May 25, 2012.
3. "中国词典﹕挂职," Ming Pao, May 15, 2007, Factiva.

The sixth generation of leaders is expected to take the helm of power in China in 2022, at the 20th Party Congress.

China observers have identified seven people who are considered rising political stars of the six generation: Hu Chunhua, Sun Zhengcai, Zhou Qiang, Lu Hao, Su Shulin, Zhang Qingwei, and Nur Bekri.

Among them, Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai are widely considered to be top future contenders for president and premier of China, succeeding Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang.

This generation of leaders all share something in common: compared with previous generations of leaders handpicked by Party patriarchs, they are more educated and better travelled, according to China expert Cheng Li.

They are more familiar with economic development and less focused on Party ideology than their predecessors, added Liu Junsheng, a public administration professor at the China University of Political Science and Law.

As all were born after 1960, these sixth generation of leaders have little memory of the turmoil under Mao Zedong and will argue for faster economic growth and more ambitious foreign policy, according to John Lee, a foreign policy fellow at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney.

Without these experiences, these leaders risk repeating the mistakes of the Cultural Revolution, according to Lee. However, the new generation of leaders could also push forward economic liberalization and eventually political reform, Lee wrote.

Lee’s point was echoed by Professor Mao Shoulong at Renmin University, who said: “These younger officials will have liberal thinking and open minds. They will see an era of change.”

References

1. 韩咏红, “一个上会记者的‘两会’手记,” 南风窗, March 29, 2011.
2. John Lee, “The New Guard”, South China Morning Post, January 11, 2010, Factiva.
3. Keith Zhai, “Seven rising stars tipped to lead sixth generation of China’s leaders,” South China Morning Post, October 1, 2012.
4. Melinda Liu, “China’s New Guard”, Daily Beast, October 9, 2007.
5. “New Politburo Lineup Signals Rising Stars Who May Replace Xi,” Bloomberg, November 16, 2012.

Abbreviation

State-owned Enterprise (国有企业)

A special administrative region is a provincial-level administrative region of the People's Republic of China.

At present, China has two special administrative regions, Hong Kong and Macau, which were former British and Portuguese colonies respectively.

Established on the basis of Deng Xiaoping's "one country, two systems" concept, the special administrative regions operate under the notion that vastly different systems and ideologies - socialist and capitalist - can coexist within one nation.

The two regions are now responsible for all local issues except for foreign affairs and national defense, and they exercise a high degree of autonomy, enjoying somewhat limited executive, legislative and judicial power.

References

1. "China's Political System," china.org.cn, accessed August 23, 2012.
2. "The Basic Law," gov.hk, accessed August 23, 2012.

Created after the "reform and opening up" of China in 1978, special economic zones are geographical regions in China that have adopted economic policies and flexible governmental measures that promote more market-oriented economies compared to the rest of the country.

In the early 1980s, China set up four special economic zones under the watch of Deng Xiaoping, first in Shenzhen, and then in Zhuhai and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province. In 1988, China designated the province of Hainan the fifth special economic zone, and established Kashgar, in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, as the sixth in 2010.

These special economic zones have played an important role in the country's economic development, but at the same time they have caused considerable disparity between geographic regions in China, as well as much social unease. In recent years, strikes and other forms of protests have emerged among migrant workers in the south, where most of the SEZs are located.

References

1. Chris King-Chi Chan, "The Challenge of Labour in China: Strikes and the Changing Labour Regime in Global Factories," University of Warwick, July 2008.
2. "Special Economic Zones and Open Coastal Cities," china.org.cn, assessed August 23, 2012.
3. Tatsuyuki OTA, "The Role of Special Economic Zones in China's Economic Development As Compared with Asian Export Processing Zones: 1979-1995," Asia in Extenso, March 2003.
4. Xu Dixin, "China's Special Economic Zone," Beijing Review, May 26, 2009.

Chinese SOEs are enterprises in which assets are wholly or partly owned by the state, and are supervised by the government. Central SOEs are controlled by the central government and managed by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC). Others are owned and governed by provincial or local governments.

There were approximately 114,500 SOEs nationwide in 2010, including state monopolies and oligopolies in key sectors such as chemical, electricity, petroleum and telecommunications.

Even though private companies have far surpassed SOEs in economic output since Deng Xiaoping launched his market-oriented reform in 1978, SOEs still remain significant to the country's economy, controlling about 50 percent of China's gross domestic product, according to a report published by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in October 2011.

References

1. Andrew Szamosszegi and Cole Kyle, "An Analysis of State-owned Enterprises and State Capitalism in China," U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, October 26, 2011.
2. Cheng Li, "China's Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 4: Top Leaders of Major State-Owned Enterprises)," China Leadership Monitor 34 (2011), 3-4.
3. "China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society," World Bank, February 27, 2012.
4. David A. Ralston, Jane Terpstra-Tong, Robert H. Terpstra, Xueli Wang and Carolyn Egri, "Today's State-Owned Enterprises of China: Are They Dying Dinosaurs or Dynamic Dynamos?," Strategic Management Journal 9 (2006).
5. Georges Desvaux, Michael Wang, and David Xu, "Spurring performance in China's state-owned enterprises," McKinsey Quarterly, December 2004.
6. "Just How Powerful Are China's State-Owned Firms?," The Wall Street Journal, October 26, 2011.

The Suzhou Clique is a term used by media to refer to officials who have held leading posts in the coastal city of Suzhou, Jiangsu Province. The clique has gained prominence in recent years, with a string of the city’s former Party secretaries and mayors occupying key positions around the country.

Suzhou is a 2,500-year-old city located in the Yangtze River Delta famous for its picturesque gardens and scenery. As the economic hub of Jiangsu Province, Suzhou rates as one of the country’s top regions in terms of GDP, exports and the number of migrants.

The core members of the Suzhou clique include Liang Baohua, Wang Min, Chen Deming and Wang Rong, the former Party bosses of Suzhou. All of them were rewarded with promotions after their terms in Suzhou.

Also known as the “Suzhou Gang”, these officials quickly rose to prominence thanks to their significant achievements in economic development and foreign investment in Suzhou, according to a report by Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post.

The rise of Suzhou’s officials is attributed to the economic success of the inland province – which are typically poorer than China’s coastal ones – rather than powerful mentors, reported the South China Morning Post, citing China expert Cheng Li.

References

1. "城市概括-历史文化," 中国苏州, accessed February 19, 2013.
2. "苏州," 中国网, September 20, 2011.
3. "苏州成全国第二大移民城市," 新华网, March 16, 2012.
4. "苏州概览-2011年经济社会发展基本情况," 中国苏州, accessed February 19, 2013.
5. "Key Hu ally to take over party 'nerve centre' Jiangsu party chief appointed head of powerful department," South China Morning Post, October 27, 2007.
6. "Staunch Hu ally tipped as next Beijing mayor," South China Morning Post, November 19, 2007.
7. "Suzhou proving to be a cradle for governors; High growth puts city's leaders in demand elsewhere," South China Morning Post November 24, 2004.
8. "Suzhou's economic boom loses its lustre," South China Morning Post, March 1, 2005.

Technocrats emerged as a political force at the core of the Chinese Communist Party in the 1980s, during the post-Mao reform era under Deng Xiaoping.

While the definition of a technocrat varies widely, in the Chinese political context, the term is commonly used to describe members of the political elite who have university-level technical education in engineering or the sciences.

Under Mao Zedong, the Communist Party was largely led by soldiers, peasants and the worker class, but that changed abruptly in 1982 when Deng ordered the "Four Transformations" of cadres, reforming them into a corps that was "revolutionized, better educated, professionally competent and younger in age," according to China observer Jungwon Yoon.

The 12th Party Congress in 1982 marked a leadership watershed when a number of technocrats were recruited to the Party's Central Committee.

By the 1990s, the Party's top leadership positions were held by these engineers, including Jiang Zemin (electrical engineer), Li Peng (civil engineer), Zhu Rongji (electrical engineer), as well as leaders Hu Jintao (hydraulic engineer), Wen Jiabao (geological engineer), and Wu Bangguo (electrical engineer). Their dominance reached an all-time peak in 2002, when engineers occupied all nine seats in the Politburo Standing Committee.

Xi Jinping is considered a technocrat, having studied chemical engineering at Tsinghua University. He will share power with a non-technocrat, however. Li Keqiang studied law at Peking University.

Observers predict that moving forward the Chinese leadership will continue to diversify in terms of academic background, with a growing number of rising leaders trained in economics, social sciences and the law.

References

1. Cheng Li, "China Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?," Asia Policy, Number 6, July 2008.
2. Jungwon Yoon, "The Technocratic Trend and Its Implication in China," Georgia Institute of Technology, presented at the Science & Technology in Society: An International Multidisciplinary Graduate Student Conference, Washington, DC, March 31-April 1, 2007.

There are 10 military leaders celebrated for "meritorious service to the country during the Period of the Chinese People's Revolutionary War," according to the Ministry of National Defense official website.

These men, Zhu De, Peng Dehuai, Lin Biao, Liu Bocheng, He Long, Chen Yi, Luo Ronghuan, Xu Xiangqian, Nie Rongzhen, and Ye Jianying, were made marshals in 1955 in honor of their leadership of the armed forces during the Sino-Japanese War, the CPC-Kuomintang War and the Korean War.

Lin Biao's honored status as a member of the group was tarnished after he was accused of orchestrating an assassination attempt on Mao Zedong.

References

1. "Chronology of the People's Republic of China (1949-2009)," Xinhuanet.com, October 2, 2009.
2. "Lin Biao regains his place in army history," China Daily, July 17, 2007.
3. "Military Figures Marshals," mod.gov.cn, accessed January 22, 2013.
4. "Ye Jianying," People.com.cn, accessed August 24, 2012

The Central Advisory Commission (CAC) was a transitional organization offering "political assistance and consultation" to the Central Committee of the Party from 1982 to 1992.

It was established to abolish the life-long tenure of leading cadres and lower the average age of members of the Central Committee, while allowing some senior elder leaders to retain some influence and prestige.

Originally, the CAC comprised more than 170 aged leaders, including paramount leader Deng Xiaoping as its chairman, and vice-premiers Chen Yun and Bo Yibo. Contrary to Deng's original intention to help diminish the power of elders, the commission's authority and power rivaled that of the Politburo Standing Committee, a shadow cabinet known as the "sitting committee."

Commission members played a crucial role in reaching a consensus among the top leadership to mobilize the military to suppress pro-democracy protesters in Tiananmen Square, and to remove General Secretary Zhao Ziyang from power in 1989. In the aftermath of the violent crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protesters, Jiang Zemin was promoted to succeed Deng Xiaoping.

The powerful Central Advisory Commission was seen as a possible threat to Jiang's position, and at the 14th Party Congress in 1992, Deng successfully maneuvered for the abolishment of the commission to consolidate the incumbent leadership, removing the last official apparatus for old cadres to intervene in politics.

"For critics of China's authoritarian government structure, the experience of the CAC was another example of the weakness of political institutions and rules in a country where ‘rule by man' prevails over ‘rule by law'," wrote Lawrence Sullivan in the book "Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party".

References

1. "中共中央顾问委员会的十年旅程," ifeng.com, January 16, 2007.
2. Barry Naughton, Dali L. Yang, Holding China Together: Diversity and National Integration in the Post-Deng Era, (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 77.
3. Gordon White, The Chinese State in the Era of Economic Reform: The Road to Crisis (M.E. Sharp), 168.
4. Lawrence R. Sullivan, Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Communist Party (Scarecrow Press, 2011), 41.
5. Richard Baum, "The Road to Tiananmen: Chinese Politics in the 1980s", in The Politics of China: The Eras of Mao and Deng, ed. Roderick MacFarquahar , (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 343.
6. "SPEECH AT THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE CENTRAL ADVISORY COMMISSION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA," People's Daily, September 13, 1982.
7. Yu-shan Wu, Comparative Economic Transformations: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan (Stanford University Press, 1995), 234.

The "Eight Elders" were revolutionary leaders who enjoyed crucial decision-making powers and authority in China from the 1980s to the early-1990s, during Deng Xiaoping's tenure as paramount leader.

They were senior leaders of Communist Party of China who fought with Mao during the CPC-Kuomintang War.

Their influence waxed and waned in the first three decades of Party rule. Many were purged during the Cultural Revolution, but were rehabilitated after Mao Zedong's death in 1976.

As Deng consolidated power, these elders were his kitchen cabinet, backing the paramount leader as he launched sweeping economic reforms and moved China towards becoming a socialist market economy. The country appeared poised for political liberalization until the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy protests in Beijing.

The Eight Immortals

1. • Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997)
2. • Chen Yun (1905–1995)
3. • Peng Zhen (1902–1997)
4. • Yang Shangkun (1907–1998)
5. • Bo Yibo (1908–2007)
6. • Wang Zhen (1908–1993)
7. • Li Xiannian (1909–1992)
8. • Deng Yingchao (1904-1992)

Xi Zhongxun, Song Renqiong, and Wan Li became members of Deng's circle after some original members died.

References

1. "Chen Yun Death Removes Deng Rival from China Scene," Reuters, April 11, 1995.
2. "The 'Eight Immortals' Who Jockeyed for Control of a Nation," South China Morning Post, December 1, 2008.
3. Wang Xiaoqi, China's Civil Service Reform (Routledge, 2012), 4.

The Great Hall of the People, which dominates the western side of Tiananmen Square, is where the National People's Congress and Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference hold their annual meetings every March. It is 335 meters (1,100 feet) long and has 172,000 square meters (1,850,000 square feet) of floor space.

These meetings are held in the 10,000-seat grand auditorium, which is topped with a red star on its curved ceiling.

Construction was completed within 10 months to be ready for the 10th anniversary of the founding of the PRC in 1959. More than 30,000 people from 20 provinces worked to construct the building.

References

1. "Beijing," Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed August 24, 2012.
2. "Foreword," npc.gov.cn, accessed August 24, 2012.

The term is based on Mao Zedong's belief that "political power flows from the barrel of the gun" and describes the Party's absolute leadership over the military.

The phrase is derived from a speech by Mao at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth CPC Central Committee in November 1938, in which he said, "Our principle is that the Party commands the gun, and the gun must never be allowed to command the Party."

References

1. "党指挥枪，从胜利走向胜利的根本保障," People's Daily, June 25, 2011.
2. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995), 54.
3. Peter Martin, "Is the gun beginning to command the party?," The Guardian, January 13, 2011.

The "Three Represents" is a socio-political ideology advanced by former Party General Secretary Jiang Zemin in 2000. It became a long-term guiding theory of the Communist Party at its 16th Party Congress in 2002, when it was enshrined in the Constitution of the Communist Party.

The official statement of the ideology specified that the Party represents the development trends of advanced productive forces, the orientations of an advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the people of China.

In simpler terms, Jiang aimed to modernize Marxism and portray the Party as the vanguard of economic, cultural and technological forces.

Under the theory, the Party has expanded its representation by recruiting new members from all walks of life, including private entrepreneurs.

The "Three Represents" theory was first introduced during Jiang's inspection tour of Guangdong Province in February 2000. The theory was fully elaborated in 2001, in a speech by Jiang to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the Party.

After being formally added into the Party Constitution in 2002, it has been adopted as one of the guidelines for the Party, together with Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought and the Deng Xiaoping Theory.

References

1. "11月14日：‘三个代表'载入党章," Xinhuanet.com, November 14, 2006.
2. "CPC FAQs," china.org.cn, accessed on August 22, 2012.
3. Joseph Fewsmith, "Studying the Three Represents," China Leadership Monitor, No.8, accessed August 22, 2012.
4. "On the Three Represents," International Department Central Committee CPC, accessed on August 22, 2012.
5. "The ‘Three Representatives' Theory," Xinhuanet.com, June 25, 2001.
6. "'Three Represents' theory," CCTV, accessed August 22, 2012.
7. "What is ‘Three Represents' CPC Theory?," China.org.cn, accessed August 22, 2012.
8. Willy Wo-Lap Lam, "Party's survival linked to development campaign," South China Morning Post, June 22, 2000, Factiva.

Following the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, power shifted from the second to the third generation of leadership, as Deng Xiaoping promoted Shanghai Party chief Jiang Zemin to Party general secretary, replacing ousted Zhao Ziyang, who lived under house arrest for the rest of his life.

Deng himself retired from all his official positions, including that of the Chairman of the Central Military Committee. But he remained influential, anointing Hu Jintao as Jiang’s successor, though that transition would not take place until after Deng’s death.

The third generation, with Jiang Zemin at the core, includes Li Peng, Zhu Rongji, Li Lanqing and Li Ruihuan. These leaders were born before the Chinese Revolution and most of them were technocrats, educated in science and engineering.

Under Jiang’s 13-year leadership, this generation continued Deng’s economic reforms and the country maintained high economic growth, at an average rate of 8 percent per year.

These leaders oversaw the opening of stock markets in 1990, the launch of the Three Gorges Dam project in 1993, further reform of state-owned enterprises, the return of Hong Kong and Macao to China, and China’s accession to the WTO in 2001.

Jiang’s ‘Three Represents’ theory was the crucial ideology of this period, under which the Party expanded its representation by recruiting new members from other spheres in society, including private entrepreneurs.

References

1. "第十三届中央委员会第四次全体会议公报," 中国共产党新闻网, accessed February 19, 2013.
2. "江泽民对党的历史经验的科学总结与“三个代表”重要思想的形成," 中国共产党新闻网, June 3, 2011.
3. "《江泽民文选》：宝贵的精神财富 强大的思想武器," cpc.people.com.cn, accessed February 19, 2013.
4. Anthony G. Porter, “CHINA’S MODUS OPERANDI FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,” Marine Corps University, 14-15, June 2005.
5. Cheng Li, China’s Leaders: The New Generation, (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001), 9.
6. "China: a country with 5,000-year-long civilization", GOV.cn, accessed February 19, 2013.
7. “China: Description of Selected Government Practices and Policies Affecting Decision-Making in the Economy,” U.S. International Trade Commission, December, 2007, C-6.
8. Michael E. Marti, CHINA'S LEADERSHIP TRANSITION: IMPLICATIONS FOR AMERICA China Brief Volume: 1 Issue: 7, accessed February 19, 2013.
9. Ulric Killion, A Modern Chinese Journey to the West: Economic Globalization And Dualism, (Nova Science Pub Inc 2006), 90, accessed February 19, 2013.
10. Gucheng Li, A Glossary of Political Terms of The People's Republic of China, (Chinese University Press, 1995), 61, accessed September 28, 2012.

Weeks of student-led protests in Beijing's Tiananmen Square ended in bloodshed on June 4, 1989, after troops backed by tanks attacked demonstrators and citizens throughout the city. Estimates by human rights groups and witnesses put the number of people killed somewhere between several hundred to several thousand.

According to figures released by China's State Council, some 300 "mobsters" and 23 students were killed and about 5,000 military officers and 2,000 civilians were injured during the protests.

The protests were set against the backdrop of economic instability beginning in 1988, when rising inflation peaked around 30 percent across cities in China.

Public discontent, coupled with the death of purged reform-minded Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang on April 15, 1989, set the stage for the demonstrations.

After the military crackdown, which elicited global condemnation, the government called the movement a "counter revolutionary" plot, but has more recently referred to the events of June 4 as a "political disturbance".

References

1. "1989: Massacre in Tiananmen Square," BBC, June 4, 1989.
2. "FACTBOX-Five facts about the Tiananmen Square protests," Reuters, December 10, 2010, Factiva.

The Tsinghua Clique is a term used by journalists to refer to senior Party and government officials who graduated from Tsinghua University and are often considered economically reformist technocrats.

Tsinghua University, often called “China’s MIT”, is widely known as the cradle of engineers, entrepreneurs and statesmen. Tsinghua technocrats began to make inroads into the top levels of power amidst the reform and economic liberalization of the 1980s as the country placed extraordinary emphasis on construction, development and profitmaking.

Tsinghua graduates dominated the third and fourth generations of leadership (from the early 1990s to 2012), which was known as the “Tsinghua Phenomenon” (清华现象) among political observers.

In Jiang Zemin’s government, Zhu Rongji, Yao Yilin and Song Ping were alumni of Tsinghua, and in Hu Jintao’s government, besides Hu, Wu Bangguo and Liu Yandong are also from Tsinghua. The rise of the Tsinghua Clique peaked when Hu Jintao became Party chief in 2002, and three of his Tsinghua schoolmates were elected to the Politburo Standing Committee.

Though Hu’s successor, Xi Jinping, also graduated from Tsinghua, the power of the Tsinghua Clique has been declining in the past five years, as more officials who graduated from the similarly prestigious but humanities-focused Peking University have moved into senior roles.

In a socialist country that initially modeled its education system on the Soviet Union, science and engineering was given “excessive preference” in China, according to Liu Junning, a political analyst in Beijing, in the South China Morning Post.

Yet after the Cultural Revolution, liberal arts curriculums have been given more resources, according to Liu. The decline of the Tsinghua Clique, associated with the decline of technocrats’ power in today’s China, is a natural progression, Liu said.

References

1. "政坛辉煌的‘清华现象’," 中国经济周刊, April 25, 2011.
2. Cheng Li, "China’s Fifth Generation: Is Diversity a Source of Strength or Weakness?," Asia Policy, 6 (2008): 72-73.
3. Raymond Li, "Illustrious string of alumni have shaped nation," South China Morning Post, April 25, 2011.
4. Shreya Singh, "Factionalism in China: Between ‘Princellings and ‘Tuanpai’," Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, June 1, 2012.
5. "Tsinghua --- Cradle of Engineers, Entrepreneurs and Statesmen," china.org.cn, Apirl 25, 2012.

Tuanpai (团派), or the tuan faction, refers to Communist leaders with past experience working for the Communist Youth League of China (CYL).

The term is commonly used in reference to the Party faction led by President Hu Jintao, but its origin dates back much earlier. Former CYL leader Hu Yaobang promoted many tuanpai officials, including Hu Jintao, during his tenure as Party general secretary in the 1980s.

The Tuanpai's power has expanded and consolidated under Hu Jintao, who became the Party's general secretary in 2002. Under Hu, the number of tuanpai leaders in provincial top posts (which serve as stepping stones for higher leadership positions) has steadily increased, from five in 2002 to 13 in 2005, and rising to 21 in 2010.

Prominent tuanpai leaders include Li Keqiang, Li Yuanchao, Liu Yandong and Wang Yang. Other tuanpai leaders who have risen to power in recent years, but who are not considered beneficiaries of Hu's patronage, include Wang Lequan, Liu Yunshan and Wang Zhaoguo.

Wang Zhengxu, a research fellow at the East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, divides tuanpai officials into three tiers based on their closeness to Hu Jintao. The first tier includes those who worked with him at the CYL Central Committee during the 1980s, such as Li Keqiang and Li Yuanchao. The second tier includes people who worked as provincial secretaries of the CYL between 1982 and 1985 such as Qian Yunlu, Song Xiuyan, and Huang Huahua. The third tier includes officials who worked in the CYL after Hu left the organization in 1985.

References

1. Cheng Li, "China's Midterm Jockeying: Gearing Up for 2012 (Part 1: Provincial Chiefs)," China Leadership Monitor 31 (2010): 17.
2. Cheng Li, "Was the Shanghai Gang Shanghaied? The Fall of Chen Liangyu and the Survival of Jiang Zemin's Faction," China Leadership Monitor 20 (2007): 14.
3. Zhengxu Wang, "Hu Jintao's Power Consolidation: Groups, Institutions, and Power Balance in China's Elite Politics," Issues & Studies 42, No. 4 (December 2006): 14.

Lianghui, which literally means "two sessions", is a common Chinese abbreviation for the twin meetings of China's top legislature, the National People's Congress (NPC), and China's top advisory body, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which are held annually in Beijing in March.

The two sessions are major political events in China, usually lasting 10 to 15 days. During the meetings, key issues such as the national economy, political and social development, foreign policy, and the people's livelihood, are addressed, while thousands of delegates discuss and vote on these issues.

The two sessions can provide a preview of the direction of the country's political and economic movement. As the most important event in the Chinese political calendar, the meetings draw significant attention both at home and abroad.

References

1. "两会简介," China.com.cn, March 12, 2012.
2. Bian Ji, "China's National People's Congress System: A Brief Introduction," China-US Focus, March 6, 2011.
3. "China's National Assemblies Open," Dong-A Ilbo Daily, March 4, 2005.
4. "China Opens 'Two Sessions' in Beijing," Caijing, March 3, 2011.
5. "China's two sessions attract world media," People's Daily, March 3, 2012.
6. Jaime FlorCruz, "Springtime in Beijing? Time for ‘Lianghui'," CNN, February 25, 2011.
7. Sun Shangwu, "NPC Deputies Play More Important Role," China Daily, March 2, 2006.
8. Wang Shanshan, "Finding Inspiration Amid Tedium," China Daily, March 6, 2007.

The "Up to the Mountains and Down to the Countryside" movement first started in 1955, when Mao Zedong declared, "All the intellectuals who can go to the countryside to work should be happy to go there. The countryside is a vast place and great work can be done there." By the end of 1957, about 79, 000 youths were sent to the countryside.

The first half of the movement up to 1965 was generally considered successful and eased urban unemployment, according to the Party's flagship newspaper People's Daily. Beginning in 1966, however, the movement became intertwined with and aggravated by the Cultural Revolution, draining social resources and derailing the country's development.

During the Cultural Revolution, the government spent about 10 billion yuan to settle 17 million rusticated youths, a significant expense for the country at that time. After the movement, a lot of rusticated youths flooded back to the city without jobs and education, dissatisfied and disgruntled.

See also Rusticated Youth/ Sent-down Youth.

References

1. "Cultural Revolution," Encyclopaedia Britannica, accessed January 22, 2013.
2. Roderick MacFarquhar and John K. Fairbank ed., The Cambridge History of China, Volume 14: The People's Republic, Part 1: The emergence of revolutionary China (Cambridge University Press, 1987).
3. Hongbin Li, Mark Rosenzweig and Junsen Zhang, "Altruism, Favoritism, and Guilt in the Allocation of Family Resources: Sophie's Choice in Mao's Mass Send Down Movement," Journal of Political Economy, 118(1), February 2010.
4. 崔禄春, "论‘文化大革命'之前的知识青年上山下山运动," 党史论坛，No.3 (1999), CNKI.
5. "落潮—知青上山下乡的衰落终结阶段," 共和国知青网, accessed August 21, 2012.
6. "知识青年上山下乡运动的评价及其历史命运," 理论与现代化, January 21, 2009.

This Chinese saying refers to the common phenomenon in China that whenever the central leadership promulgates a policy, there is a countermeasure from the local leadership.

It is often used to describe local leadership's inertia, circumvention or resistance in terms of implementing central government's policies.

References

1. "上有政策、下有对策," Xinhuanet.com, April 29, 2009.
2. Lynetter Khoo, "Well-governed S-chips urged to speak up for themselves," Business Times Singapore, May 25, 2009.
3. Sunny Liu,"What goes up must come down," China Daily, April 13, 2007.
4. Tony Fang, "Chinese Business Culture," in Chinese Business Negotiating Style (SAGE, 1998), 177.

The "system" refers to the massive system of government organizations, military organizations, Party organizations, SOEs and organizations funded by the government.

Such organizations normally offer better income and benefits. Jobs "within the system" are also attractive to young people because they offer steady employment, especially in an era when the private sector is more subject to state capitalism's aggressive expansion in China.

In addition, these jobs sometimes offer the possibility of under-the-table and illegal income, reported China Economic Weekly, a weekly magazine affiliated with People's Daily, the official Party mouthpiece.

Being "in the system" allows access of supervision power of market activities, creating room for corruption through the combination of access to both government power and market resources, according to Fu Yong, doctor of economics from Fudan University.

Government officials with approval authority over construction or land exploration projects, for example, can use their influence to solicit bribes or shares in the project, wrote professor Cai Jiming, director of the Political Economy Center at Tsinghua University.

References

1. 傅勇, "腐败能增进效率吗？," People.com.cn, December 30, 2004, accessed January 11, 2013.
2. "官员"隐性利益"悄然"扩张"," Xinhuanet.com, December 13, 2010.
3. 晋海东, "冷眼透析：体制内、体制外," 商业评论网, March 1, 2011.
4. 潘晓凌 and 范承刚, "年轻人, 到‘体制内'去," 南方周末, March 1, 2011.
5. "收入分配差距仍在扩大," 瞭望新闻周刊, No.2, 2008.
6. "体制内外待遇有别 体制外员工是二等公民吗？," Xinhuanet.com, May 19, 2007.
7. "‘土地腐败'的制度分析," People.com.cn, October 11, 2011.
8. "我国体制内隐性福利内幕：最高可获北京闹事房产," Xinhuanet.com, August 14, 2012.
9. ""隐性福利"乃是一种"隐性腐败"," 济南日报, August, 16, 2012.

During the Cultural Revolution, university exams were abolished and universities recruited students directly from factories, farms and the army, giving this group the name worker-peasant-soldier students.

An initial pilot project by Beijing University and Tsinghua University was adopted by other universities, and a total of 41,870 worker-peasant-soldier students were admitted in 1970.

Workers, peasants, soldiers and young cadres were considered for entry if they 1) had been recommended by their superiors; 2) were around 20 years old; 3) had three years working experience; 4) had an education credential equivalent of junior high or above; and 5) were politically and ideologically reliable.

A phrase at the time summed up the poor state of university education: "University teachers, middle-school textbooks and primary school students." However, attempts to reinstate the university entrance exams in 1973 were scrapped and examinations did not return until 1977.

References

1. "1970年6月27日 工农兵学员上大学," people.com.cn, accessed August 21, 2012.
2. Gucheng Li, A glossary of political terms of the People's Republic of China (Chinese University Press, 1995).
3. Joel Andreas, Rise of the Red Engineers: the Cultural Revolution and the origins of China's New Class (Stanford University Press, 2009).

Zhongnanhai, which literally means "Central and South Seas", was once an imperial garden but is now the compound housing China's central leadership in downtown Beijing. Adjacent to the Forbidden City, it has served as the central headquarters of the Communist Party of China and Chinese government, as well as the home of top leaders, since 1949.

The huge rectangular complex is usually regarded as China's White House or Kremlin, representing the country's leadership at large.

Senior Party and government leaders, including Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao, carry out many of their day-to-day administrative duties inside Zhongnanhai, including meetings with foreign dignitaries.

Since the end of 2002, lectures by intellectual elites have been formalized by Hu Jintao at the Politburo at Zhongnanhai. Nearly every month, two scholars will be invited into the complex to lecture on a specific topic to all members of the Politburo, one of China's top leadership bodies.

By August 2012, there have been 142 experts and scholars invited to Zhongnanhai to give more than 70 lectures, which cover a wide range of topics decided by the Central Policy Research Office, including the economy, politics, law, culture, society, international affairs, military and Party construction. Law was the most hotly debated topic.

The lecturers come from a number of prestigious research institutions and top universities, including the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the Development Research Centre of the State Council, and Renmin University of China.

References

1. "政治局已进行74次集体学习 142位学者走进中南海讲课," XINHUANET.com, August 15, 2011.
2. "中南海的10年必修课," XINHUANET.com, August 1, 2011.
3. "Beijing pleasure park houses top Chinese leaders," Reuters, April 28, 2004, Factiva.
4. "China's top officials receive regular lectures on society issues," Xinhua News Agency, February 27, 2007, Factiva.
5. Nicholas D. Kristof,"Beijing Journal; Whatever the High Walls Hide, It Isn't Opulence," The New York Times, January 25, 1991.
6. "Premier Wen presides over meeting with experts and scholars at Zhongnanhai," People's Daily, February 13, 2012.
7. "The Leaders' lecturers," Global Times, February 21, 2012.
8. "Where 'Top Student' Has A New Meaning," The Washington Post, December 2, 2011.